Patrick Jaguar, LLC, d/b/a Patrick Land Rover
v. Chris Batozech
Claim Number: FA0805001190348
PARTIES
Complainant is Patrick Jaguar, LLC, d/b/a
Patrick Land Rover (“Complainant”), represented by Martin Stilwell, Illinois, USA.
Respondent is Chris Batozech (“Respondent”),
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <patricklandrover.com>,
registered with
PANEL
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and
impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving
as Panelist in this proceeding.
Debrett Gordon Lyons as Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum
electronically on May 13, 2008; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard
copy of the Complaint on May 15, 2008.
On May 15, 2008,
On May 20, 2008, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of
Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline
of June 9, 2008 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was
transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons
listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing
contacts, and to postmaster@patricklandrover.com by e-mail.
A timely Response was received on June 9, 2008 but was deemed deficient
pursuant to Supplemental Rule 5 because the Response was not submitted in hard
copy prior to the Response deadline.
Both parties made Additional Submissions. Complainant made a timely Additional
Submission on June 13, 2008 which complied with Supplemental Rule 7. Respondent made a timely Additional
Submission on June 18, 2008 which complied with Supplemental Rule 7.
On June 17, 2008, pursuant to Complainant’s
request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National
Arbitration Forum appointed Debrett G. Lyons as Panelist.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from
Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
The Complaint and the Response pay little regard to the Policy. They are more in the nature of narratives;
however those claims pertinent to the application of the Policy have been
distilled below.
A. Complainant
Complainant alleges to have purchased the Land Rover franchise in
Complainant asserts that Respondent has not used, and has not made any
demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to
the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or
services. Respondent is not making
legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name. Complainant argues that Respondent does not
appear to be commonly known by the domain name, nor has he any trademark or
service mark rights related to the domain name.
Complainant posits that Respondent registered the disputed domain name
in anticipation of Complainant’s purchase of the franchise. Complainant states
that:
When we went to register the domain name <patricklandrover.com>, we found out Respondent discreetly
registered it with
B. Respondent
Respondent’s account of why he registered the
domain name follows.
The respondent’s given name at birth is patrick, and he is of irish heritage. The respondent is adopted. The respondent does not have any supporting
documentation to show the name change. Respondent
is sending a photo of the respondent’s tattoo containing the name “Patrick.” The
respondent has also been a Land Rover enthusiast for his entire adult
life. The respondent has owned many Land
Rovers, and currently owns two. A photo
and an insurance card for one is enclosed. Respondent wanted to create a website
dedicated to the global Land Rover enthusiast, while identifying it with the
respondent through his Irish heritage. Respondent’s website will strictly be
used for networking with fellow Land Rover enthusiasts, blogging and
memorabilia trading.
Respondent submits that he has not acted in bad faith. He states that there is no evidence that it was common public knowledge
that Complainant was purchasing the local Land Rover franchise at the time
Respondent registered the disputed domain name.
Respondent denies any claim that it demanded money from Complainant for
the domain name. Respondent states that
he does not wish to sell the domain name.
C. Additional Submissions
Both parties made Additional Submissions
C-1 Complainant
Complainant challenges Respondent’s account of why he registered the domain
name and alleges that subsequent to filing the Complaint, it was discovered
that Respondent is the sales manager for Laurel Land Rover, of
C-2 Respondent
Respondent’s Additional Submissions include the following statements.
There was no public knowledge of this buyout taking place before the
respondent received the first failed (sic.)
complaint, although it is common knowledge that the respondent is the manager
of another Land Rover dealer in the Chicago land area and has been for many
years, (as well as an enthusiast) the respondent is surprised that the
complainant just recently discovered that commonly known public fact as the
respondent thought all along his employment was known by all the Chicago area
Land Rover dealers as he has had a healthy, positive and professional business
relationship with all the competing land rover dealers in the area for years ,
and would hope to include the new Land Rover store among them .
The respondents web site was in no way purchased in bad faith and will,
in no way, hinder the effectiveness of the complainants business, as the
website is not in business to retail new or pre owned Land Rovers it appears as
if the complainant is confusing a personal interest or hobby with the respondents
place of employment … the respondent genuinely wishes to use the domain name as
was described in the original response which will have no affiliation with any
Land Rover retailer … The domain name and website is in its infancy and is
currently under development. … The respondents website
will strictly be used for networking with fellow Land Rover enthusiasts,
blogging and memorabilia trading, etc.
