CEDA, LLC v. Elvis Chorens / CENA Rehab Center
Claim Number: FA1910001867005
Complainant is CEDA, LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Jaime Rich Vining of Friedland Vining, P.A., Florida, USA. Respondent is Elvis Chorens / CENA Rehab Center (“Respondent”), Florida, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <888ceda.com>, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on October 16, 2019; the Forum received payment on October 16, 2019.
On October 17, 2019, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <888ceda.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On October 17, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of November 6, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@888ceda.com. Also on October 17, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On November 11, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant is a nationally regarded and highly regarded provider of medical services and medical litigation support to those injured in automobile accidents, slip and falls, and other accidents. Complainant has common law rights in the 1 800 388CEDA mark through its continuous and exclusive use of the mark for over a year. Respondent’s <888ceda.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s 1 800 388CEDA mark as it incorporates the mark, merely substituting the number “8” for the “3’ in Complainant’s mark and adding the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, nor has Complainant authorized or licensed him to use its mark. Additionally, Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead uses it to create a false impression of affiliation with Complainant in order to redirect users to a competing web site.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. He attempts to disrupt Complainant’s business and registered the Domain Name to prevent Complainant from registering the Domain Name. He also attempts to attract, for commercial gain, users to a competing web site. Finally, Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s 1 800 388CEDA mark prior to registering the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires Complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring the Domain Name:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
On March 20, 2019 Complainant applied for registration of its 1 800 388CEDA mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), claiming first use in July 2018 (Complaint Annex C). It is well-settled that an application for registration of a mark with the USPTO is, in and of itself, insufficient to establish rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Imagine Nation Books Ltd. v LEE, LAWRENCE, FA 1662128 (Forum Mar. 31, 2016) (“Complainant’s only assertion of rights in the mark stem from a trademark application and the statement that Complainant offers ‘services and goods under the name Collective Goods’… [and] pending trademark applications do not establish rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”). A trademark registration, however, is not necessary to demonstrate rights under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), as common law rights can be sufficient if the complainant can establish that the mark has acquired secondary meaning. Microsoft Corporation v. Story Remix / Inofficial, FA 1734934 (Forum July 10, 2017) (finding that “The Policy does not require a complainant to own a registered trademark prior to a respondent’s registration if it can demonstrate established common law rights in the mark.”).
Secondary meaning is proven by showing exclusive use of the mark in commerce for a period of time, evidence of advertising and sales, recognition of the mark by customers, unsolicited media attention, or other evidence showing that the relevant consuming public has come to associate the mark with goods or services provided by a single vendor. Klabzuba Oil & Gas, Inc. v. LAKHPAT SINGH BHANDARI, FA 1625750 (Forum July 17, 2015) (holding, “Complainant has provided evidence of secondary meaning by providing evidence of length of use in the mark; evidence of holding an identical domain name; media recognition; and promotional material/advertising (including letterhead and business cards.”), Gourmet Depot v. DI S.A., FA 1378760 (Forum June 21, 2011) (“Relevant evidence of secondary meaning includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0 at ¶ 1.3 lists a number of factors that support a claim of common law trademark rights, including “(i) the nature and duration of use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys.”
