DECISION

 

Vivid Video, Inc. v. Internet Domains

Claim Number: FA0303000150483

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Vivid Video, Inc., Van Nuys, CA ("Complainant") represented by Paul J. Cambria, of Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Salisbury & Cambria, LLP.  Respondent is Internet Domains, Osterville, MA ("Respondent").

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME 

The domain name at issue is <vividcash.com>, registered with Iholdings.Com, Inc. d/b/a Dotregistrar.Com.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Rodney C. Kyle as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the "Forum") electronically on 18 March 2003; the Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on 19 March 2003.

 

On 19 March 2003, Iholdings.Com, Inc. d/b/a Dotregistrar.Com confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name <vividcash.com> is registered with Iholdings.Com, Inc. d/b/a Dotregistrar.Com and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Iholdings.Com, Inc. d/b/a Dotregistrar.Com has verified that Respondent is bound by the Iholdings.Com, Inc. d/b/a Dotregistrar.Com registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy").

 

On 20 March 2003, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the "Commencement Notification"), setting a deadline of 9 April 2003 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@vividcash.com by e-mail.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on 8 April 2003.

 

Complainant filed a timely Additional Submission on 14 April 2003.

 

On 17 April 2003, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Rodney C. Kyle as Panelist.

 

Respondent filed a timely Additional Submission on 21 April 2003.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name at issue be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

In the Complaint, Complainant basically makes three main sets of contentions.

 

First, Complainant basically contends by way of three points that (i) the domain name at issue <vividcash.com> is registered to Respondent; (ii) there are United States trademark registrations and service mark registrations for VIVID and VIVID VIDEO in association with "adult" entertainment (such as by motion pictures and the Internet), which marks are famous and are evidenced by copies of TARR printouts that are Complaint Exhibits A through E, and in which Complainant has rights; and (iii) the domain name at issue incorporates the mark VIVID, combines it with the word "cash", and is confusingly similar to said mark.

 

Second, Complainant basically contends by way of four points that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of <vividcash.com>, in that (i) Respondent has no connection or affiliation with Complainant, and has not received from Complainant any license, authorization or consent, express or implied, to use VIVID in a domain name or in any other manner; (ii) by obtaining <vividcash.com> on 15 June 2001 but not operating a website through <vividcash.com> for the approximately two years thereafter, Respondent has not used, or made demonstrable preparations to use, <vividcash.com>, or a name corresponding to <vividcash.com>, in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; (iii) Respondent is not commonly known by <vividcash.com>; and (iv) Respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of <vividcash.com>.

 

Third, Complainant basically contends by way of five points that Respondent registered and is using the domain name at issue in bad faith, in that: (i) Respondent acquired <vividcash.com> in order to induce Complainant to offer to purchase same in excess of the expenditure to Respondent to register said domain name, or in the hope that potential customers would logically believe that any future website located thereat is operated by or associated with Complainant, owner of the famous VIVID and VIVID VIDEO trademarks; (ii) Respondent’s registration and bad-faith use of a domain name confusingly similar to Complainant’s famous VIVID and VIVID VIDEO marks is evidence of an attempt to disrupt Complainant’s business; (iii) the incorporation of Complainant’s VIVID mark suggests that Respondent registered the domain name <vividcash.com> primarily for the purpose of cybersquatting or trading on Complainant’s goodwill in its marks, the secondary meaning that has accrued to the VIVID and VIVID VIDEO marks and, thus, to disrupt Complainant’s business; (iv) there is no plausible circumstance in which the Respondent could legitimately use Complainant’s VIVID mark; and (v) there is no plausible situation in which Respondent would have been unaware of Complainant’s world-famous VIVID or VIVID VIDEO marks at the time of the registration and/or acquisition of the domain name.

 

B. Respondent

In the Response, Respondent basically makes one main set of contentions and repeats or reasserts aspects of it in response to each of Complainant's three main sets of contentions.

