Coachella Music Festival, LLC v. Scheril Murray Powell
Claim Number: FA1912001876024
Complainant is Coachella Music Festival, LLC (“Complainant”), represented by David J. Steele of Tucker Ellis, LLP, California, USA. Respondent is Scheril Murray Powell (“Respondent”), represented by Joshua D Martin of Johnson & Martin, P.A., Florida, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES
The domain names at issue are <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com>, registered with Godaddy.Com, Llc.
Calvin A. Hamilton as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on December 19, 2019; the Forum received payment on December 19, 2019.
On December 20, 2019; 12/24/2019, Godaddy.Com, Llc confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com> domain names are registered with Godaddy.Com, Llc and that Respondent is the current registrant of the names. Godaddy.Com, Llc has verified that Respondent is bound by the Godaddy.Com, Llc registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On December 27, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of January 28, 2020 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@reggaechella.com, postmaster@rapchella.com, postmaster@gospelchella.com, postmaster@ganjachella.com, postmaster@caribchella.com, postmaster@yardiechella.com, postmaster@. Also, on December 27, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on January 28, 2020.
Complainant filed an additional submission on February 3, 2020 which complies with Supplemental Rule 7.
Respondent filed an additional submission on February 10, 2020 which complies with Supplemental Rule 7.
On February 3, 2020, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Calvin A. Hamilton as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.
Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant, Coachella Music Festival, LLC., is the owner and operator of an annual music festival. Complainant has rights in its COACHELLA mark and CHELLA mark through its registrations with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 3,196,119, registered Jan. 9, 2007 and Reg. No. 5,075,233, registered on Nov. 1, 2016). See Compl. Ex. I. Respondent’s <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com> domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark as Respondent merely combines the CHELLA mark with the descriptive terms related to Complainant’s goods and services or to music festivals, including “reggae,” “rap,” “gospel,” “yardie” and “carib,” and “ganja.” along with the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondents has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names as Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names, nor has Respondent been licensed, authorized, or otherwise permitted by Complainant to use Complainant’s marks. Furthermore, Respondent’s use is not a bona fide offering of goods or services, nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, as Respondent is merely hosting pay-per-click hyperlinks.
Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain names in bad faith, as Respondent is attempting to attract Internet users for commercial gain by hosting pay-per-click hyperlinks. Furthermore, Respondent attempted to sell the disputed domain names in excess of out-of-pocket costs. Finally, Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s marks when it registered the disputed domain names.
B. Respondent
Respondent is an agricultural and cannabis attorney who is licensed to practice law in the State of Florida and plans to cultivate various strains of cannabis in Chella, Spain. Respondent’s <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com> domain names are not confusingly similar to Complainant’s marks, as the word “Chella” denotes the geographic area of Respondent’s business plans and the USPTO recognizes other marks owned by third parties that include the word “Chella”. Alternatively, Complainant’s CHELLA mark is generic.
Respondent has rights and legitimate interest in the disputed domain names, as the domain names are all strains of cannabis that Respondent is cultivating in Chella, Spain. These names were chosen to reflect Respondent’s Jamaican heritage and the region in Spain out of which Respondent intends to be based. Respondent has demonstrated preparations to use the disputed domain names for a bona fide use.
Respondent has not registered and used the disputed domain names in bad faith. Respondent merely invited Complainant to make an offer on the disputed domain names, but did not register the disputed domain names with the intention of selling them. Respondent did not register the disputed domain names with the intention of stopping Complainant to do so. Respondent and Complainant are not competitors. Finally, Respondent has good faith reasons for registering and using the disputed domain names and is not associated with Complainant, which shows Respondent is not attempting to attract Internet users who are seeking Complainant’s goods and services.
The Panel notes that the <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com> domain names were all registered on October 19, 2019. See Compl. Ex. A.
C. Additional Submissions
Complainant
In her Response, Respondent makes several misstatements of law and fact which both warrant and require correction so as not to mislead the Panel. First, Respondent incorrectly asserts that Complainant’s CHELLA mark is generic and that the subject domain names are not confusingly similar under the Policy. Second, Respondent raises a fair use defense because her use of the domain names is geographically descriptive. However, this defense fails on both the facts of the case and the law. Third, Respondent asserts that she has a legitimate interest in the domain names, but she has presented no actual evidence of preparations to use the subject domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services, and the proposed future use she alleges evidences that no legitimate interest exists under the Policy. Lastly, Respondent’s proposed future use merely trades on the goodwill of Complainant’s marks and would cause a likelihood of confusion, a false association and dilution of Complainant’s marks.