Complainant submitted a Declaration under penalty of perjury from its owner, Mark Cereceda (Complaint Annex B), who states that the mark is highly advertised and has resulted in millions of dollars in revenue annually. He states that Complainant displays the trademark on billboards, buses, bus benches and at its medical facilities, and uses the trademark in its advertising on television, social media and radio. An example of the billboard and bus advertising is included in the Complaint and Mr. Ceda’s Declaration. Complainant also provides a WHOIS report on its domain name <388ceda.com> showing its registration in July 2017 (Complaint Annex D) and a screenshot of its website at that domain (Complaint Annex E) that incorporates and displays the 1 800 388CEDA mark. Further, while the USPTO application is not sufficient on its own to establish rights in the mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), it does corroborate Mr. Ceda’s testimony. While Complainant offered no documentary evidence demonstrating recognition of the mark by consumers, the amount of sales claimed, or media attention, Mr. Ceda’s statement is given under penalty of perjury. It is not disputed by Respondent or challenged by any other evidence in the record. On balance, the Panel finds that Complainant has sufficient common law rights in the 1 800 388CEDA mark to satisfy the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Respondent’s <888ceda.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to the 1 800 388CEDA mark, as it fully incorporates the mark, merely deleting the “1 800,” substituting the numeral “8” for the “3” in the mark and adding the “.com” gTLD. These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Domain Admin / PrivacyProtect.org / Denis Ferulev, FA 1652313 (Forum Jan. 19, 2016) (“Complainant notes that the domain name contains the recognised acronym for its FAMILY GUY mark, along with the number ‘24’ … the Panel finds that the <fg24.biz> domain name is confusingly similar to the FAMILY GUY mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”), Myspace, Inc. v. Kang, FA 672160 (Forum June 19, 2006) (finding that the <myspce.com> domain name was confusingly similar to the complainant’s MYSPACE mark and the slight difference in spelling did not reduce the confusing similarity). The WIPO Overview 3.0 at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the 1 800 388CEDA mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
Rights or Legitimate Interests
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) the respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) the respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Complainant has not licensed or otherwise permitted Respondent to use its mark, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate or fair use because it redirects Internet traffic to a competing web site. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists the registrant of the Domain Name as “Elvis CHORENS / CENA Rehab Center.” None of these names bears any resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Guardair Corporation v. Pablo Palermo, FA1407001571060 (Forum Aug. 28, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <guardair.com> domain name according to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), as the WHOIS information lists “Pablo Palermo” as registrant of the disputed domain name), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant states that it has never licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark in any way. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Annex G is a screenshot of portions of the home page of the web site at <305800pain.com> to which the Domain Name redirects Internet traffic. It advertises legal and other services for persons injured in accidents, inviting visitors to call the phone number shown on the page at any time, from anywhere. These services compete directly with those offered by Complainant. Although the evidence is not conclusive, because the registrant organization shown on the WHOIS report for the Domain Name (Complaint Annex F) is listed as the “CENA Rehab Center,” it is most likely that this site is sponsored by Respondent himself. The web page does not name any person or entity as the sponsor of the site. Using a confusingly similar domain name to attract and divert Internet traffic to a site that competes with the complainant does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or as a legitimate or fair use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). General Motors LLC v. MIKE LEE, FA 1659965 (Forum Mar. 10, 2016) (finding that “use of a domain to sell products and/or services that compete directly with a complainant’s business does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”).
Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent ‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is clearly using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his web site. Also, by registering and using a confusingly similar domain name to redirect Internet traffic to Respondent’s own web site, where he offers the same types of services offered by Complainant, Respondent is disrupting the business of Complainant. This fits squarely within the circumstances articulated by Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) and (iv) and is clear evidence of bad faith registration and use. Walgreen Co. v. MUHAMMAD SALEEM / WALGREENSGENERAL TRADING LLC, FA 1790453 (Forum Jul. 1, 2018) (“Respondent’s registration and use of the confusingly similar <walgreensshop.com> domain name in furtherance of trading competitively on Complainant’s WALGREENS trademark demonstrates Respondent’s bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) and (iv).”), Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA1504001612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) (“The Panel agrees that Respondent’s use of the website to display products similar to Complainant’s, imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”), Dell Inc. v. Prashant Chhibber, FA 1785651 (Forum June 1, 2018) (“Respondent offers support services related to Complainant’s products that are in direct competition with the services Complainant offers. The Panel finds that Respondent registered and used the domain names in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).”).
Second, while Complainant did not assert the argument, by substituting the numeral “8” for the “3” in Complainant’s mark, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of similar appearance in an email address or typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. The fact that the two numerals involved, “8” and “3,” are similar in appearance strongly suggests that this substitution is intentional and calculated to attract Internet traffic seeking Complainant’s site. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and typosquatting has, in and of itself, been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use. Adorama, Inc. v. Moniker Privacy Services, FA1503001610020 (Forum May 1, 2015) (“Respondent has also engaged in typosquatting, which is additional evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii)”), Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant’s mark with small typographical errors introduced therein).
Finally, it is evident from the fact that both Complainant and Respondent operate in the same geographical area,[i] are in the same field of endeavor, and from Respondent’s copying Complainant’s mark with a subtle change in numerals into his Domain Name that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name in September 2018 (Complaint Annex F WHOIS report shows the registration date). Given the nonexclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in its mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <888ceda.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
November 13, 2019
[i] The information furnished to the FORUM by the registrar lists Respondent’s address as Miami, Florida, which is also the situs of Complainant’s principal office.
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