DECISION

 

Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. George Louis

Claim Number: FA1705001731863

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Chevron Intellectual Property LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Jenny T. Slocum of Dickinson Wright PLLC, District of Columbia, United States.  Respondent is George Louis (“Respondent”), Nigeria.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <oilchevron.com>, registered with PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Paul M. DeCicco, as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on May 16, 2017; the Forum received payment on May 16, 2017.

 

On May 17, 2017, PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <oilchevron.com> domain name is registered with PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com has verified that Respondent is bound by the PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On May 17, 2017, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of June 6, 2017 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@oilchevron.com. Also on May 17, 2017, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On June 8, 2017, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Paul M. DeCicco as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant contends as follows:

 

Complainant uses the CHEVRON mark in connection with the distribution and sale of petroleum products.

 

Complainant’s owns multiple registrations of the CHEVRON mark in the U.S. and worldwide. Complainant registered the CHEVRON mark with the United States Patent and Trade Office (“USPTO”) (e.g., Reg. No. 364,683, registered Feb. 14, 1939). Complainant’s trademark registrations for CHEVRON demonstrate its rights in the CHEVRON mark.

 

Respondent’s <oilchevron.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s CHEVRON mark because it incorporates the mark in its entirety, adding only the term “oil” and the generic top-level domain name (“gTLD”) “.com,” neither of which meaningfully distinguish the domain name from Complainant’s registered mark. Instead, the addition of the word “oil” enhances Internet user confusion, because it relates directly to Complainant’s business.

 

Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in <oilchevron.com>. Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name, nor has Complainant authorized Respondent to use the CHEVRON mark for any purpose. Respondent also fails to use the domain name in connection with any bona fide offering of goods or services, but instead uses it to ‘pass off’ as Complainant to conduct a phishing scam through an email account attached to the disputed domain name. Through this email account, Respondent solicits sensitive information from Complainant’s would-be customers, presumably intending to generate financial gain.

 

Respondent registered and continues to use <oilchevron.com> in bad faith. Respondent’s use of the disputed domain involves using email from the at-issue domain name to pose as Complainant which disrupts Complainant’s business and also allows Respondent to financially profit by exploiting the sensitive user information it obtains through a phishing scheme. Additionally, the existence of Respondent’s phishing scheme itself is evidence of bad faith use and registration of the disputed domain name. Finally, the fact that the word “oil’ was added to the domain name at issue indicates that Respondent has actual notice of Complainant’s trademark and its involvement in the oil industry, which further evinces bad faith on the part of Respondent.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Complainant owns a USPTO trademark registration for its CHEVRON mark as well as numerous other registrations worldwide.

 

Respondent registered the at-issue domain name subsequent to Complainant’s acquisition of rights in the CHEVRON mark.

 

Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark.

 

Respondent uses email originating from the at-issue domain name to impersonate Complainant in furtherance of a phishing scheme.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory.  See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The at-issue domain name is confusingly similar to a trademark in which Complainant has rights.

 

Complainant’s registration of the CHEVRON mark with the USPTO as well as numerous other registration worldwide establishes its rights in a mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Chevron Texaco Corp. v. Domains a/k/a Best Domains,

FA0137035 (Forum Jan. 20, 2003) (finding rights established in the CHEVRON mark through registration with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, other governmental organizations worldwide, and widespread, continuous use of the mark in commerce).

 

Respondent’s <oilchevron.com> domain name contains Complainant’s CHEVRON mark in its entirety prefaced with the suggestive/descriptive term “oil.” The top level domain name “.com” is appended to the “oilchevron” string to complete the domain name. The differences between Respondent’s domain name and Complainant’s trademark are insufficient to differentiate one from the other for the purpose of the Policy. In fact, Respondent’s use of the term “oil” in the domain name is suggestive of Complainant’s petroleum related business and thus adds to any confusion between the domain name and Complainant’s trademark. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent’s domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s CHEVRON mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Abbott Laboratories v. Miles White, FA 1646590 (Forum Dec. 10, 2015) (holding that the addition of descriptive terms, particularly terms that pertain to complainant’s business, do not adequately distinguish a disputed domain name from complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Antigua Domains, FA 1073020 (Forum Oct. 17, 2007) (“[T]he inclusion of the generic top-level domain ‘.com’ is inconsequential to the Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) analysis, as a top-level domain is required of all domain names.”).

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the domain name.

 

Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests.  See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Forum Aug. 18, 2006). Since Respondent failed to respond and as discussed below there is no evidence supporting a finding pursuant to Policy 4(c) that Respondent has rights or interests in the at-issue domain name, Complainant’s prima facie showing acts conclusively.

