Brasfield & Gorrie, L.L.C. v. Mariana Borges
Claim Number: FA2205001996002
Complainant is Brasfield & Gorrie, L.L.C. (“Complainant”), represented by Johnny L. Banks of BALCH & BINGHAM, LLP, Alabama, USA. Respondent is Mariana Borges (“Respondent”), Missorui, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <brasfieldsgorrie.us.com>, registered with PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant participated in the mandatory CentralNic Mediation, and the mediation process was terminated.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on May 11, 2022; the Forum received payment on May 11, 2022.
On May 13, 2022, PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <brasfieldsgorrie.us.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com has verified that Respondent is bound by the PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with the CentralNic Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On May 23, 2022, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of June 13, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@brasfieldsgorrie.us.com. Also on May 23, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On June 21, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the “Panel”) finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules to the Policy (“Rules”). Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, the Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant operates in the construction industry. It has rights in the BRASFIELD & GORRIE mark through its registrations of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s <brasfieldsgorrie.us.com> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark as it fully incorporates the mark, merely adding an “s” after the BRASFIELD element and the “.us” country code top-level domain (ccTLD).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. It is not commonly known by the Domain Name, nor is Respondent using it in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial use because there is no active website resolving from it and Respondent is using it to send deceptive phishing emails to Complainant’s clients.
Respondent uses the Domain Name in bad faith. There is no active website associated with the Domain Name and Respondent uses it to send deceptive emails to Complainant’s clients.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.
The Policy also requires that Complainant have participated in a CentralNic Mediation, and that said mediation must have been terminated prior to the consideration of the Complaint. Complainant has participated in such a mediation and the same has been terminated (email from CentralNic submitted as Annex C to Amended Complaint).
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
Given the similarity between the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) and the CentralNic Dispute Resolution Policy, the Panel will draw upon UDRP precedent as applicable in rendering its decision, except where differences in the policies require a different analysis.
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The BRASFIELD & GORRIE mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 2,653,412) on November 26, 2002 (TS&DR report included in Complaint Annex F). Complainant’s registration of its mark with the USPTO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Recreational Equipment, Inc. v. Liu Chan Yuan, FA 2107001954773 (Forum Aug. 9, 2021) (“Registration of a mark with the USPTO is sufficient to demonstrate rights in the mark per Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)”).
Respondent’s <brasfieldsgorrie.us.com> Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the BRASFIELD & GORRIE mark. It fully incorporates the mark, merely omitting spaces and the ampersand between the two words, adding the letter “s” at the end of the BRASFIELD element and adding the “.us” ccTLD and the “.com” gTLD. These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Morgan Stanley v. Domain Admin / Whois Privacy Corp., FA 1783121 (Forum June 1, 2018) (“Respondent’s <morganstanle.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark as it wholly incorporates the mark, but for the omission of the letter ‘y’ and spacing within the mark, and appends the ‘.com’ gTLD.”), Dansko, LLC v. zhang wu, FA 1757745 (Forum Dec. 12, 2017) (finding the <danskoshoes.us.com> domain name to be confusingly similar to the DANSKO mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), despite the addition of the “.us” ccTLD and the “.com” gTLD). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the BRASFIELD & GORRIE mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) it is not commonly known by the Domain Name, and (ii) it is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offer of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the Domain Name does not resolve to an active website, and Respondent is using it for deceptive emails. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists “Mariana Borges” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no Response has been filed UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name.
Complaint Annex B is a screenshot of the website resolving from the Domain Name. The only content appearing is a message saying there was no connection to the server host. This is not an active use of the Domain Name. As such it is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Morgan Stanley v. Francis Mccarthy / Baltec Marine Llc, FA 1785347 (Forum June 8, 2018) (“both Domain Names resolve to a web site that shows the words, ‘Not Found, The requested URL / was not found on this server.’ Inactive holding of a domain name does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”)
Complaint Annexes C and D are copies of emails in one of which (Annex D) a person posing as “Gary Vargas” writing from the email address gary.vargas@brasfieldsgorrie.us.com inquires, purportedly on behalf of Complainant, about the recipient’s warehousing services, requesting numerous items of information about the recipient’s facilities and operations and expressing an interest in using them. In Annex C the recipient of the Annex D email alerts Complainant about the contact from Gary Vargas. The information items sought In Annex D are of a general business nature relating in broad terms to warehousing and do not solicit sensitive private information such as account numbers, passwords, and the like, so these communications cannot be considered as phishing, which is a fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by disguising oneself as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. Nevertheless, Respondent is posing and passing off as Complainant. Using a domain name to pass off as a complainant is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iv). Emerson Electric Co. v. golden humble / golden globals, FA 1787128 (Forum June 11, 2018) (“Passing off as a complainant through e-mails is evidence that a respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) & (iii).”), Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. Thomas Webber / Chev Ronoil Recreational Sport Limited, FA 1661076 (Forum Mar. 15, 2016) (finding that the respondent had failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services or any legitimate noncommercial or fair use, stating, “Respondent is using an email address to pass themselves off as an affiliate of Complainant. Complainant presents evidence showing that the email address that Respondent has created is used to solicit information and money on false pretenses. The disputed domain name is being used to cause the recipients of these emails to mistakenly believe Respondent has a connection with Complainant and is one of the Complainant’s affiliates.”), Emerson Electric Co. v. Adilcon Rocha, FA 1735949 (Forum July 11, 2017) (finding that respondent’s attempt to pass off as complainant through emails does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services and, as such, respondent lacked rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name).
Next, although not argued by Complainant, by registering the Domain Name with a subtle misspelling of Complainant’s mark, adding an “s” at the end of the BRASFIELD element of Complainant’s mark, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting, which is the intentional misspelling of a protected trademark to take advantage of typing errors made by Internet users seeking the web sites of the owners of the mark. Registering a typosquatted domain name has been held to evidence a lack of rights and legitimate interests in the domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA1503001610050 (Forum Apr. 23, 2015) (“Users might mistakenly reach Respondent’s resolving website by misspelling Complainant’s mark. Taking advantage of Internet users’ typographical errors, known as typosquatting, demonstrates a respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of five circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
(v) the respondent has provided false contact details to the registrar.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use. As discussed above, the Domain Name resolves to an inactive web site. Passive holding of a domain name is evidence of bad faith. This may not fit within any of the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), failure to make active use of a confusingly similar domain name is evidence of bad faith. Caravan Club v. Mrgsale, FA 95314 (Forum Aug. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent made no use of the domain name or website that connects with the domain name, and that [failure to make an active use] of a domain name permits an inference of registration and use in bad faith).
Next, as discussed above, by registering the Domain Name with a subtle misspelling of Complainant’s mark, Respondent is guilty of typosquatting. Again, this does not fit precisely within any of the circumstances listed in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that list is non-exclusive, allowing for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and registering a typosquatted domain name has been held to be bad faith for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding the respondent engaged in typosquatting—and thus registered and used the at-issue domain names in bad faith—where the names consisted of the complainant’s mark with small typographical errors introduced therein).
Finally, as discussed above, Respondent is using the Domain Name for an email account which it uses to pass off as Complainant. The evidence does not disclose exactly how inquiries purportedly from Complainant, a construction company, sent to warehouse operators about their facilities and methods of operation might serve some fraudulent purpose but it is clear that Respondent is impersonating Complainant with these emails, and this, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. MidFirst Bank v. Smith, FA0907001274302 (Forum Aug. 31, 2009) (use of the disputed domain name to pass oneself off as the Complainant constitutes bad faith registration and use of the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <brasfieldsgorrie.us.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
June 24, 2022
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