i.

By virtue of its federal trademark and/or service mark registration(s), Complainant is the owner of the Complainant's Mark(s). See, e.g., United Way of America v. Alex Zingaus, NAF Claim No. FA0707001036202 ("Panels have long recognized Complainant's registration of a mark with a trademark authority is sufficient to confer rights in the mark pursuant to Policy 4(a)(i)").  As in other cases, it is also important to note that it is irrelevant for the purposes of Policy ¶4(a)(i) whether Complainant registered the mark in the country where Respondent operates or resides. See Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telepathy Inc., D2001-0217 (WIPO May 7, 2001) (finding that the Policy does not require that a mark be registered in the country in which a respondent operates, it being sufficient that a complainant can demonstrate rights in a mark in some jurisdiction).

ii.

When comparing the Disputed Domain Name(s) to the Complainant's Mark(s), the relevant comparison to be made is between only the second-level portion of the Disputed Domain Name(s) and the Complainant's Mark(s). See Rollerblade, Inc. v. Chris McCready, WIPO Case No. D2000-0429 (finding that the top-level domain, such as ".net" or ".com", does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar); see also Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin. Ltd., NAF Claim No. FA0304000153545 ("[t]he addition of a top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark is identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required element of every domain name.")

iv.

The Disputed Domain Name(s) (is/are) confusingly similar to Complainant's Mark(s) because (it/they) differ(s) by only a single character from Complainant's Mark(s), or because it differs by only the juxtaposition of two characters when compared to Complainant's Mark(s). For clarification, the Disputed Domain Name(s) contain(s) either:

[i.] the addition of one extra character, or...
[ii.] the removal of one character, or...
[iii.] one character which is incorrect, or...
[iv.] two juxtaposed characters

as compared to Complainant's Mark(s).

v.

The Disputed Domain Name(s) (is/are), simply put, a classic example of "typosquatting". The practice of typosquatting is designed to take advantage of Internet users' typographical errors, which means the names must be confusingly similar by design. See Reuters Ltd. v. Global Net 2000, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0441 (finding that a domain name which differs by only one letter from a trademark has a greater tendency to be confusingly similar to the trademark where the trademark is highly distinctive); Caterpillar Inc. v. Center for Ban on Drugs, NAF Claim No. FA0603000661437 ("the omission of a single letter from Complainant's mark does not adequately distinguish the Disputed Domain Name from the mark"); and Victoria's Secret v. Zuccarini, NAF Claim No. FA0010000095762 (finding that, by misspelling words and adding letters to words, a respondent does not create a distinct mark but nevertheless renders the domain name confusingly similar to the complainant's marks).

i.

Respondent has not been commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name(s). Upon information and belief, at the time Respondent registered the Domain Name(s), it had no trademark or intellectual property rights in the Domain Name(s).  See Policy, ¶4(c)(ii). Where, as here, "the WHOIS information suggests Respondent is known as" an entity other than the trademark associated with Complainant, and Complainant has not "licensed, authorized, or permitted Respondent to register domain names incorporating Complainant's... mark," a Panel should find that the Respondent is not commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name. United Way of America v. Alex Zingaus, NAF Claim No. FA0707001036202.

See also RMO, Inc. v. Burbridge, FA 96949 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 16, 2001) (interpreting Policy , ¶4(c)(ii) "to require a showing that one has been commonly known by the domain name prior to registration of the domain name to prevail"); See also Gallup Inc. v. Amish Country Store, FA 96209 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 23, 2001) (finding that when a respondent was not known by a mark it did not have rights in a domain name incorporating that mark).

ii.

Respondent is not sponsored by or legitimately affiliated with Complainant in any way.

iii.

Complainant has not given Respondent permission to use Complainant's Mark in a domain name.  See Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Com-Union Corp., D2000-0020

(WIPO Mar. 14, 2000) (finding that a respondent had no rights or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name where it was not commonly known by the mark and never applied for a license or permission to use the mark).

iv.

A "Cease and Desist" letter was sent to the Respondent. The letter informed the Respondent that it was infringing on Complainant's IP rights and allowed the Respondent the opportunity to respond if they have any IP rights. The Respondent was provided with the information of the Complainant's trademark(s), hence showing proof that the Complainant has rights to the brand(s). To date, no reply has been received from Respondent. The Respondent's failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the Complaint to be deemed true. See also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, WIPO Case No. D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000("In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint."). Also in WIPO case ACCOR v. Pham Manh Ha, Case No. D2007-1855, the panel found that the evidentiary burden therefore shifts to the Respondent to show by concrete evidence that it does have rights or legitimate interests in that name.

v.

