Kohler Co. v Daniel Deal
Claim Number: FA1706001735077
Complainant is Kohler Co. (“Complainant”), represented by Paul D. McGrady of Winston & Strawn, Illinois, USA. Respondent is Daniel Deal (“Respondent”), Maryland, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES
The disputed domain names are <kohlergeneratorparts.com>, <kohlergeneratorservice.com>, <kohlermarinegeneratorparts.com>, and <kohlermarinegeneratorservice.com>, registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Fernando Triana, Esq, as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on June 8, 2017; the Forum received payment on June 9, 2017.
On June 9, 2017, GoDaddy.com, LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <kohlergeneratorparts.com>, <kohlergeneratorservice.com>, <kohlermarinegeneratorparts.com>, <kohlermarinegeneratorservice.com> domain names are registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the names. GoDaddy.com, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the GoDaddy.com, LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On June 9, 2017, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of June 29, 2017 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@kohlergeneratorparts.com, postmaster@kohlergeneratorservice.com, postmaster@kohlermarinegeneratorparts.com, postmaster@kohlermarinegeneratorservice.com. Also on June 9, 2017, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on June 29, 2017.
On July 5, 2017, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Fernando Triana, Esq, as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2.
Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
a. Complainant, founded in 1873, is a market leader in the power-generation industry.
b. Complainant operates under the trademark KOHLER in numerous countries, and has forty-four manufacturing plants, twenty-six subsidiaries and affiliates, and dozens of sales offices.
c. Complainant registered its trademark KOHLER with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (e.g. Reg. No. 590,052, registered May 18, 1954), and has rights in the mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
d. The disputed domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark because each merely appends a combination of the following words: “generator,” parts,” “marine,” and “service” and the generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com.”
e. Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.
f. Complainant has not licensed or otherwise authorized Respondent to use its trademark KOHLER.
g. Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names.
h. Respondent’s offering to sell the disputed domain names in excess of its out-of-pocket costs further evinces Respondent’s lack of rights and legitimate interests.
i. Additionally, Respondent does not use the disputed domain names for any bona fide offering of goods or services as the disputed domain names used to resolve to holding pages, and now resolve to webpages that disclaims any affiliation with Complainant.
j. Respondent registered the disputed domain names in bad faith.
k. Respondent offers to sell the disputed domain names to Complainant for $10,000.00 each, which greatly exceeds its out-of-pocket costs.
l. Respondent’s passive holding of the disputed domain names further evinces bad faith.
m. Respondent registered multiple confusingly similar domain names, which constitutes cybersquatting behavior.
n. Respondent must have had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the mark, evinced by the mere fact that Respondent registered multiple domain names incorporating the famous trademark.
o. Respondent’s subsequent use of a disclaimer on the resolving webpages does not avoid a finding of bad faith.
B. Respondent
a. The disputed domain names were purchased by Respondent on April 24, 2012.
b. There never was or has been any negligent or malicious intentions with the ownership of the domains.
c. Respondent works on Kohler Generators.
d. Respondent intends to use the disputed domain names to develop a help support service.
e. Respondent offered the disputed domain names at a reasonable price of $1250 each.
f. Currently, the disputed domain names display the following disclaimer: “This domain name and website is not owned, managed, or affiliated with or by Kohler, which is a USA-based company”.
C. Additional Submissions
a. Complainant
i. Respondent implied that Complainant should have taken action regarding the disputed domain names five years ago; however, there is no equitable doctrine of laches or estoppel in UDRP cases.
ii. The disputed domain names themselves trade off of Complainant’s KOHLER mark, which is registered in connection with generators and marine engines.
iii. Respondent’s use of a “disclaimer” cannot mitigate the evidence of his obvious bad faith activity involving the disputed domain names, and past panels have found that use of a “disclaimer” does not preclude a finding of bad faith.