Respondent
Complainant’s contentions disregard the common course of conduct and practice in the cannabis industry in seeking the legalization of cannabis and the fact that, until recently, cannabis was illegal in most parts of the world, and legalization is a recent, growing trend. The contentions also ignore the abundance of evidence submitted by Respondent that Respondent is a licensed cannabis attorney who is an expert in cannabis legislation and legalization. She has spoken at numerous conferences and conventions on cannabis, worked on cannabis legalization in Jamaica, the UK, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and has two trips to Spain scheduled for this year to lobby on cannabis legislation and legalization.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant claims rights in the COACHELLA and CHELLA marks through its registrations with the USPTO (e.g., Reg. No. 3,196,119, registered Jan. 9, 2007 and Reg. No. 5,075,233, registered on Nov. 1, 2016). See Compl. Ex. I. Registration with the USPTO is sufficient to demonstrate rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrate its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).
The Panel finds that the Complainant has rights in the COACHELLA and CHELLA marks under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant argues Respondent’s <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com> domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. Specifically, Respondent merely adds descriptive terms and the “.com” gTLD to Complainant’s mark in each of the disputed domain names.
Previous panels have determined that adding generic and/or descriptive terms and a gTLD to an otherwise fully incorporated mark may not sufficiently distinguish a disputed domain name from a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. George Whitehead, FA 1784412 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“[S]light differences between domain names and registered marks, such as the addition of words that describe the goods or services in connection with the mark and gTLDs, do not distinguish the domain name from the mark incorporated therein per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).
In the present dispute, Respondent combines the CHELLA mark with the descriptive terms related to Complainant’s goods and services or to music festivals, including “reggae,” “rap,” “gospel,” “yardie” and “carib,” and “ganja”, along with the “.com” gTLD.
Respondent asserts that its <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com> domain names are not confusingly similar to Complainant’s marks, as the word “Chella” denotes the geographic area of Respondent’s business plans. Respondent asserts that “Chella” is a city in Spain where Respondent wishes to do business and sought to reflect the geographical location in the disputed domain names.
While Respondent contends that the <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com> domain names are comprised of a common and generic term and as such cannot be found to be confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark, the Panel finds that such a determination is not necessary under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), as this portion of the Policy considers only whether Complainant has rights in the marks and whether the disputed domain names are identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. See Precious Puppies of Florida, Inc. v. kc, FA 1028247 (Forum Aug. 10, 2007) (examining Respondent’s generic terms arguments only under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) and Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) and not under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)); see also Vitello v. Castello, FA 159460 (Forum July 1, 2003) (finding that the respondent’s disputed domain name was identical to complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), but later determining the issue of whether the disputed domain name was comprised of generic terms under Policy ¶¶ 4(a)(ii) and 4(a)(iii)).
In light of the present facts, the Panel finds Respondent’s disputed domain names to be confusingly similar to Complainant’s CHELLA mark.
Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).
Complainant argues that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names as Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names, nor has Respondent been licensed or authorized by Complainant to use Complainant’s marks.
Relevant WHOIS information can be used as evidence to show a respondent is or is not commonly known by the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. Fred Wallace, FA1506001626022 (Forum July 27, 2015) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <chevron-europe.com> domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), as the WHOIS information named “Fred Wallace” as registrant of the disputed domain name). Additionally, lack of authorization to use a complainant’s mark may indicate that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interest in a disputed domain name. See Emerson Electric Co. v. golden humble / golden globals, FA 1787128 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“lack of evidence in the record to indicate a respondent is authorized to use [the] complainant’s mark may support a finding that [the] respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii)”).
The Panel notes that the WHOIS of record identifies the Respondent as “Scheril Murray Powell” and no information in the record indicates that Respondent was authorized to use Complainant’s marks or was commonly known by the disputed domain names. See Compl. Ex. A.
Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Next, Complainant argues that Respondent fails to use the disputed domain names in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Rather, Respondent’s disputed domain names are used to host pay-per-click hyperlinks.
Hosting hyperlinks that are either competing or unrelated to a complainant’s business may not be a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii). See Danbyg Ejendomme A/S v. lb Hansen / guerciotti, FA1504001613867 (Forum June 2, 2015) (finding that the respondent had failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name where the disputed domain name resolved to a website that offered both competing hyperlinks and hyperlinks unrelated to the complainant’s business).
Complainant provided screenshots of the disputed domain names resolving webpages, each showing a parked webpage that displays links to goods and services related and unrelated to Complainant’s business and music festival services. See Compl. Ex. N.
The Panel holds that Complainant has established a prima facie case in support of its arguments that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) and the burden shifts to Respondent.
