CSXT Intellectual Properties Corporation v. Mary Leon / Hjad
Claim Number: FA2206001998691
Complainant is CSXT Intellectual Properties Corporation (“Complainant”), represented by Amanda L. DeFord of McGuireWoods LLP, Virginia, USA. Respondent is Mary Leon / Hjad (“Respondent”), California, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <one-csx.com>, registered with DNC Holdings, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on June 1, 2022; the Forum received payment on June 1, 2022.
On June 2, 2022, DNC Holdings, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <one-csx.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with DNC Holdings, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. DNC Holdings, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the DNC Holdings, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On June 3, 2022, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of June 23, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@one-csx.com. Also on June 3, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On July 5, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant provides freight transportation services. It has rights in the CSX mark based upon its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). The <one-csx.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because it incorporates the entire mark, merely adding the generic word “one,” a hyphen, and the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. It is not commonly known by the Domain Name and Complainant has not authorized it to use its CSX mark. Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the Domain Name previously resolved to a webpage which displayed pornographic material and currently resolves to an inactive webpage.
Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith. Respondent registered and used the Domain Name to attract Internet traffic to its website for commercial gain and the Domain Name now resolves to an inactive website. Finally, Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the CSX mark when it registered the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The CSX mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 2,543,728) on March 5, 2002 (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint Exhibit B). Complainant’s registration of its mark with the USPTO establishes its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Haas Automation, Inc. v. Jim Fraser, FA 1627211 (Forum Aug. 4, 2015) (finding that Complainant’s USPTO registrations for the HAAS mark sufficiently demonstrate its rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)).
Respondent’s <one-csx.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. It incorporates the CSX mark in its entirety, merely adding the generic word “one,” a hyphen, and the “.com” gTLD. These changes do not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (concluding that the affixation of a gTLD to a domain name is irrelevant to a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis), Skechers U.S.A., Inc. and Skechers U.S.A., Inc. II v. Svensson Viljae, FA 1784650 (Forum June 1, 2018) (finding confusing similarity where “[t]he disputed domain name <skechers-outlet.com> adds a hyphen and the generic term ‘outlet’ to Complainant's registered SKECHERS mark, and appends the ‘.com’ top-level domain.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the CSX mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) it is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Complainant has not authorized or licensed it to use the CSX mark, (iii) it is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offer of goods or services, or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because it currently resolves to a parked webpage with no substantive content and previously resolved to a website displaying pornography. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists “Mary Leon / Hjad” as the registrant of the Domain Name. These names bear no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no Response has been filed UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name.
Complainant states that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Exhibit E contains a screenshot of the web site currently resolving from the Domain Name. It is a parking page which states only that “This page isn’t working.” This is not an active use of the Domain Name. As such it is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as contemplated by Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Morgan Stanley v. Francis Mccarthy / Baltec Marine Llc, FA 1785347 (Forum June 8, 2018) (“both Domain Names resolve to a web site that shows the words, ‘Not Found, The requested URL / was not found on this server.’ ’ Inactive holding of a domain name does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), 3M Company v. Kabir S Rawat, FA 1725052 (Forum May 9, 2017) (holding that “a general offer for sale… provides additional evidence that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests” in a disputed domain name).
The Complaint alleges that when counsel for Complainant first visited the website resolving from the Domain Name they observed pornographic images and related links, with text written in Mandarin. They did not obtain any screenshots of those pages and the site subsequently changed its content to that shown in Complaint Exhibit E. These allegations are plausible and uncontroverted by any evidence before the Panel. In this case the Panel accepts them as true, notwithstanding the lack of any documentary evidence. Using a confusingly similar domain name to host a commercial pornography site does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate or fair use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Karen Koehler v. Hiroshi Ishiura/ Lifestyle Design Inc., FA1730673 (Forum June 1, 2017) (holding that “Respondent is not using the disputed domain name for any bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate non-commercial fair use because Respondent uses the domain name to host a pornographic website.”), Tumblr, Inc. v. Srivathsan GK, FA1409001582401 (Forum Oct. 30, 2014) (“Consequently, the Panel finds that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name for adult oriented images also does not provide a bona fide offering of goods or services, or make a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) and Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), Chicago Southland Convention & Visitors Bureau v. Daniel, FA 1679347 (Forum July 26, 2016) (“The Panel further finds that there has been no bona fide offering of goods or services or any legitimate noncommercial or fair use because Respondent uses the disputed domain to display adult-oriented material”), Nat’l Football League Prop., Inc. v. One Sex Entm’t Co., D2000-0118 (WIPO Apr. 17, 2000) (finding that the Respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names and where the Respondent linked these domain names to its pornographic website), MatchNet plc. v. MAC Trading, D2000-0205 (WIPO May 11, 2000) (finding that it is not a bona fide offering of goods or services to attract Internet users to third party sites offering sexually explicit and pornographic material where such use is calculated to mislead consumers and to tarnish the Complainant’s mark).
Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, by using the Domain Name to attract Internet traffic to a commercial pornography site, Respondent was clearly using it to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its web site. This fits squarely within the circumstances stated in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. AOL LLC v. iTech Ent, LLC, FA 726227 (Forum July 21, 2006) (finding that the respondent took advantage of the confusing similarity between the <theotheraol.com> and <theotheraol.net> domain names and the complainant’s AOL mark, which indicates bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)), White Oak Entertainment, LLC - DBA The Chateau at White Oak Vineyard v. Al Perkins, FA 1702045 (Forum Dec. 12, 2016) (finding the respondent’s use of the domain name to redirect users to a pornographic website constituted evidence of bad faith).
Next, as discussed above, the Domain Name presently resolves to an inactive web site. Passive holding of a domain name is evidence of bad faith. This may not fit within any of the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). Given the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), failure to make active use of a confusingly similar domain name is evidence of bad faith. Caravan Club v. Mrgsale, FA 95314 (Forum Aug. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent made no use of the domain name or website that connects with the domain name, and that [failure to make an active use] of a domain name permits an inference of registration and use in bad faith).
Finally, Complainant alleges that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name in April 2022 2021 (WHOIS report submitted as Complaint Exhibit A shows the creation date). Respondent’s website does not mimic or copy Complainant’s website, but Complainant has been using the CSX mark since at least as early as 1980 (USPTO registration certificate included in Complaint exhibit B shows that as the year of first use). It is well-known not only in the eastern U.S. where Complainant operates most frequently but in many other parts of the country as well. More importantly, it is whimsical and unique in nature and not the kind of mark a person would normally choose as a name for its business unless the purpose of the business was to trade off of Complainant’s reputation and goodwill. Respondent copied that mark exactly into the Domain Name. The Panel finds that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name. In light of the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in the incorporated mark has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons first set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <one-csx.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
July 7, 2022
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