Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. v. Aleksey A Bogachev
Claim Number: FA2107001955364
Complainant is Abbott Diabetes Care Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Molly Buck Richard of Richard Law Group, Inc., Texas, USA. Respondent is Aleksey A Bogachev (“Respondent”), Russian Federation.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <freestylelibre.me>, registered with Regional Network Information Center, JSC dba RU-CENTER.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on July 15, 2021; the Forum received payment on July 15, 2021. The Complainant was received in both English and Russian.
On July 16, 2021, Regional Network Information Center, JSC dba RU-CENTER confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <freestylelibre.me> (the Domain Name) domain name is registered with Regional Network Information Center, JSC dba RU-CENTER and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Regional Network Information Center, JSC dba RU-CENTER has verified that Respondent is bound by the Regional Network Information Center, JSC dba RU-CENTER registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On July 20, 2021, the Forum served the Russian language Complaint and all Annexes, including a Russian language Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of August 9, 2021 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@freestylelibre.me. Also on July 20, 2021, the Russian language Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On August 16, 2021, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE: LANGUAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The registration agreement for the Domain Name is written in Russian. Rule 11(a) provides that the language of the proceedings is the language of the registration agreement, subject to the authority of the Panel to determine otherwise, having regard to the circumstances of the case. Complainant filed its Complaint in both English and Russian and requests that this proceeding be conducted in English. Factors which previous panels have seen as important include evidence showing that the respondent can understand the language of the complaint, the language of the domain name, the content on any web pages resolving from the domain name, prior correspondence between the parties, and potential unfairness or unwarranted delay in ordering the translation of the pleadings and the Decision. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.5.1, The Argento Wine Company Limited v. Argento Beijing Trading Company, D2009-0610 (WIPO July 1, 2009) (panel exercising discretion in deciding that the language of the proceedings advance in English, contrary to the Registration Agreement, based on evidence that respondent has command of the language), Finter Bank Zurich v. Shumin Peng, D2006-0432 (WIPO June 12, 2006) (deciding that the proceeding should be in English, stating, “It is important that the language finally decided by the Panel for the proceeding is not prejudicial to either one of the parties in his or her ability to articulate the arguments for the case.”).
As stated above, Complainant filed its Complaint in both English and Russian, and the Written Notice of the Complaint was also written in both Russian and English. Both were served upon Respondent in accordance with Rules 1 and 2. The web pages to which the Domain Name resolves is written exclusively in Russian, and there is no evidence of any kind that Respondent is proficient in the English language. Neither Complainant nor the Panel is proficient in Russian, however, and proceeding in that language would involve substantial additional expense and time for translation. More importantly, copies of the Complaint and the written Notice of Complaint, written in English and Russian, were duly served upon the Respondent and Respondent has not submitted a Response or any other indication that he desires to participate in this proceeding, in the Russian language or otherwise. Under these circumstances the Panel finds that the additional time and expense of proceeding in Russian would be unwarranted inasmuch as the only party who might benefit from that has declined to participate. For this reason, the Panel determines that this proceeding will be conducted in English.
A. Complainant
Complainant develops and manufactures diabetes management products, including a glucose monitoring system which it markets under the FREESTYLE LIBRE mark. It has rights in the FREESTYLE LIBRE mark based on its registration of that mark with various governmental trademark authorities, including the Russian Federal Service for Intellectual Property and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Respondent’s <freestylelibre.me> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark since it incorporates that mark in its entirety, merely adding the “.me” country code top-level domain (“ccTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. He is not commonly known by the Domain Name and is not an authorized vendor, supplier or distributor of Complainant’s goods and services. Respondent does not use the Domain Name for a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, the Domain Name resolves to a web site that prominently displays the FREESTYLE LIBRE mark with a logo very similar to that used by Complainant and appears to offer products of Complainant and other vendors as well.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. He had actual knowledge of Complainant and its FREESTYLE LIBRE mark when he registered the Domain Name. Also, he is attempting for commercial gain to attract Internet users to his web site by causing confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of that site with Complainant, and is disrupting Complainant’s business.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The FREESTYLE LIBRE mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 5,531,286) on July 31, 2018 and with the Russian Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Reg. No. 526789) on November 14, 2014 (Complainant Exhibit D). Complainant’s registration of its FREESTYLE LIBRE mark with these agencies establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Google LLC v. Bhawana Chandel / Admission Virus, FA 1799694 (Forum Sept. 4, 2018) (“Complainant has rights in the GMAIL mark based upon its registration of the mark with numerous trademark agencies around the world.”).