 

Respondent's one main set of contentions basically has five points. First, that JEF Films Inc. is Respondent's parent company. Second, that Complainant's contended 1984 first use of VIVID post-dates by approximately one year an individual's authoring, and JEF Films Inc.'s first owning copyright in and using a phrase and character name, "Vivid Cash" (regarding what is pleaded to be the family entertainment of a super-hero comic figure "whose major assets are his enormous wealth and his ability  to turn vibrant colors which temporarily blind would be criminals"), contended to be evidenced by a copy of a 1984 U.S. Copyright Office registration certificate (regarding an unpublished two-page motion picture treatment entitled "Hokum") that is Response Exhibit A. Third, that such use of that phrase and character name has occurred since then, as contended to be evidenced by a copy of a brochure (bearing a notice of 1986 copyright) that is Response Exhibit B and a copy of a 1989 U.S. Copyright Office registration certificate (regarding published advertising and promotional materials entitled "Tune in to JEF for sky high ratings") that is Response Exhibit C. Fourth, that others have applied for or obtained mark registrations and domain name registrations that include "vivid," as evidenced by a copy of a TESS printout that is Response Exhibit D and of a whois.net printout that is Response Exhibit E. Fifth, that in view of the foregoing (i) as well as that Complainant's business is clearly not a business to which Respondent would ever want to be confusingly similar and that it is hard to believe that anybody could confuse Respondent's contended character with Complainant's goods and services, the domain name at issue is not confusingly similar to Complainant's contended marks; (ii) as well as by being the domain name registrant, Respondent has rights or legitimate interests in the domain name; and (iii) Respondent is not using in bad faith, and did not register in bad faith, the domain name at issue.

 

C. Additional Submissions

Complainant's Additional Submission includes the contentions that, like Complainant, Respondent's contended parent company, JEF Films Inc., purveys "adult" entertainment, specifically in the "adult motion picture industry," and that such activity is evidenced by Internet printouts (that are the Exhibit to Complainant's Additional Submission) showing JEF Films Inc.'s association with several such motion pictures.

 

Respondent's Additional Submission basically includes a denial of those aspects of Complainant's Additional Submission, except as to JEF Films Inc. being Respondent's parent company.

 

FINDINGS

The Panel finds --

(i)         the domain name at issue <vividcash.com> is registered to Respondent and is confusingly similar to the U.S. registered trademarks or U.S. registered service marks VIVID (registration numbers 2415035, 2509991, and 2452336) and VIVID VIDEO (registration numbers 2677774 and 2677773) in which Complainant has rights;

(ii)        Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name at issue; and

(iii)       the domain name at issue has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

(i)         the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights;

(ii)        Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(iii)       the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view especially of Rule 15(a), the Panel notes four rules and principles of law that it especially deems applicable to ascertaining whether each of those three elements has been proven. First, that

Both [dispositive] and evidential facts must, under the law, be ascertained in some one or more of four possible modes: 1. By judicial admission (what is not disputed); 2. By judicial notice, or knowledge (what is known or easily knowable); 3. By judicial perception (what is ascertained directly through the senses; cf. "real evidence"); 4. By judicial inference (what is ascertained by reasoning from facts already ascertained by one or more of the four methods here outlined).[1]

Second, especially as to mode "3," that Rule 10(d) provides that "The Panel shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence." Third, as to construing and applying Rule 10(d), especially as to whether mode "1" rather than mode "3" applies: a complainant’s pleading of fact that is not disputed (or, phrased differently, not "put in issue") by a respondent against whom it is contended, is an admission by that respondent,[2] so evidence tendered as being rationally probative of (i.e. as being "relevant to") establishing that fact becomes immaterial, and hence inadmissible, as to establishing that fact.[3] Fourth, as to whether mode "2" rather than either of mode "1" or mode "3" applies, a canvassing of law and commentary shows that 

It was not desirable, nor indeed possible, to foreclose the trier's use of background information but should the matter noticed be in the forefront of the controversy, should the fact be determinative, the law protected the adversary by insisting that the matter be so commonly known, and hence indisputable, that its notice could not prejudice the opponent.[4]

and that "The party who has the burden of proof on the issue may have to call on the trier to judicially notice the fact when it comes time to analyze the question."[5]

 