Respondent has ignored Complainant's attempts to resolve the dispute outside of this administrative proceeding. Complainant notes that if the owner of the Disputed Domain Name(s) fails to respond to this Complaint, it is presumed that the owner has no rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name(s). See Mattel, Inc. v. Rave Club Berlin, FA106115 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 8, 2002), citing Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Greenhouse Agency Ltd., D2000-1221 (WIPO Dec. 4, 2000) (finding that Respondents' failure to respond can be construed as an admission that they have no legitimate interest in the domain names). Further, Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) states that when "the complainant has made a prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to the respondent to show by providing concrete evidence that it has rights to or legitimate interest in the domain name at issue."

vi.

Respondent is using (some or all of) the Disputed Domain Name(s) to redirect unsuspecting Internet users to a website featuring generic links to third-party websites, some of which directly compete with Complainant's business. Presumably, Respondent receives pay-per-click fees from these linked websites. As such, Respondent is not using the Disputed Domain Name(s) to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services as allowed under Policy; 4(c)(i), nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use as allowed under Policy; 4(c)(iii). See 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. 24HourNames.com-Quality Domains For Sale, FA 187429 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sep. 26, 2003) (holding that Respondent's use of the 24hrsfitness.com.gt, 24-hourfitness.com.gt and 24hoursfitness.com.gt, domain names to redirect Internet users to a website featuring advertisements and links to Complainant's competitors could not be considered a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use); see also Computer Doctor Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Computer Doctor, FA 95396 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 8, 2000) (finding that the respondent's website, which is blank but for links to other websites, is not a legitimate use of the domain names).

See Exhibit H for screenshot(s) of the website(s) reachable through the Disputed Domain Name(s).

vii.

The earliest date on which Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name(s) was January 5, 2006, for LENNOVO.COM, which is significantly after Complainant's first use of the LENOVO mark in commerce, May 1, 2005, as specified in their relevant registration with the USPTO.

viii.

The earliest date on which Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name(s) was January 5, 2006, for LENNOVO.COM, which is significantly after Complainant's registration of the LENOVO Mark on March 15, 2004, as specified in their relevant registration in the Republic of China.

ix.

The earliest date on which Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name(s) was January 5, 2006, for LENNOVO.COM, which is significantly after Complainant's registration of LENOVO.COM on September 5, 2002.

i.

Respondent's typosquatting behavior is, in and of itself, evidence of bad faith. See Canadian Tire Corp. v. domain adm'r no.valid.email@worldnic.net 1111111111, D2003-0232 (WIPO May 22, 2003) (finding the respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith because the respondent created a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the Respondent's web site or location'.. . through Respondent's persistent practice of 'typosquatting'"); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Baseball League, Inc. v. Zuccarini, D2002-1011 (WIPO Jan. 21, 2003) ("Typosquatting ... is the intentional misspelling of words with [the] intent to intercept and siphon off traffic from its intended destination, by preying on Internauts who make common typing errors. Typosquatting is inherently parasitic and of itself evidence of bad faith.").

ii.

iii.

iv.

Respondent's bad faith is further shown by the Respondent using the Disputed Domain Name(s) website in connection with generating revenue as a "click through" website by using the Complainant's registered trademark(s) and providing links to the services and products offered by the Complainant to take advantage of Complainant's well known mark to achieve a wrongful competitive advantage and commercial gain. In WIPO Decision D2008-1470, AIDA Cruises German Branch of Societa di Crociere MercurioS.r.l., v. Caribbean Online International Ltd. / Belgium Domains "the Panel finds that the Respondent registered and is using the disputed domain name for the purposes of commercial gain by offering links to other companies' websites related to cruises and travels, in the form of a "clickthrough" website. In similar cases, many prior panel decisions have recognised [sic] that the registration of domain names to be used in a "click-through" website has to be considered as an evidence of bad faith (see, e.g. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. v. Digi Real Estate Foundation., WIPO Case No. D2007-0440; Early Times Distillers Company v. IP Admin / DNAV ASSOCS, WIPO Case No. D2007-1812; HBOS Plc v. Whois Protection, WIPO Case No. D2007-1605)".

