South Concrete Constructors LLC v. Rant Mitchell
Claim Number: FA2110001968611
Complainant is South Concrete Constructors LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Benjamin W. Janke, Louisiana, USA. Respondent is Rant Mitchell (“Respondent”), Kentucky, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <southconcreteconstructor.com>, registered with NameCheap, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles a. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on October 12, 2021; the Forum received payment on October 12, 2021.
On October 12, 2021, NameCheap, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <southconcreteconstructor.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with NameCheap, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameCheap, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameCheap, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On October 13, 2021, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of November 2, 2021 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@southconcreteconstructor.com. Also on October 13, 2021, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On November 8, 2021, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant is a Georgia-based concrete contractor. It has common law rights in the SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTORS mark through its continuous use of that mark in connection with its business operations since 2019. Respondent’s <southconcreteconstructor.com> Domain Name is virtually identical and confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because it incorporates the SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTORS mark in its entirety, merely omitting the letter “s” at the end of the mark and adding the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. It is not commonly known by the Domain Name, it is not associated or affiliated with Complainant in any way and Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTORS mark, and Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, Respondent is using the Domain Name for an email account which passes off as Complainant and fraudulently attempts to divert payments from Complainant’s customers to Respondent.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith by using it for an email account from which it attempts to divert to Respondent payments due from Complainant’s customers. Further, Respondent registered the Domain Name with actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTORS mark.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
Complainant has not registered its SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTORS mark with any governmental trademark authority. Nevertheless, a complainant need not show registration of its mark to establish rights in a mark in order to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). If proven, common law rights are sufficient to establish rights for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Oculus VR, LLC v. Ivan Smirnov, FA 1625898 (Forum July 27, 2015) (“A complainant does not need to hold registered trademark rights in order to have rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) and it is well established that a Complainant may rely on common law or unregistered trademarks that it can make out”.), Artistic Pursuit LLC v. calcuttawebdevelopers.com, FA 894477 (Forum Mar. 8, 2007) (finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) does not require a trademark registration if a complainant can establish common law rights in its mark).
Common law rights in a trademark can be established by evidence of secondary meaning, which is proven by showing exclusive use of the mark in commerce for a period of time, evidence of advertising and sales, recognition of the mark by customers, unsolicited media attention, or other evidence showing that the relevant consuming public has come to associate the mark with goods or services provided by a single vendor. Karen Koehler v. Hiroshi Ishiura/ Lifestyle Design Inc., FA 1730673 (Forum June 1, 2017) (holding that Complainant established common law rights in her personal name since “[a] mark can generate a secondary meaning sufficient to establish Complainant’s rights when consistent and continuous use of the mark has created distinctive and significant good will . . . . Complainant has published under the KAREN KOEHLER name extensively, and Complainant’s legal skills have been recognized by various organizations and groups with extensive positive media coverage. Complainant also operates an online blog associated with the KAREN KOEHLER mark.”), Gourmet Depot v. DI S.A., FA 1378760 (Forum June 21, 2011) (“Relevant evidence of secondary meaning includes length and amount of sales under the mark, the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0” ¶ 1.3 lists a number of factors that support a claim of common law trademark rights, including “(i) the nature and duration of use of the mark, (ii) the amount of sales under the mark, (iii) the nature and extent of advertising using the mark, (iv) the degree of actual public (e.g., consumer, industry, media) recognition, and (v) consumer surveys.”