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Aside from the above-described Additional Submission contentions basically concerning whether Complainant and JEF Films Inc. are competitors of one another, neither Party’s Additional Submission permissibly provides anything pertinent that, in view of the Complaint and the Response, was not already apparent to the Panel as being at issue or as being the responsibility of the Panel.[6] In view of Respondent's apparently unregistered name[7] and the fact that apparently it was in the Response that Respondent first asserted to Complainant that Respondent had a relationship with JEF Films Inc., Complainant cannot reasonably be expected to have known much about Respondent (at the time of submitting the Complaint), let alone known about Respondent's contended JEF Films Inc. relationship. In turn, Respondent's denials (i.e. in either or both of the Response and the Additional Submission, basically that neither Respondent nor JEF Films Inc. is a competitor of Complainant) result in Complainant's Additional Submission Exhibit being material evidence. That Exhibit also appears relevant and admissible. Moreover, it is persuasive. Especially in view of that Exhibit, the Panel finds that, if indeed JEF Films Inc. exists, Complainant and JEF Films Inc. are competitors. As well, in view of all the pertinent circumstances of this case (especially the Response and Respondent's Additional Submission), the Panel also finds that especially when it comes to <vividcash.com> Respondent basically acts as if it is, or that it is acting on behalf of, JEF Films Inc., such that Complainant and Respondent are also competitors.

 

SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS

 

Identical or Confusingly Similar

As for Complainant's contention that the domain name at issue <vividcash.com> is registered to Respondent, Respondent has admitted it.

 

As for Complainant's contentions of registered trademarks and registered service marks, and of Complainant having rights therein, Respondent has taken issue therewith. Complaint Exhibits A through E, and Response Exhibits A through E, are therefore material. They also appear to be relevant and admissible. In turn, the Panel has satisfied itself via the respective U.S. government websites that Complaint Exhibits A through E (i.e. those copies of TARR printouts) evidence what they themselves purport to evidence, and that Response Exhibits A and C (i.e. those copies of the copyright certificates) and D and E (i.e. those copies of TESS and whois.net printouts) evidence what they themselves purport to evidence. Response Exhibit B (i.e. the copy of the brochure) is another matter, and is dealt with more extensively below under the heading of "Rights or Legitimate Interests." In weighing Response Exhibits A through E against Complaint Exhibits A through E, the Panel notes that Complainant does not have to be the only person who has rights regarding marks that include "vivid", and hence that Response Exhibits A through E do not suffice against Complaint Exhibits A through E. The Panel finds Complainant has proven that the registered trademarks and registered service marks Complainant contend it owns do indeed exist and that Complainant has rights therein.

 

As for the domain name at issue being confusingly similar to said registered marks, Respondent has taken issue therewith. The Panel finds that as in Oki Data Americas, Inc. v. ASD Inc., D2001-0903 (WIPO Nov. 6, 2001) so too in this case, "the fact that a domain name incorporates a Complainant’s registered mark is sufficient to establish identical or confusing similarity for purposes of the Policy despite the addition of other words to such marks" and that as in Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Inja, Kil, D2000-1409 (WIPO Dec. 9, 2000) so too in this case, "[n]either the addition of an ordinary descriptive word . . . nor the suffix '.com' detract from the overall impression of the dominant part of the name in each case."

 

 In view of the immediately preceding three paragraphs, Policy paragraph 4(a)(i) is proven: the domain name at issue <vividcash.com> is registered by Respondent, there are trademarks and service marks VIVID and VIVID VIDEO (registered in the United States Trademark Office as registrations 2415035, 2509991, 2452336, 2677774 and 2677773) in which Complainant has rights, and the domain name at issue is identical or confusingly similar thereto.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

The context in which this part of this discussion occurs includes Policy paragraph 4(c) and decisions such as Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000).

 

Policy paragraph 4(c) is basically directed from a domain name registrar to a domain name registrant and prospective mandatory administrative proceeding respondent, and includes that

When you receive a complaint, you should refer to [Rule 5] in determining how your response should be prepared. Any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate your rights or legitimate interests to the domain name for purposes of [Policy paragraph] 4(a)(ii):

 

(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or

(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or

(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

(See footnote 2 hereof for some provisions of Rule 5.)

 

Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web includes that when, as in this case, "the complainant has made a prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to the respondent to show by providing concrete evidence that it has rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name at issue" (emphasis in original). To similar effect see, e.g., Gene Logic Inc. v. Bock, FA 103042 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 4, 2002) and Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Benstein, FA 102962 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 27, 2002).

 

As for Policy paragraph 4(c)(iii), that paragraph does not appear to be contended for by evidence in this proceeding: the paragraph is phrased in the present tense, yet Respondent has not produced evidence that it is using the domain name at issue within the meaning of "use" as that word appears in that paragraph.