1. Complainant owns the trademark KOHLER in the United States of America, since 1954, that is, before the disputed domain names were registered by Respondent.
2. Respondent was aware of Complainant’s rights in the trademark KOHLER, yet it incorporated it in the disputed domain names. Thus, Respondent used the trademark KOHLER to prevent Complainant from reflecting the trademark in the corresponding domain names and intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users, by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant's trademark.
3. Respondent has never been commonly known by the disputed domain names or the trademark KOHLER.
4. Respondent is not affiliated with Complainant in any way: Complainant has never authorized, contracted, licensed or otherwise permitted Respondent to use the trademark KOHLER, nor is Respondent an authorized vender, supplier or distributor of Complainant’s goods and services.
5. Respondent has the intention to sell the disputed domain name registration to Complainant for value in excess of Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the disputed domain names.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) The domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
This discussion, based on the evidentiary support submitted by the parties, will be developed as follows:
First of all, the Panel will determine whether or not the disputed domain names are identical or confusingly similar to the trademark in which Complainant has rights. Secondly, the Panel will verify if Respondent has any rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain names; and thirdly, the Panel will establish whether or not the disputed domain names have been registered and are being used in bad faith by Respondent.
Doctrine or Defense of Laches
Respondent mentions Complainant’s 5 years delay in filing the Complaint which is understood as a claim that this case should be precluded by laches.
Certain jurisdictions endorse the doctrine of laches which typically bars the recovery of damages incurred before the filing of a lawsuit and courts have concluded that the rationale behind the doctrine of laches does not militate against injunctive relief[1].
The remedies under the Policy are injunctive rather than compensatory in nature, and the concern is to avoid ongoing or future confusion as to the source of communications, goods, or services[2].
The Policy offers a limited remedy to avoid future confusion in the marketplace, and it does not contemplate that such a remedy would be unavailable because of delay in instituting a Policy proceeding.
Furthermore, lengthy delays in seeking legal or administrative remedies can often have the effect of eroding or undermining the complainant’s arguments with respect to the respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, or the respondent's alleged bad faith in registering and using the domain name.
Complainant contends to be the owner of the trademark KOHLER in the United States of America, registered on May 18, 1954, with registration No. 590,052, to identify internal-combustion engines for driving generators and for general power application.
a) Existence of a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights
Firstly, it is important to point out that Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires the existence of a trademark or a service mark. The industrial property rights are only acquired by registration before the competent office in a number of many jurisdictions of the world.
The worldwide-accepted definition of a trademark, involves the concept of distinctive force as the most relevant element. Said force gives the sign the capability to identify the products or services of its owner and differentiate them from the product and services of other participants in the market.
When a sign is registered as a trademark, it is surrounded by a presumption of sufficient distinctive force, and the owner is granted with an exclusive right over the mark, which entitles him to prevent any third party from using the registered sign or any other sign confusingly similar to it.
However, the UDRP does not discriminate between registered and unregistered trademarks[5] and thus, it is well established that a Complainant is not required to own a registered trademark to invoke the Policy. It is sufficient in certain common law jurisdictions, such as the United States of America, that Complainant has rights over an unregistered trademark as to deserve legal protection, based solely on its use in commerce.
In this case, Complainant proved its rights in the trademark KOHLER. Exhibits C to the Complaint:
· United States Trademark Registration No. 590,052 issued on May 18, 1954, for “internal-combustion engines for driving generators and for general power application”.
This information appears to be incontestable and conclusive evidence of Complainant’s ownership of the cited trademark and the exclusive right to use it in connection with the stated goods. The registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of validity, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is inherently distinctive[6].
Thus, Complainant established its rights in the trademark KOHLER[7].
Therefore, the Panel concludes that Complainant has demonstrated rights in the trademark KOHLER for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy.
b) Identity or confusing similarity between the Disputed Domain Name and the Complainant’s trademark
Complainant alleges that the disputed domain names are nearly identical and confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark since they fully incorporate the trademark KOHLER.