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DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each
of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be
cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which
Complainant has rights;
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests
in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith.
Preliminary Issue: Deficient Response
Respondent
submitted a timely electronic Response, but failed to submit it in hard copy prior
to the Response deadline and so the Forum deemed the Response deficient
pursuant to Supplemental Rule 5. The
Panel has discretion whether or not to consider Respondent’s primary submission
because it was not made in compliance with the Rules. Given that the electronic Response represents
the substance of Respondent’s position, the Panel takes the view that it would
be unfairly prejudicial to rule the Response as a whole inadmissible. Accordingly, on this occasion the Panel has
given full consideration and weight to the Response.[i]
Identical
or Confusingly Similar: Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Complainant
alleges only that the disputed domain name is identical to Complainant’s d/b/a,
“Patrick Land Rover”. That allegation
does not address Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) according to
which Complainant must establish that
the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or
service mark in which the Complainant has rights.
Appended to
the Complaint is a copy of a State of
Also
appended to the Complaint is a photograph of Complainant’s business premises
which prominently shows the name “Patrick” on the face of the building and, on
another wall, the words “Land Rover.”
Neither of
those attachments does anything to establish trademark rights in either
“Patrick” or “Patrick Land Rover”. There
is no evidence that Complainant has registered the name “Patrick” or “Patrick
Land Rover” as a trademark. Nevertheless,
for the purpose of establishing rights in a trademark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), registration is not mandatory if Complainant can show trademark
rights acquired through use and reputation.[ii]
Complainant
has not claimed trademark rights acquired through use and reputation and it
would be open to this Panel to refuse to transfer the disputed domain name
simply because Complainant had failed at the first hurdle under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).[iii]
Together with the National Arbitration Forum, the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) provides an arbitration service under the
Policy. Some time ago, WIPO published an
overview of some commonly recurring questions under the Policy.[iv] The question and answer to 1.6 and 1.7 were:
1.6 Can a complainant
show rights in a personal name?
Consensus view:
While the UDRP does not specifically protect personal names, in situations
where an unregistered personal name is being used for trade or commerce, the
complainant can establish common law trademark rights in the name. Reference
can be made to the test required for the common law action of passing off.
Personal names that have been trademarked are protected under the UDRP.
Relevant decisions:
Roberts v. Boyd, D2000-0210 (WIPO May
29, 2000) (Transfer)
Winterson v. Hogarth, D2000-0235 (WIPO May 22, 2000) (among
others, Transfer)
Crichton v. In Stealth Mode, D2002-0874
(WIPO Nov. 25, 2002) (Transfer)
However: The name in
question should be actually used in trade or commerce to establish unregistered
trademark rights. Merely having a famous name (such as a businessman, or
religious leader) is not necessarily sufficient to show unregistered trademark
rights.
Relevant decisions:
Asper v. Communication X Inc., D2001-0540
(WIPO June 11, 2001) (among others, Denied)
Ghose v. ICDSoft.com and Sliwa, D2003-0248
(WIPO May 22, 2003) (Transfer).
1.7 What needs to be shown for the
complainant to successfully assert common-law or unregistered trademark rights?
Consensus view: The
complainant must show that the name has become a distinctive identifier
associated with the complainant or its goods and services. Relevant evidence of
such “secondary meaning” includes length and amount of sales under the mark,
the nature and extent of advertising, consumer surveys and media recognition.
The fact that the secondary meaning may only exist in a small geographic area
does not limit complainant’s rights in a common law trademark. Unregistered
rights can arise even when the complainant is based in a civil law
jurisdiction.
Relevant decisions:
Uitgeverij Crux v. Isler, D2000-0575 (WIPO
Oct. 30, 2000) (Transfer)
Skattedirektoratet v. Eivind Nag, D2000-1314
(WIPO Dec. 18, 2000) (Transfer)
Amsec Enters., L.C. v. McCall, D2001-0083
(WIPO April 3, 2001) (Denied)
Australian Trade Comm’n. v. Reader, D2002-0786
(WIPO Nov. 12, 2002) (Transfer)
Imperial College v. Dessimoz, D2004-0322
(WIPO June 30, 2004) (among others, Transfer)
Applying these
criteria, it is clear that Complainant is using the name “Patrick” in trade or
commerce. The name is part of
Complainant’s company name. It appears
prominently on its showroom premises and on its various websites. This Panel has no doubt that the name is
being used as a trademark and the only important issue is whether there is
sufficient indication of use and reputation to support common law trademark
rights.
