Rocket Mortgage, LLC v. Carolina Rodrigues / Fundacion Comercio Electronico
Claim Number: FA2203001988538
Complainant is Rocket Mortgage, LLC (“Complainant”), represented by David K. Caplan, California, USA. Respondent is Carolina Rodrigues / Fundacion Comercio Electronico (“Respondent”), Panama.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <quivkenloan.com>, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Petter Rindforth as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on March 16, 2022; the Forum received payment on March 16, 2022.
On March 17, 2022, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <quivkenloan.com> domain name is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On March 21, 2022, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of April 11, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@quivkenloan.com. Also on March 21, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On April 18, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Petter Rindforth as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
The Complainant is a well-known provider of lending services, and is considered to be the largest mortgage and FHA lender in the United States. Complainant has rights in the QUICKEN LOANS trademark through its license with Inuit to use Intuit’s registration of the trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g. Reg. No. 2,528,282 registered January 8, 2002).
Respondent’s <quivkenloan.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark because it incorporates the QUICKEN LOANS trademark by replacing the letter “c” with the letter “v” and omitting the letter “s” and adds the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”)
Respondent has no legitimate interests in the <quivkenloan.com> domain name. Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name and there is no relationship between Complainant and Respondent giving rise to any license, permission, or other right by which Respondent could use any domain name incorporating the QUICKEN LOANS trademark. Additionally, Respondent does not use the disputed domain name for any bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, the disputed domain name links to portals with sponsored ads for financial goods or services, to derive pay-per-click revenue.
Respondent registered and uses the <quivkenloan.com> domain name in bad faith. Respondent registered the disputed domain name in order to participate in typosquatting. Finally, Respondent registered the disputed domain name with actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the QUICKEN LOANS trademark.
B. Respondent
Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
The Complainant is the exclusive licensee of the QUICKEN LOANS trademark, registered and owned by Intuit Inc, with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”):
No. 2,528,282 QUICKEN LOANS (word), registered on January 8, 2002 for services in Intl Class 36.
The disputed domain name <quivkenloan.com> was registered on June 18, 2021.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).
Complainant asserts rights in the QUICKEN LOANS trademark based on Intuit’s registration of the trademark with the USPTO (e.g. Reg. No. 2, 528, 282 registered January 8 2002) and its license agreement with Intuit to use the trademark. Complainant claims to be the exclusive licensee of this trademark, which is a valid showing of rights in the trademark. See Stevenson v. Crossley, FA 1028240 (Forum Aug. 22, 2007) (“Per the annexed U.S.P.T.O. certificates of registration, assignments and license agreement executed on May 30, 1997, Complainants have shown that they have rights in the MOLD-IN GRAPHIC/MOLD-IN GRAPHICS trademarks, whether as trademark holder, or as a licensee. The Panel concludes that Complainants have established rights to the MOLD-IN GRAPHIC SYSTEMS mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).
Here, the Panel notes that the certificate of registration provided by the Complainant, has no notes on any registered licensee. However, some of the Annex documents (such as Annex E, F and G1) show advertisement and web sites marketing the trademark QUICKEN LOANS together with the Complainant’s name. Further, the Panel notes that when the registered owner of the trademark QUICKEN LOANS filed the Combined Declaration of Use and/or Excusable Nonuse/Application for Renewal of Registration of a Mark under Sections 8 & 9, on October 20, 2011, the only evidence of use provided by Intuit Inc, was “prinouts from the the licensee's website showing the mark in connection with the services”. The printouts were all related to the Complainant.
The Panel therefore find that Complainant has rights in the trademark under Policy 4(a)(i).
The Complainant argues that Respondent’s <quivkenloan.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s QUICKEN LOANS trademark as it incorporates the trademark while adding and omitting certain letters and adding the “.com” gTLD. The addition and omission of certain letters, resulting in a minor misspelling, normally fails to distinguish a disputed domain name from a trademark. See WordPress Foundation v. Bernat Lubos, FA 1613444 (Forum May 21, 2015) (finding that the <worspress.org> domain name is confusingly similar to the WORDPRESS trademark under Policy ¶4(a)(i), stating, “On a standard QWERTY keyboard, the letters ‘s’ and ‘d’ are adjacent. A minor misspelling is not normally sufficient to distinguish a disputed domain name from a complainant’s mark.”) Here, as noted, the disputed domain name incorporates the QUICKEN LOANS trademark by adding the adjacent letter “v” in place of the letter “c” and omitting the letter “s.” Therefore, the Panel find that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark per Policy ¶4(a)(i).
Once the Complainant makes a prima facie case in support of its allegations in respect of the second element of the Policy, the burden shifts to the Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). See AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Forum Sept. 25, 2006) (“Complainant must first make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light. If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.”); see also Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Forum Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the complainant must first make a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under UDRP ¶ 4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name).
