Max Mara Fashion Group S.r.l. v. Private Registration (name)
Claim Number: FA1111001417298
Complainant is Max Mara Fashion Group S.r.l. (“Complainant”), represented by Judith L. Grubner of Arnstein & Lehr LLP, Illinois, USA. Respondent is Private Registration (name) (“Respondent”), Cayman Islands.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <sportmaxcode.com>, registered with Bargin Register Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and, to the best of his knowledge, has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
The Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.) as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on November 28, 2011; the National Arbitration Forum received payment on November 28, 2011.
On December 22, Bargin Register Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name is registered with Bargin Register Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Bargin Register Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Bargin Register Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On December 13, 2011, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of January 3, 2012 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@sportmaxcode.com. Also on December 13, 2011, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the National Arbitration Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On January 9, 2012, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed the Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.) as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the National Arbitration Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the National Arbitration Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant makes the following assertions:
1. Respondent’s <sportmaxcode.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s SPORTMAX mark.
2. Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name.
3. Respondent registered and used the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name in bad faith.
B. Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
Complainant, Max Mara Fashion Group S.r.l., is a fashion house and offers its products under its SPORTMAX mark. Complainant owns numerous trademark registrations with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for its SPORTMAX mark (e.g., Reg. No. 1,342,760 registered June 18, 1985).
Respondent, Private Registration (name), registered the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name on August 5, 2007. The disputed domain name resolves to a website hosting multiple third-party hyperlinks, which resolve to competing websites.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant provides evidence that it owns trademark registrations with the USPTO for its SPORTMAX mark (e.g., Reg. No. 1,342,760 registered June 18, 1985). For the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), the Panel finds that this evidence is sufficient to establish rights in the SPORTMAX mark. See Expedia, Inc. v. Tan, FA 991075 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 29, 2007) (“As the [complainant’s] mark is registered with the USPTO, [the] complainant has met the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”); see also Intel Corp. v. Macare, FA 660685 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 26, 2006) (finding that the complainant had established rights in the PENTIUM, CENTRINO and INTEL INSIDE marks by registering the marks with the USPTO); see also Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telepathy Inc., D2001-0217 (WIPO May 7, 2001) (finding that the Policy does not require that the mark be registered in the country in which the respondent operates; therefore it is sufficient that the complainant can demonstrate a mark in some jurisdiction).
Respondent’s <sportmaxcode.com> domain name contains Complainant’s entire SPORTMAX mark in addition to the generic term “code” and the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com.” The Panel determines that these alterations remove the disputed domain name from the realm of confusing similarity under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin) Ltd. v. Healy/BOSTH, D2001-0026 (WIPO Mar. 23, 2001) (finding confusing similarity where the domain name in dispute contains the identical mark of the complainant combined with a generic word or term); see also Trip Network Inc. v. Alviera, FA 914943 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 27, 2007) (concluding that the affixation of a gTLD to a domain name is irrelevant to a Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis).
The Panel finds Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) is satisfied.
Complainant alleges that Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name. The burden shifts to Respondent to prove it does have rights or legitimate interests when Complainant makes a prima facie case in support of its allegations under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). See Intel Corp. v. Macare, FA 660685 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 26, 2006) (finding the “complainant must first make a prima facie case that [the] respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), and then the burden shifts to [the] respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests.”). The Panel finds Complainant made a sufficient prima facie case. Respondent’s failure to respond to the Complaint allows the Panel to infer that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name. See Desotec N.V. v. Jacobi Carbons AB, D2000-1398 (WIPO Dec. 21, 2000) (finding that failing to respond allows a presumption that the complainant’s allegations are true unless clearly contradicted by the evidence). However, the Panel will examine the record to determine whether Respondent has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c).