 

As for Policy paragraph 4(c)(ii), that paragraph does not appear to be contended for by evidence in this proceeding: the paragraph is phrased in terms of a respondent being known by a domain name at issue, whereas Respondent's contentions basically are evidence as to Respondent's contended parent company's contended products (i.e. the contended character "Vivid Cash" and related products) being known by the domain name at issue.

 

As for Policy paragraph 4(c)(i), and the preamble of Policy paragraph 4(c), they appear to be contended for by evidence in this proceeding. However, as the Panel finds in the following six paragraphs, they do not avail Respondent.  

 

Ownership of the Domain Name at Issue

Respondent's contention that being the owner of the registration of <vividcash.com> avails Respondent under Policy paragraph 4(c) is wrong. If a respondent's domain name registration that is the very subject-matter of a mandatory administrative proceeding under the Policy could, per se, confer or evidence "rights or legitimate interests" within the meaning of that expression as it appears in Policy paragraph 4(a)(ii) then the Policy would basically be rendered a nullity. As a result, it has long been well and clearly established by mandatory administrative proceeding decisions under the Policy that such registrations do not do so. See, e.g., the following decisions, and decisions in which they are cited: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc. v. Entredomains, D2000-0387 (WIPO July 5, 2000) and Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret AS v. Mehmet Kahveci, D2000-1244 (WIPO Nov. 11, 2000).

 

            Copyright

What evidence there is in this case on this topic appears to not be as to Respondent's "rights or legitimate interests" as that expression is used in Policy paragraph 4(a)(ii). Instead, it appears to be as to copyright ownership by JEF Films Inc., which entity Respondent contends (by pleading and argument, but not by evidence) is Respondent's parent company. Even assuming that the JEF Films Inc. referred to in each copyright certificate still exists or that there is some successor to that corporation, there is not, for example, evidence of a chain of copyright title from the copyright registrant (i.e. as stated in part 4 of each certificate, "JEF Films Inc.") to Respondent or evidence of a copyright license from JEF Films Inc. to Respondent. Moreover, even if it were evidenced (rather than merely pleaded and argued) that JEF Films Inc. is the "parent company" of Respondent, that would not mean that Respondent has such title or such license: if a first entity owns or controls a second entity then it can happen that the first entity owns or controls the second entity's property or licenses but it does not necessarily follow that all or any of the property, or licenses, owned by the first entity has been assigned, or licensed or sub-licensed, to the second entity. Furthermore, as in Seagate Tech. LLC v. TC Servs., FA 102782 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 7, 2002) so too in this case: a respondent's assertion of rights of a third party to demonstrate rights or legitimate interests does not avail when that third party has not formally intervened in the proceeding.

 

Even if the evidence were to be construed as evidence of Respondent's Policy paragraph 4(a)(ii) "rights or legitimate interests," Respondent would still not prevail on this topic. In 17 U.S.C. §§410(a) and 410(c) it is basically provided that each copy of each certificate (i.e. basically each of Response Exhibits A and C) "shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate." However, the facts stated in each certificate do not include the expression "Vivid Cash" and there is no evidence in this proceeding that the expression "Vivid Cash" is subject-matter to which either of those certificates applies. Quite importantly in that regard, each certificate copy includes the statement made by the Copyright Office that, apparently in accordance with 17 U.S.C. §408(b), at least one deposit of the subject-matter for which copyright was being registered had been received by the Copyright Office. Whether or not copies of such deposits are available from other than the Copyright Office, they apparently are available from the Copyright Office itself, to JEF Films Inc. or persons acting as an agent of or claiming through JEF Films Inc., Respondent's contended parent company.[8] Yet, the copy of the contended brochure bearing a notice of 1986 copyright (i.e. Response Exhibit B) is not even contended to be a copy of such a deposit. Nor is it even notarially certified as being a true copy of such a deposit or submitted, under oath or statutory declaration, as being a true copy of such a deposit. As well, although the contended brochure copy includes a copyright notice (i.e. "© 1986 JEF Films, Inc.") and two occurrences of the expression "VIVID CA$H", applying a copyright notice is a permitted rather than mandatory act that basically is done by or on behalf of a copyright claimant, and 17 U.S.C. §§401(a) and 401(b) indicate as much. Moreover, such a notice does not, per se, confer or evidence copyright for the purposes of a proceeding such as this, and 17 U.S.C. §§401(d) indicates as much. Furthermore, one of those two occurrences is as part of a contended title of a contended prospective series, "The Adventures of Vivid Cash," and the other occurrence, apparently solely as a reference to the attractiveness of the contended character, is that "Audiences everywhere will love Vivid Cash," but, as indicated by Nimmer on Copyright,[9] Respondent's apparent non-use of "Vivid Cash" as a trademark or so as to give rise to legal interests against passing off,[10] along with there being no persuasive evidence of a distinctively delineated or sufficiently developed character, mean that neither occurrence is evidence of subject-matter to which copyright applies.[11] As for the phrase "vivid cash" being a "literary work" (such as within the meaning of that expression as it appears in 17 U.S.C. §101) and an "original work of authorship" (such as within the meaning of that expression as it basically appears in 17 U.S.C. §102(a)), and therefore being subject to copyright: in this proceeding there is no evidence that copyright subsists in the phrase.[12]