Complaint Exhibit 2 is a screenshot of Complainant’s web site at <southconcreteconstructors.com>, which it alleges it has been using since 2019. It amply demonstrates Complainant’s use of SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTORS as its trademark and describes the many concrete construction services it furnishes under that mark. Complaint Exhibit 3 is a printout from Complainant’s Facebook page. It provides much the same evidence as Complainant’s web site and states that 410 people follow this page. It shows that the page was created on November 5, 2020. Complaint Exhibit 4 consists of printouts of articles appearing in various trade association publications which describe Complainant and corroborate its allegation that the SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTIORS mark has come to be associated exclusively with Complainant. On this evidence, the Panel finds that Complainant has common law rights in the SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTORS mark sufficient to meet the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Respondent’s <southconcreteconstructor.com> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTOR mark. It incorporates that mark almost verbatim, merely omitting spaces and the “s” at the end of the mark and adding the “.com” gTLD. These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Dell. Inc. v. Protection of Private Person / Privacy Protection, FA 1681432 (Forum Aug. 1, 2016) (“A TLD (whether a gTLD, sTLD or ccTLD) is disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax requires TLDs. Likewise, the absence of spaces must be disregarded under a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis because domain name syntax prohibits them.”), ShipCarsNow, Inc. v. Wet Web Design LLC, FA 1601260 (Forum Feb. 26, 2015) (establishing a confusing similarity between the <shipcarnow.com> domain name and the SHIPCARSNOW mark because the domain name simply removes the letter “s”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRCTORS mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Respondent is not associated or affiliated with Complainant and Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use its mark, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because it is using the name for an email account from which it passes off as Complainant and attempts to defraud its customers. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists “Rant Mitchell” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant states that Respondent has no connection or affiliation with it and that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Exhibit 5 contains copies of a number of emails between a person writing from the address agriffith@southconcreteconstructor.com, identifying “agriffith” as the president of Complainant, and a customer of Complainant, in which this individual requests the customer to wire funds owed to Complainant under a referenced pay application. The customer resists the request to wire funds and offers alternate means of delivering its check. The “agriffith” continues to insist on payment by wire or ACH, stating it has suspended payment by check. The emails from this individual contain a logo used by Complainant and printing identifying Arthur Griffith as president of Complainant. Complainant states that the name of its president actually is Arthur Griffith. Exhibit 5 also contains a string of emails purportedly between a “Blake McRae,” identified as a project manager for Complainant, at the address bmcrae@southconcreteconstructor.com and another customer. These emails are essentially the same in nature, with “bmcrae” insisting on payment by wire rather than by check, and the customer resisting. These emails also contain Complainant’s logo and the printed name and title of “Blake McRae.” Respondent is thus using the Domain Name for an email address which he uses in an attempt to defraud Complainant and its customers of money due from the customers to Complainant. Using a domain name to gain commercially through a fraudulent email scam is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Emerson Electric Co. v. golden humble / golden globals, FA 1787128 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“Passing off as a complainant through e-mails is evidence that a respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii).”), Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. Thomas Webber / Chev Ronoil Recreational Sport Limited, FA 1661076 (Forum Mar. 15, 2016) (finding that the respondent had failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services or any legitimate noncommercial or fair use, stating, “Respondent is using an email address to pass themselves off as an affiliate of Complainant. Complainant presents evidence showing that the email address that Respondent has created is used to solicit information and money on false pretenses. The disputed domain name is being used to cause the recipients of these emails to mistakenly believe Respondent has a connection with Complainant and is one of the Complainant’s affiliates.”), Emerson Electric Co. v. Adilcon Rocha, FA 1735949 (Forum July 11, 2017) (finding that respondent’s attempt to pass off as complainant through emails does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services and, as such, respondent lacked rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use. As discussed above, Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in connection with an email scheme designed to impersonate Complainant and fraudulently divert to Respondent invoice remittances due to Complainant. This conduct may not fall precisely within any of the circumstances described Policy ¶ 4(b), but that paragraph acknowledges that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and using a confusingly similar domain name to perpetrate fraud is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. v. Hyatt, FA1811001818756 (Forum Dec. 28, 2018) (“using a domain name to pose as a complainant to promote a fraudulent scheme has often been held to constitute bad faith”) (citations omitted); Yahoo! Inc. v. Kalra, FA1512001650447 (Forum Dec. 31, 2015) (“Respondent's registration of domain names obviously intended to create confusion with Complainant, together with its use of those domain names in connection with a fraudulent scheme involving passing itself off as Complainant and attempting to defraud Complainant's customers, is indicative of bad faith under paragraphs 4(b)(iii) and 4(b)(iv)”), MidFirst Bank v. Smith, FA0907001274302 (Forum Aug. 31, 2009) (use of the disputed domain name to pass oneself off as the Complainant constitutes bad faith registration and use of the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)).
Second, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name in September 2021 (the WHOIS report submitted as Complaint Exhibit 1 shows creation date). At that time Complainant had been using its SOUTH CONCRETE CONSTRUCTORS mark since 2019. Respondent copied the mark almost verbatim into the Domain Name and attempts to pass off as various officers of Complainant, even to the extent of using Complainant’s distinctive logo and font in Respondent’s emails (Complaint Exhibit 5). Again, the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in its mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <southconcreteconstructor.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
November 10, 2021
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