It is said
that a complainant has common law rights if it could sustain an argument of
passing off. It was said in one passing
off case that:
The nature and degree of business activity will differ from case to
case. …A business has goodwill attached to it in a particular place if there is
an attraction among people there to do business with it. … In many cases
distance or the nature of the business will make it unlikely that anyone could
be so attracted[v]
Passing off
actions have, however, frequently succeeded based on regional reputation or
goodwill, especially in cases of localized service providers such as
restaurants, builders, hairdressers, and similar service providers. There is a respectable argument that main
line motor dealers fall into that category.
They provide not just new car sales, but typically sales of approved
used cars of the same make(s), provide servicing of those vehicles, provide
courtesy cars, deal with warranty claims, offer trade-in services, and today
frequently provide a range of ancillary services. Their customer base is
typically local.
In this
case, the evidence is that in February 2008, Complainant opened discussions to
acquire the Land Rover franchise in
The
corresponding websites referred to earlier all contain statements similar to
the following:
According to Crain's Chicago
Business, the Patrick Dealer Group is
The Panel has
no reason to question those claims.
Given the inherently local nature of the services provided by car
dealerships and the fact that Complainant holds the franchise to a number of
prestigious European car makes, the Panel finds that Complainant has common law
rights in its PATRICK trademark.[vi]
The
remaining issue under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) is whether the
domain name is confusingly similar to the trademark PATRICK. The domain name fully contains Complainant’s
PATRICK mark with the addition of the secondary trademark “Land Rover”, which
in the context of Complainant’s business, describes what is being sold by
Complainant. The Panel finds the domain
name to be confusingly similar to the trademark and so finds that Complainant
has established the first element under the Policy.[vii]
Rights
and Legitimate Interests:
Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
Complainant
has made a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate
interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). Accordingly,
the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate
interests in the disputed domain name.[viii]
Policy ¶ 4(c) states that
any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if
found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence
presented, shall demonstrate rights or legitimate interests to a domain name
for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute,
your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name
corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or
other organization) have been commonly known by the domain name, even if you
have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you are making
a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for
commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or
service mark at issue.
Respondent does not satisfy any of
those criteria. He is not known by the
disputed domain name, even if his first used Christian name was in fact
“Patrick.”[ix] Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, the
website corresponding to the disputed domain name is clearly of a commercial
character. Respondent’s use of the
disputed domain name to redirect Internet users to Complainant’s competitors’
websites is not a bona fide offering
of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a
legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).[x]
There is absolutely no evidence that the
website might be directed towards Land Rover aficionados.
In short,
Respondent has no demonstrable rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain
name and so Complainant has established the second limb of the Policy.
Registration
and Use in Bad Faith: Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out
the circumstances which shall be evidence of the registration or use of
a domain name in bad faith and so the Panel considers it logical to first
compare them to the facts of the case.
They are:
(i) circumstances
indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name
primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the
domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark
or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable
consideration in excess of your documented out‑of‑pocket costs
directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you
have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark
or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the
purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted
to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your website or other on‑line
location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as
to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your website or
location or of a product or service on your website or location.
Respondent claims
to have registered the domain name before he had any knowledge of Complainant’s
intended purchase of the Land Rover franchise.
The Panel must judge the veracity of that claim based on the evidence
before it and on the balance of probabilities.
The Respondent admits to being the manager of a Land Rover
dealership. Complainant’s claim that the
two businesses are in contiguous market areas is not contradicted by
Respondent. Respondent admits to
knowledge of Complainant’s business.
Respondent registered the disputed domain name in the same timeframe as
the purchase discussions. Respondent’s
claim that the disputed domain name would be used for a non-commercial website
devoted to Land Rover enthusiasts is without foundation. The website currently shows information of a
commercial nature competitive with Complainant’s business interests.
Weighing the
evidence, the Panel can give no credibility to Respondent’s account of why he
registered the domain name[xi]
and the Panel finds that Respondent’s actions fall squarely within Policy ¶ 4(b)(ii) and (iii) set out above.
Accordingly,
Complainant has satisfied the third and final element of the Policy.