The WHOIS information identifies “Private Registration (name)” as the registrant of the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name, which is not similar to the disputed domain name. Respondent did not present any evidence that it is commonly known by the disputed domain name, and the Panel fails to find any such evidence in the record. Thus, the Panel concludes that Respondent is not commonly known by the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See M. Shanken Commc’ns v. WORLDTRAVELERSONLINE.COM, FA 740335 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 3, 2006) (finding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <cigaraficionada.com> domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) based on the WHOIS information and other evidence in the record); see also Coppertown Drive-Thru Sys., LLC v. Snowden, FA 715089 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 17, 2006) (concluding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <coppertown.com> domain name where there was no evidence in the record, including the WHOIS information, suggesting that the respondent was commonly known by the disputed domain name).
Respondent’s <sportmaxcode.com> domain name resolves to a website that hosts third-party hyperlinks that resolve to Complainant’s competitors in the fashion and clothing industries. The Panel infers that Respondent commercially benefits from the hyperlinks by receiving click-through fees each time an Internet user clicks on one of the hyperlinks. Therefore, the Panel holds that Respondent makes neither a Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) bona fide offering of goods or services nor a Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name. See Skyhawke Techns., LLC v. Tidewinds Group, Inc., FA 949608 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 18, 2007) (“Respondent is using the <skycaddy.com> domain name to display a list of hyperlinks, some of which advertise Complainant and its competitors’ products. The Panel finds that this use of the disputed domain name does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”); see also Expedia, Inc. v. Compaid, FA 520654 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 30, 2005) (finding that the respondent’s use of the <expediate.com> domain name to redirect Internet users to a website featuring links to travel services that competed with the complainant was not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)).
The Panel finds Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) is satisfied.
As some of the hyperlinks found on the website resolving from the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name resolve to third-party websites that offer products that compete with Complainant’s products, the Panel infers that Complainant’s business is disrupted by Respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name, constituting bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). See Tesco Pers. Fin. Ltd. v. Domain Mgmt. Servs., FA 877982 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 13, 2007) (concluding that the use of a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet users to a directory website containing commercial links to the websites of a complainant’s competitors represents bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)); see also Persohn v. Lim, FA 874447 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 19, 2007) (finding bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) where a respondent used the disputed domain name to operate a commercial search engine with links to the complainant’s competitors).
Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i), the Panel held that Respondent’s <sportmaxcode.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s SPORTMAX mark. As noted above, Respondent uses this confusingly similar domain name to commercially benefit by hosting competing hyperlinks. Consequently, the Panel concludes that Respondent attempts to commercially benefit by creating confusion as to Complainant’s affiliation with the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name, which constitutes bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Zee TV USA, Inc. v. Siddiqi, FA 721969 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 18, 2006) (finding that the respondent engaged in bad faith registration and use by using a domain name that was confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark to offer links to third-party websites that offered services similar to those offered by the complainant); see also Univ. of Houston Sys. v. Salvia Corp., FA 637920 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 21, 2006) (“Respondent is using the disputed domain name to operate a website which features links to competing and non-competing commercial websites from which Respondent presumably receives referral fees. Such use for Respondent’s own commercial gain is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”).
Complainant also contends that Respondent could not have registered and used the disputed domain name without actual or constructive knowledge of Complainant and its rights in the SPORTMAX mark. While constructive notice has not generally been held to suffice for a finding of bad faith registration and use, the Panel nonetheless finds that Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) because the Panel finds Respondent had actual notice of Complainant’s trademark rights. See Deep Foods, Inc. v. Jamruke, LLC, FA 648190 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 10, 2006) (stating that while mere constructive knowledge is insufficient to support a finding of bad faith, where the circumstances indicate that the respondent had actual knowledge of the complainant’s mark when it registered the domain name, panels can find bad faith); see also Yahoo! Inc. v. Butler, FA 744444 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 17, 2006) (finding bad faith where the respondent was “well-aware” of the complainant’s YAHOO! mark at the time of registration).
The Panel finds Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) is satisfied.
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <sportmaxcode.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
The Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.), Panelist
Dated: January 23, 2012
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