Respondent’s <freestylelibre.me> Domain Name is confusingly similar or identical to Complainant’s FREESTYLE LIBRE mark as it incorporates that mark verbatim, merely adding the “.me” ccTLD. This change does not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). CloudFlare, Inc. v. [Registrant], FA 1624251 (Forum Aug. 1, 2015) (holding, “The inclusion of a ccTLD does not alleviate the similarity between a mark and a disputed domain name as per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the change described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the FREESTYLE LIBRE mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following four nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent or commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Respondent is not an authorized vendor, supplier or distributor of Complainant’s good and services, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the web site resolving from it displays Complainant’s name and logo and appears to sell Complainant’s products and products of other vendors. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists the registrant of the Domain Name as “Aleksey Bogachev.” This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where the respondent has not filed a Response, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name.
Complainant states that Respondent is not an authorized “vendor, supplier or distributor” of its goods and services. Implicit in this allegation is the fact that Complainant has never licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark in any way. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Exhibit E consists of screenshots of pages from the web site resolving from the Domain Name, and an auto translated version, in English. The site (i) prominently displays Complainant’s name and a butterfly image very similar to Complainant’s logo, (ii) features very similar if not identical coloring and font style as Complainant’s web site (Complaint Exhibit C), and (iii) purports to sell Complainant’s products, as well as those of another vendor. Taken as a whole, the site is obviously designed to convey the impression that it is sponsored or at a minimum authorized by Complainant. It is plainly passing off as Complainant’s site. Passing off as a complainant and offering to sell Complainant’s goods does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or as a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Netflix, Inc. v. Irpan Panjul / 3corp.inc, FA 1741976 (Forum Aug. 22, 2017) (“The usage of Complainant’s NETFLIX mark which has a significant reputation in relation to audio visual services for unauthorised audio visual material is not fair as the site does not make it clear that there is no commercial connection with Complainant and this amounts to passing off . . . As such the Panelist finds that Respondent does not have rights or a legitimate interest in the Domain Name.”),
Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent have registered or the respondent has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent’s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is clearly using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his web site. The evidence does not establish whether Respondent is actually selling Complainant’s products (or a counterfeit) or fraudulently representing that it does, collecting money from the customer and then not delivering the products. Under either scenario, Respondent’s conduct fits squarely within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA1504001612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) (“The Panel agrees that Respondent’s use of the website to display products similar to Complainant’s, imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”).
Complainant alleges that Respondent’s conduct also falls within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). That paragraph reads as follows: “you [the respondent] have registered the domain name primarily for the purposes of disrupting the business of a competitor” (emphasis supplied). Respondent is clearly competing with Complainant and by using the Domain Name to attract Internet traffic to his web site, Respondent is also disrupting the business of Complainant. The extent of the disruption is compounded by Respondent’s passing off as Complainant. While Respondent and Complainant may presently be competitors, however, there is another aspect of the concept of competition that must be considered. In order for a respondent’s conduct to fall within ¶ 4(b)(iii), the competition must exist before the domain name is registered. Otherwise, the language of ¶ 4(b)(iii), paraphrased as “you registered the domain name primarily to disrupt the business of a competitor,” would not apply. The competition must exist before the registration. In this case the Domain Name was registered in May 2017 (Complaint Exhibit A), but Complainant was in business and using the FREESTYLE LIBRE mark at least as early as November 2014 (Complaint Exhibit D—Russian Certificate for Reg No. 526789). Complainant and the Respondent were not competitors when the Domain Name was registered. Any actual competition between them arose only after Respondent registered and began using the Domain Name as he now is. Even then, it is questionable whether disrupting the Complainant’s business was Respondent’s primary purpose in registering the Domain Name. On the contrary, the evidence strongly suggests that Respondent’s primary motive was not so much to harass or burden an existing commercial adversary as it was to trade upon Complainant’s goodwill and reputation by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of his site, which is properly addressed under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Respondent’s conduct does not fall within the circumstances stated in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).
That said, using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a competing web site wrongfully and unfairly disrupts the business of a complainant and is still bad faith. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and using a confusingly similar domain name wrongfully to disrupt the business of a complainant is sufficient to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Respondent’s primary intent in registering and using the Domain Name is less important than the effect of his conduct. Respondent knew or should have known the disruptive impact his conduct would have upon Complainant’s business. Respondent went forward with his plans in spite of that and this demonstrates bad faith independently of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Red Wing Shoe Company, Inc. v. wei zhang / Magdalena Jennifer / Mu Yan / Carolina Rodrigues / Fundacion Comercio Electronico, FA1911001873163 (Forum Jan. 3, 2020), Psyonix LLC v. Vasya Pupkin, FA2004001894087 (Forum June 3, 2020).
Finally, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when he registered the Domain Name. Complainant’s FREESTYLE LIBRE mark has been used by it in commerce since 2014 (Complaint Exhibit D). Respondent copied that mark exactly into the Domain Name, uses it in his web site with the same coloring and style of font as those used by Complainant, and purportedly offers the same types of goods as Complainant. In light of the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <freestylelibre.me> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
August 19, 2021
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