 

Trademark or Passing Off

Respondent has not produced any evidence of use of the expression "Vivid Cash" as a trademark or so as to give rise to legal interests against passing off, if indeed Respondent was contending such use. If there were any such evidence in this proceeding it basically would have been evidence somewhat along the lines of, and going beyond, Response Exhibits A through C, but Exhibits A through C do not suffice. Nor has Respondent produced any evidence that such use, if it occurred at all, enured to Respondent's benefit.

 

Summary

Based on the Panel's evaluation of all evidence presented, there is no evidence that at any pertinent time was "Vivid Cash" or <vivdcash.com> subject to copyright, or used as a trademark or so as to give rise to legal interests against passing off, or used (or a subject of demonstrable preparations to be used) in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. Hence, there is no evidence that Respondent has the rights or legitimate interests that it contended for itself in respect of "Vivid Cash" and <vivdcash.com>. Instead, Respondent has no Policy paragraph 4(a)(ii) "rights or legitimate interests" in respect of the domain name at issue.

 

In view of the eleven immediately preceding paragraphs, the Panel finds that Policy paragraph 4(a)(ii) is proven.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

The context in which this part of this discussion occurs includes Policy paragraph 4(b).

Policy paragraph 4(b) is basically directed from a domain name registrar to a domain name registrant and prospective mandatory administrative proceeding respondent, and includes that

For the purposes of [Policy paragraph] 4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:

 

(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.

 

As for Policy paragraph 4(b)(iv), it basically defines a type of bad-faith use and provides that if such type of use is ascertained by a panel, then bad-faith registration is in turn evidenced via application of that provision. It does not appear to reasonably be contended for in this proceeding, in that there basically is no substantiated contention of use of the domain name <vividcash.com>.

 

As for each of Policy paragraphs 4(b)(i), 4(b)(ii), and 4(b)(iii), they basically define respective types of bad-faith registration and provide that if any one of such types of registration has been ascertained by a panel then bad-faith use is in turn evidenced via application of the respective one of those three provisions.

 

Policy paragraph 4(b)(ii) does not appear to be contended for in this proceeding, there being no contention of the required pattern of conduct.

 

Policy paragraphs 4(b)(i) and 4(b)(iii) appear to be contended for. As well, the Policy paragraph 4(b)(i) requirement of there being a competitor of Complainant (actually two such competitors, i.e. Respondent and JEF Films Inc.) has been found above;[13] likewise, the Policy 4(b)(iii) requirement of there being a competitor of Respondent (i.e. Complainant) has also been found above.[14] On the one hand, circumstances indicating the Policy paragraph 4(b)(i) requirement of "for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name" do not appear to be present. On the other hand, circumstances indicating the Policy paragraph 4(b)(iii) requirement of the domain name <vividcash.com> having been registered "primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor" (i.e. the business of Complainant) do appear to be present: there is no plausible use of <vividcash.com> by Respondent that would not infringe on Complainant’s VIVID family of marks and disrupt Complainant’s business.

 

In view of the immediately preceding paragraph hereof, the Panel finds that Policy paragraph 4(a)(iii) is proven.

 

DECISION

All three elements required under the Policy have been established. The Panel therefore concludes that the requested relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <vividcash.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

 

Rodney C. Kyle, Panelist

Dated: 1 May 2003

 

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