 

WHOIS information for the at-issue domain name identifies the domain name’s registrant as “George Louis.” The record before the Panel contains no evidence that might otherwise tend to prove, contrary to the WHOIS information, that Respondent is commonly known by the at-issue domain name. The Panel therefore concludes that for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) Respondent is not commonly known by the at-issue domain name. See Coppertown Drive-Thru Sys., LLC v. Snowden, FA 715089 (Forum July 17, 2006) (concluding that the respondent was not commonly known by the <coppertown.com> domain name where there was no evidence in the record, including the WHOIS information, suggesting that the respondent was commonly known by the disputed domain name).

 

Additionally, Respondent uses the domain name to support an email address originating from the <oilchevron.com> domain name. By sending email which appears to be from a domain name sponsored by Complainant Respondent, perpetrates a foul phishing scheme. Respondent uses a careers@oilchevron.com email address to distribute fraudulent CHEVRON associated job applications and related documents to job seeker. After emailing phony detailed employment applications, travel documents and working documents to third party job seekers Respondent attempts to use the proprietary data contained in the job seeks’ returned papers to defraud both the job seekers and/or Complainant.  Using the domain name in this manner is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). See Chevron Intellectual Property LLC v. Thomas Webber / Chev Ronoil Recreational Sport Limited, FA 1661076 (Forum Mar. 15, 2016) (finding that the respondent had failed to provide a bona fide offering of goods or services or any legitimate noncommercial or fair use, stating, “Respondent is using an email address to pass themselves off as an affiliate of Complainant. Complainant presents evidence showing that the email address that Respondent has created is used to solicit information and money on false pretenses. The disputed domain name is being used to cause the recipients of these emails to mistakenly believe Respondent has a connection with Complainant and is one of the Complainants affiliates.”); see also, Morgan Stanley v. Zhange Sheng Xu / Zhang Sheng Xu, FA1501001600534 (Forum Feb. 26, 2015) (“The Panel agrees that the respondent’s apparent phishing attempt provides further indication that the respondent lacks any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”).  

 

Given the forgoing, Complainant satisfies its initial burden and conclusively demonstrates Respondent’s lack of rights and lack of interests in respect of the at-issue domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

The at‑issue domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith. As discussed below, Policy ¶4 (b) circumstance are present as well as other circumstances which lead the Panel to conclude that Respondent acted in bad faith pursuant to paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.

 

As discussed above regarding rights and interests, Respondent’s confusingly similar domain name was registered and used to help facilitate a phishing scheme whereby targeted internet users are tricked into giving up money and/or proprietary information to Respondent. Respondent fools the recipients of email originating from its <oilchevron.com> domain name into believing that such email is from Complainant. Use of the domain name in this manner is disruptive to Complainant’s business and demonstrates bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). Further, Respondent’s use of the at-issue confusingly similar domain name to capitalize on Complainant’s goodwill to attract internet job seekers and defraud them demonstrates Respondent’s bad faith registration and use of the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). See Perot Sys. Corp. v. Perot.net, FA 95312 (Forum Aug. 29, 2000) (finding bad faith where the domain name in question is obviously connected with the complainant’s well-known marks, thus creating a likelihood of confusion strictly for commercial gain); see also, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Bonds, FA 873143 (Forum Feb. 16, 2007) (“The Panel finds such use to constitute bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv), because [r]espondent is taking advantage of the confusing similarity between the <metropolitanlife.us> domain name and Complainant’s METLIFE mark in order to profit from the goodwill associated with the mark.”);see also, Monsanto Co. v. Decepticons, FA 101536 (Forum Dec. 18, 2001) (finding that the respondent's use of <monsantos.com> to misrepresent itself as the complainant and to provide misleading information to the public supported a finding of bad faith).

Indeed, Respondent’s phishing scheme is, in and of itself, evidence of bad faith registration and use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Emdeon Business Services, LLC v. HR Emdeon Careers, FA1507001629459 (Forum Aug. 14, 2015) (finding that the respondent had engaged in an email phishing scheme indicating bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii), where respondent was using the disputed domain name to send emails to internet users and advising them that they had been selected for a job interview with the complainant and was persuading the users to disclose personal information in the process).

 

Finally, Complainant’s CHEVRON mark is well-known and registered in many countries throughout the world. In light of the mark’s notoriety and Respondent’s overt use of the domain name to impersonate Complainant, including forging documents so that they appear to be proprietary to Complainant, there can be no doubt that Respondent was well aware of Complainant’s CHEVRON mark when it registered the confusingly similar <oilchevron.com> domain name. Registering a domain name with knowledge of another’s rights therein is indicative of bad faith under Policy ¶4(a)(iii). See also Minicards Vennootschap Onder FIrma Amsterdam v. Moscow Studios, FA 1031703 (Forum Sept. 5, 2007) (holding that respondent registered a domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) after concluding that respondent "actual knowledge of Complainant's mark when registering the disputed domain name").

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <oilchevron.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Paul M. DeCicco, Panelist

Dated:  June 11, 2017

 

 

 

 

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