Respondent argues that she has rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names as evidenced by demonstrable preparations to use the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. In order to establish rights and legitimate interest in a disputed domain name, a respondent must provide evidence of these preparations. See AutoNation Holding Corp. v. Alawneh, D2002-0058 (WIPO May 1, 2002) (finding that, prior to having received notice of the dispute, the respondent had made demonstrable preparations to use the disputed domain name by submitted “substantial, overwhelming and undisputed evidence” of those preparations); see also Sony Pictures Television Inc. v Thomas, Jeff, FA 1625643 (Forum Aug. 6, 2015) (holding that “Respondent has provided evidence of his plans to use the disputed domain name and, despite Complainant’s arguments to the contrary, Respondent can take his time so long as there is no indication of bad faith.”).
Respondent says she intends to cultivate cannabis in Chella, Spain and the disputed domain names are a reflection of the names for the strains of cannabis, in addition to a manifestation of the geographical location of the production of the cannabis. While respondent has demonstrated credentials of expertise in the field of cannabis cultivation (See Resp. Annex. 1-4.), Respondent has not provided proof (despite the fact it is Respondent’s burden) that shows that before any notice of this dispute, Respondent had made demonstrable preparations to use the subject domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. See ¶ 4(c)(ii) of the Policy. Instead, Respondent has made self-serving statements to the effect that she intends to grow strains of marijuana in Chella, Spain. See Declaration of Scheril Murray Powell (“Powell Decl.”), ¶ 14; see also Response, at pg. 8. Respondent has failed to introduce any evidence that demonstrates specific preparations for a legitimate interest in the domain names that predate notice of this dispute. For example, self-authenticating documents such as a business license to conduct such a business in Chella, Spain (with a date that predates this dispute), a trademark application (with a filing date that predates this dispute), or a lease or purchase agreement for land in Chella, Spain, where this alleged marijuana project would be undertaken (with a date that predates this dispute), or a joint venture agreement, with partners in Spain, to pursue these objectives.
Significantly, as suggested by the Complainant, commercial cultivation of marijuana is illegal in Spain. Accordingly, Respondent’s stated intent is impossible or, at best, illegal. Respondent has not provided any evidence on an approach to this public policy obstacle.
Respondent has failed to carry her burden and the Panel finds that Respondent has no legitimate interest under the Policy. The Panel also finds Respondent fails to use the disputed domain names in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii).
Registration and Use in Bad Faith
Complainant argues Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain names in bad faith. Specifically, Respondent attempted to sell the disputed domain names for an amount in excess of out of pocket costs. Registering a disputed domain name merely to offer for an amount that exceeds the registration costs may be evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). See loanDepot.com, LLC v. Expired domain caught by auction winner.***Maybe for sale on Dynadot Marketplace*** c/o Dynadot, FA 1786281 (Forum June 8, 2018) (“Complainant shows that Respondent offers the disputed domain name for sale for $950, no doubt above its out-of-pocket costs.”).
Complainant provided screenshots of an email conversation between Complainant’s counsel and Respondent, in which Respondent declines to accept an amount to cover its out-of-pocket costs and therefore seeks more than the cost incurred to register the disputed domain name. See Amend. Compl. Ex. O.
Respondent argues that it has not registered and used the disputed domain names in bad faith. Specifically, Respondent merely invited Complainant to make an offer on the disputed domain names in an effort to resolve the dispute. A complainant who initiates contact with a respondent and indicates a willingness to enter into a transaction for a disputed domain name may negate a finding of bad faith registrations and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). See Puky GmbH v. Agnello, D2001-1345 (WIPO Jan. 3, 2002) (finding insufficient evidence to hold that the domain name was registered and used in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(i) where the complainant initiated contact with the respondent and the respondent responded with an offer to sell its domain name registration for $50,000). Additionally, an offer to sell a disputed domain name made during a settlement discussion may not be held against a respondent under Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). See Collegetown Relocation, L.L.C. v. Concept Software & Techs. Inc., FA 96555 (Forum Mar. 14, 2001) (finding that offers to sell a domain name made during settlement discussions are inadmissible).
Respondent avows that she did not make a specific offer, but invited the Complainant to make an offer for the disputed domain names in an effort to resolve the dispute. See Amend. Compl. Ex. O. Respondent declares that the Policy does not require a Respondent to hand over a disputed domain name to a third party merely because that party demanded it.
After a review of the record, the Panel agrees with Complainant, that Respondent’s omission of the intended use in her correspondence with Complainant, and the fact that her sole focus was on selling the domain name, undercuts any argument that Respondent had made demonstrable preparations to use the subject domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. The Complainant states that “A person who has a “team [] currently preparing to cultivate hemp in Chella, Spain” would not simply offer to sell off the domain names associated with her business venture (again, her response was ‘make an offer for the domain name if you like [sic] to purchase it.’).” The Panel agrees.