DECISION
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy,
the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <patricklandrover.com>
domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Debrett Gordon Lyons, Panelist
Dated: June 30, 2008
[i] See J.W. Spear & Sons PLC v. Fun League Mgmt., FA 180628 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 17, 2003) (finding that where Respondent submitted a timely Response electronically, but failed to submit a hard copy of the Response on time, “[t]he Panel is of the view that given the technical nature of the breach and the need to resolve the real dispute between the parties that this submission should be allowed and given due weight”); see also Strum v. Nordic Net Exch. AB, FA 102843 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 21, 2002) (“[R]uling a Response inadmissible because of formal deficiencies would be an extreme remedy not consistent with the basic principles of due process”).
[ii] See SeekAmerica
Networks Inc. v. Masood, D2000-0131 (WIPO Apr. 13, 2000) (finding that the
Rules do not require that the complainant's trademark or service mark be
registered by a government authority or agency for such rights to exist); see also
[iii] See Molecular Nutrition, Inc. v. Network News
& Publ’ns, FA 156715 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 24, 2003) (finding that the
complainant failed to establish common law rights in its mark because mere
assertions of such rights are insufficient without accompanying evidence to
demonstrate that the public identifies the complainant’s mark exclusively or
primarily with the complainant’s products); see
also Weatherford Int’l, Inc. v. Wells, FA 153626 (Nat. Arb. Forum
May 19, 2003) (“Although Complainant asserts common law rights in the WELLSERV
mark, it failed to submit any evidence indicating extensive use or that its
claimed mark has achieved secondary source
identity . . . [Complainant’s claim that it is well known]
is a finding that must be supported by evidence and not self-serving
assertions.”).
[iv] See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Question, (February 2005).
[v] See Taco Bell Pty. Ltd. v. Taco Co. of Australia Inc., 60 F.L.R. 60 (1981).
[vi] See Tuxedos By Rose v. Nunez, FA 95248 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 17, 2000) (finding common law rights in a mark where its use was continuous and ongoing, and secondary meaning was established); see also Keppel TatLee Bank v. Taylor, D2001-0168 (WIPO Mar. 28, 2001) (“[O]n account of long and substantial use of [KEPPEL BANK] in connection with its banking business, it has acquired rights under the common law.”).
[vii] See Space Imaging LLC v. Brownell, AF-0298 (eResolution Sept. 22, 2000) (finding confusing similarity where respondent’s domain name combines complainant’s mark with a generic term that has an obvious relationship to complainant’s business; see also Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) (finding that the top level of the domain name such as “.net” or “.com” does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar).
[viii] See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t
Commentaries, FA 741828
(Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that complainant must first make a prima
facie case that respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the
disputed domain name under UDRP ¶ 4(a)(ii) before the
burden shifts to respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate
interests in a domain name); see also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200
(Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 25, 2006) (“Complainant must first make a prima facie
showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the
subject domain names, which burden is light.
If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to respondent
to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain
names.”)
[ix] See Sumner v. Urvan, D2000-0596 (WIPO July 24, 2000) (finding that the respondent’s evidence that he used the name “Sting” as a login name at a gaming site was “at the weaker end of the spectrum of such evidence” and thus did “not establish that he has been ‘commonly known’ by the domain name as contemplated by” the Policy); see also DIMC, Inc. v. Phan, D2000-1519 (WIPO Feb. 20, 2001) (rejecting the claim that the respondent was commonly known by the “Krylon” nickname since there was no evidence indicating when the alleged nickname was adopted and how it was used).
[x] See Coryn Group, Inc. v. Media Insight, FA 198959 (Nat. Arb.
Forum Dec. 5, 2003) (finding that respondent was not using the domain names for
a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial
or fair use because respondent used the names to divert Internet users to a
website that offered services that competed with those offered by complainant
under its marks); see also Glaxo Group Ltd. v. WWW Zban, FA
203164 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 1, 2003) (finding that respondent was not using
the domain name within the parameters of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii) because
respondent used the domain name to take advantage of complainant's mark by
diverting Internet users to a competing commercial site); see also WeddingChannel.com
Inc. v. Vasiliev, FA 156716 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 12, 2003) finding
that respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to redirect Internet users to
websites unrelated to complainant’s mark, websites where respondent presumably
receives a referral fee for each misdirected Internet user, was not a bona
fide offering of goods or services as contemplated by the Policy; see
also Deutsche Telekom AG v. SKK, D2003-0744
(WIPO Nov. 17, 2003).
[xi] See Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Greenhouse Agency Ltd., D2000-1221 (WIPO Dec. 4, 2000) (finding that the “domain names are so obviously connected with complainants that the use or registration by anyone other than Complainants suggests ‘opportunistic bad faith’”).
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