The Complainant contends that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name since Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name and Complainant has not authorized the Respondent any license, permission, or other right to use the QUICKEN LOAN trademark. When no response is submitted, relevant WHOIS information may demonstrate that a Respondent is not commonly known by a disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same). The WHOIS information for the disputed domain name lists the registrant as “Carolina Rodrigues/ Fundacion Comercio Electronico,” and there is no other evidence to suggest that Respondent was authorized to use the QUICKEN LOANS trademark. Therefore, the Panel find that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name per Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant argues that Respondent fails to use the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use as the disputed domain name links users to sponsored ads for financial goods and services like those associated with Complainant, including advertising for Complainant’s competitors. Where the Respondent uses a domain to redirect users to competing services, the Panel may find the respondent fails to make a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii). See Provide Commerce, Inc. v. e on Craze, FA1506001626318 (Forum Aug. 11, 2015) (holding that the respondent was not making a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and 4(c)(iii) where the respondent was using the disputed domain name to host generic links to third-party websites, some of which directly competed with the complainant’s business). Here, Complainant provides evidence of the disputed domain name resolving to a page displaying pay-per-click third party links. See Compl. Ex. J, K. Therefore, the Panel may find that Respondent fails to use the disputed domain name for a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii).
Complainant argues that, because the domain includes only the mark while adding/deleting letters to make a typographical error, Respondent has engaged in typosquatting and thus demonstrated its lack of rights or legitimate interests in Complainant’s trademark. See Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA1503001610050 (Forum Apr. 23, 2015) (“Users might mistakenly reach Respondent’s resolving website by misspelling Complainant’s mark. Taking advantage of Internet users’ typographical errors, known as typosquatting, demonstrates a respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”). Here, the <quivkenloan.com> domain name replaces the letter “c” with the letter “v,” adjacent on a QWERTY keyboard, and omits the letter “s” from the QUICKEN LOANS trademark. The Panel therefore clearly find that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, per Policy ¶4 (a)(ii).
The Complainant argues that Respondent has registered and used <quivkenloan.com> in bad faith because the disputed domain name incorporates the QUICKEN LOANS trademark in an attempt to attract consumers for commercial gain. Use of a disputed domain name that includes a well-known trademark to derive commercial gain from click through revenue websites can demonstrate bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Capital One Financial Corp. v. DN Manager / Whois-Privacy.Net Ltd, FA1504001615034 (Forum June 4, 2015) (holding that the respondent’s use of the <capitaloneonebank.com> domain name to display links to the complainant’s competitors, such as Bank of America, Visa, Chase and American Express constituted bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)). Additionally, use of a well-known trademark by an unaffiliated respondent can also demonstrate bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Carey Int’l, Inc. v. Kogan, FA 486191 (Forum July 29, 2005) (“[T]he Panel finds that Respondent is capitalizing on the confusing similarity of its domain names to benefit from the valuable goodwill that Complainant has established in its marks. Consequently, it is found that Respondent registered and used the domain names in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”) Complainant has provided evidence to establish that it is well-known, and evidence that the disputed domain name resolves to a website featuring click-through links to third party websites. Thus, the Panel find that Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).
Complainant argues that Respondent had knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the QUICKEN LOANS trademark at the time of registering the <quivkenloan.com> domain name. The notoriety of a complainant’s trademark prior to the registration of the disputed domain name can demonstrate actual notice and bad faith registration and use. See Radio & Records, Inc. v. Nat’l Voiceover, FA 665235 (Forum May 9, 2006) (“The Panel also finds that there are reasonable grounds to infer that Respondent had actual notice of Complainant’s rights in the mark as well. Complainant’s Radio & Records Magazine is a leading business journal covering an industry towards which Respondent’s services are marketed. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent registered the <radioandrecordsmagazine.com> domain name despite having constructive and actual notice of Complainant’s rights in the RADIO & RECORDS mark. Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name with knowledge of Complainant’s rights is further evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”) Here, the disputed domain name resolves to a page that links to financial goods and services similar to those provided by Complainant. As said, the Complainant has provided evidence to establish its notoriety, and the disputed domain name was not registered until years after the QUICKEN LOANS mark was registered and became well-known. See Compl. Ex. A, D, G. Thus, the Panel find that Respondent’s knowledge of Complainant’s rights are evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant argues that, because the domain name includes only the trademark while adding/deleting letters to make a typographical error, Respondent has engaged in typosquatting and thus demonstrated bad faith registration and use. Typosquatting may in and of itself be considered evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Twitter, Inc. v. Domain Admin, FA1503001607451 (Forum Apr. 2, 2015) (“Typosquatting is a practice whereby a domain name registrant, such as Respondent, deliberately introduces typographical errors or misspellings into a trademark and then uses the string in a domain name. The conniving registrant wishes and hopes that Internet users will inadvertently type the malformed trademark when searching for the mark’s associated products or services. In doing so the wayward Internet users are directed to a web presence controlled by the domain name’s registrant where their accidental visits may be exploited.”). As previously mentioned, <quivkenloan.com> is an example of typosquatting. Thus, the Panel find Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name to be in bad faith, pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <quivkenloan.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Petter Rindforth, Panelist
Dated: April 22, 2022
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