To further stress the above, Respondent’s setting up of a “click through” website for which it likely receives revenue for each misdirected Internet user obviously demonstrates Respondent’s bad faith.  The Respondent has registered and used the Disputed Domain Name(s) in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv) by using the Disputed Domain Name(s) to attract and mislead consumers for its own profit.  See Univ. of Houston Sys. v. Salvia Corp., FA 637920 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 21, 2006) (“Respondent is using the disputed domain name to operate a website which features links to competing and non-competing commercial websites from which Respondent presumably receives referral fees.  Such use for Respondent’s own commercial gain is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv).”); see also Zee TV USA, Inc. v. Siddiqi, FA 721969 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 18, 2006) (finding that the respondent engaged in bad faith registration and use by using a domain name that was confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark to offer links to third-party websites that offered services similar to those offered by the complainant). See also Meadowbrook, L.L.C. d/b/a The Land of Nod v. Venkateshwara Distributor Private Limited, Claim Number: FA1112001419361 and Charlotte Russe Merchandising, Inc. v. Private Registrations Aktien Gesellschaft / Domain Admin, Claim Number: FA1204001439309, where the same behavior of bad faith is demonstrated and agreed by the panel, pursuant to Policy ¶4(b)(iv).

In addition to the above, the Respondent’s advertised pay-per-click links displayed on the resolving websites promotes products that compete with Complainant. These links therefore divert potential customers away from Complainant to third-party websites, which disrupts Complainant’s business. The Panel should find that this effort to divert consumers and disrupt Complainant’s business is evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶4(b)(iii). See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assoc., FA 914854 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 10, 2007) (holding that where the respondent’s website featured hyperlinks to competing websites and included a link to the complainant’s website, the respondent’s use of the <redeemaamiles.com> domain name constituted disruption under Policy ¶4(b)(iii)).

v.

The Respondent has also listed the Disputed Domain Name(s) for sale. As shown in WIPO Decision D2001-1066, Trip.com, Inc. v. Daniel Deamone, "A fourth factor is that Respondent has offered the Domain Name for sale to the public. There is nothing inherently wrongful in the offer or sale of domain names, without more, such as to justify a finding of bad faith under the Policy. However, the fact that domain name registrants may legitimately and in good faith sell domain names does not imply a right in such registrants to sell domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to trademarks or service marks of others without their consent. Although Respondent's offer of the Disputed Domain Name(s) for sale was not made specifically to Complainant or its competitor, offers for sale to the public may nevertheless constitute evidence of bad faith under the Policy." The offering for sale of a domain name, even to a third party, supports bad faith. See Policy, Paragraph 4(b); Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000); Porsche Cars North America, Inc. v. Spencer, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000); Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp.2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000). See also WIPO Case No. D2003-0689, Mr. Donning Eric v. Mr. Nyunhwa Jung,..."The posting of the announcement: "This domain is for SALE!" constitutes satisfactory evidence, when combined with the Respondent's lack of legitimate rights to or interests in the domain name, that the Respondent's primary purpose in registering the domain name was to sell it in contravention of the Policy (EFG Bank European Financial Group SA v. Jacob Foundation, WIPO Case No. D2000-0036).

vi.

Respondent has caused the website(s) reachable by (some or all of) the Disputed Domain Name(s) to display Complainant's Mark(s) spelled correctly (even though the domain name(s) (is/are) a misspelled version of the same mark(s)). This serves as further evidence of bad faith intent because it removes any doubt as to whether or not the misspelling was intentionally designed to improperly capitalize on Complainant's famous Mark(s).

vii.

viii.

ix.

Respondent has caused the websites reachable by (some or all of) the Disputed Domain Name(s) to display content and/or keywords directly related to Complainant's business. This serves as further evidence of bad faith intent because it removes any doubt as to whether or not the misspelling was intentionally designed to improperly capitalize on Complainant's famous Mark and its related business.

Respondent is a recalcitrant, serial cybersquatter / typosquatter. Searches through the NAF and WIPO UDRP decision databases reveal that Respondent has engaged in an ongoing pattern of such behavior. Previous panels have agreed that multiple prior UDRP decisions are sufficient evidence indicating a respondent’s bad faith use and registration.  See TRAVELOCITY.COM LP v. Aziz, FA 1260783 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 16, 2009) (“These previous [UDRP] decisions demonstrate a pattern of bad faith registration and use of domain names under Policy ¶4(b)(ii).”).

Respondent holds registrations on other domain names that appear to be straightforward examples of typosquatting. Although those names are not directly involved in this complaint, they serve as further evidence of bad faith intent on the part of Respondent. See Policy, 4(b)(ii) and Time Warner Inc. v. Zone MP3, NAF Claim No. FA0706001008035 (typosquatting combined with registration of as few as four domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to "protected marks" is sufficient to establish a pattern leading to bad
faith). See also Citigroup Inc. v. Digi Real Estate Foundation, NAF Claim No.
FA0704000964679.