Next, Complainant argues that Respondent is attempting to attract Internet users for commercial gain by hosting pay-per-click hyperlinks which constitutes bad faith registration and use. Registration and use of a disputed domain name to host competing hyperlinks may be evidence of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Staples, Inc. and Staples the Office Superstores, LLC v. HANNA EL HIN / DTAPLES.COM, FA1404001557007 (Forum June 6, 2014) (“Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the <dtaples.com> domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because the Respondent is using the disputed domain name to host third-party links to Complainant’s competitors from which Respondent is presumed to obtain some commercial benefit.”).
Complainant provided screenshots of the disputed domain names resolving webpages, each showing a parked webpage that displays links to goods and services related Complainant’s music festival services that may compete with Complainant. See Compl. Ex. N. In addition, Respondent is presumed to be receiving click-through-fees from the links leading to Complainant’s competitors. Id.
Respondent states that she does not compete with Complainant and that the disputed domain names reflect Respondent’s purpose. A finding of disruption may be inappropriate when a respondent is not intending to be competitive with a complainant. See PRIMEDIA Special Interest Publ’ns. Inc. v. Treadway, D2000-0752 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (holding that the respondent did not register or use the <shutterbug.com> domain name to disrupt the complainant’s business because the respondent’s contemplated use at the time of acquisition was not necessarily competitive with the complainant’s SHUTTERBUG magazine). Additionally, the registration of a disputed domain name that reflects a respondent’s intended use may be found to have been registered and used in good faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Successful Money Mgmt. Seminars, Inc. v. Direct Mail Express, FA 96457 (Forum Mar. 7, 2001) (finding the domain name <seminarsuccess.com> to be generic and that the respondent registered and used the domain name in good faith “because Respondent selected the name in good faith for its web site, and was offering services under the domain name prior to the initiation of the dispute”).
Further, Respondent argues that she is a part of the cannabis industry, not the music festival industry, and the disputed domain name reflect the Respondent’s Jamaican heritage, a city in Spain, and ultimately the goods Respondent will be offering.
Additionally, Respondent attests that Complainant has not shown enough evidence that Respondent intended to affiliate itself with Complainant to divert Internet users. A finding of bad faith registration and use for attracting Internet users for commercial gain may be overcome if a complainant does not provide adequate evidence. See Chestnutt v. Tumminelli, D2000-1758 (WIPO Feb. 2, 2001) (finding that the respondent did not register and use the <racegirl.com> domain name in bad faith because the complainant provided no evidence that the respondent intended to disrupt or divert business from the complainant).
After a review of the record, the Panel is of the opinion that Respondent’s alleged intended use is plainly not geographically descriptive, rather is simply use as a trademark. Accordingly, Respondent’s fair use defense must fail as a matter of law. Nor does the Panel agree that Respondent’s contemplated use of the domain names was clearly visible to internet visitors. Further, Respondent was not offering services related to cannabis under the domain name prior to the initiation of the dispute.
Finally, Complainant argues that Respondent registered the disputed domain names with actual knowledge of Complainant’s marks and rights therein. Actual knowledge may be proven through a totality of circumstances surrounding the registration of the disputed domain name. See Google Inc. v. Ahmed Humood, FA 1591796 (Forum Jan. 7, 2015) (“This Panel makes that inference; Respondent has actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark at the time of domain name registration based on the fame of Complainant’s GOOGLE mark and Respondent’s use of one of the disputed domain names to detail Internet domain name registration and maintenance services related to an in competition with Complainant.”).
Complainant asserts that Respondent’s explicit use of the famous CHELLA mark in the subject domain names, and using the disputed domain names to host competing hyperlinks, demonstrate that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the marks prior to the registration of the disputed domain names.
Respondent contends that the <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com> domain names are comprised entirely of a common term that have many meanings apart from use in Complainant’s CHELLA mark. Moreover, Respondent contends that the registration and use of domain names comprising such a common term is not necessarily done in bad faith.
The Panel notes that a respondent is free to register a domain name consisting of common terms. However, the Panel agrees with Complainant that geographical terms (including the names of cities) can and commonly do serve as marks. The Panel appreciates the several such examples provided by the Complainant. The Complainant has built up good will and consumer recognition in a descriptive geographical term in order to have a legally protectable interest, and take the term out of the public domain.
Moreover, Complainant’s CHELLA mark is the subject of numerous trademark and service mark registrations of national effect, both in the United States, and around the world. In this regard, the Panel is struck by the assertion made by the Respondent that the outcome of this case “may be different [] if [she] had registered domain names containing “Coachella.”
Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Panel agrees that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the COACHELLA and CHELLA marks when it registered the disputed domain names, thereby supporting a finding of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <reggaechella.com>, <rapchella.com>, <gospelchella.com>, <ganjachella.com>, <caribchella.com>, and <yardiechella.com> domain names be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Calvin A. Hamilton, Panelist
Dated: February 17, 2020
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