In the first place, before establishing whether or not the disputed domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark, the Panel wants to point out that the addition of generic top-level domain (gTLD), i.e., “.com,” “.biz,” “.edu,” “.org”, cannot be considered when determining if the registered domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the registered trademark[8]. Neither the addition of country-code top-level domains (“ccTLD”), i.e., “.co,” “.de,” “.cr,” “.es,” nor the insertion of a gTLD has a distinctive function[9].
UDRP Panels have unanimously accepted that the inclusion of the “.com” (gTLD), in the disputed domain name is not a factor in analyzing whether a disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the mark in which Complainant asserts rights. In the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks, D2000-0477 (WIPO July 20, 2000), the Panel stated that:
“[T]he addition of the generic top-level domain (gTLD) name ‘.com’ is without legal significance since use of a gTLD is required of domain name registrants, ‘.com’ is one of only several such gTLDs, and ‘.com’ does not serve to identify a specific enterprise as a source of goods or services.”
Furthermore, the Panel considers that the reproduction of the trademark KOHLER, by the disputed domain names, is sufficient ground to establish that the disputed domain names are confusingly similar to the trademark[10]. Especially since the disputed domain names reproduce entirely Complainant’s trademark without any other distinctive elements. Consequently, consumers will assume that the owner of the disputed domain names is Complainant.
In addition, the terms “generator parts”, “generator service”, “marine generator parts” and “marine generator service” included in the disputed domain name are not sufficient to make the disputed domain name different from the trademark KOHLER.
In fact, the terms “generator parts”, “generator service”, “marine generator parts” and “marine generator service” are descriptive elements referring to the goods and/or services offered by Complainant. This addition rather than distinguishing the disputed domain names from Complainant’s trademark makes it confusingly similar. Hence, the disputed domain names should be deemed as confusingly similar to the registered trademark[11].
Thus, by registering the disputed domain names, Respondent created a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s trademark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the domain names.
In consequence, as per this reasoning, the Panel finds that, in the present case, the disputed domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s trademark and thus, the requirement set forth in Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy is duly complied with.
a) Prima Facie Case.
Regarding this second element of Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, UDRP Panels have unanimously consented that requiring the complainant to prove the lack of rights or legitimate interests of the respondent in the disputed domain name is often an impossible task: it is not only a negative but also demands access to information that is mostly within the knowledge of the respondent[12].
In Julian Barnes v. Old Barn Studios Ltd., D2001-0121 (WIPO Mar. 30, 2001), the Panel stated that:
“Is the Respondent required to adduce any such evidence, if the onus is on the Complainant to prove the three elements of paragraph 4 of the Policy? While the overall burden of proof is on the Complainant, this element involves the Complainant proving matters, which are peculiarly within the knowledge of the Respondent. It involves the Complainant in the often impossible task of proving a negative. In the Panel’s view the correct approach is as follows: the Complainant makes the allegation and puts forward what he can in support (e.g. he has rights to the name, the Respondent has no rights to the name of which he is aware, he has not given any permission to the Respondent). Unless the allegation is manifestly misconceived, the Respondent has a case to answer and that is where paragraph 4(c) of the Policy comes in. If the Respondent then fails to demonstrate his rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name, the complaint succeeds under this head”.
Therefore, a Complainant is required to make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. Once this prima facie case is made, the burden of production shifts to Respondent, who must come forward with concrete evidence of its rights or legitimate interests[13]. If Respondent fails to do so, Complainant is deemed to have met the second element of Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names because of the following: i) Respondent has not been authorized by Complainant to use the trademark KOHLER in any manner; ii) Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain name to infringe Complainant’s rights in the trademark KOHLER and to trade off Complainant’s good will; iii) Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names; iv) Respondent does not use the disputed domain names for any bona fide offering of goods or services as the disputed domain names used to resolve to holding pages; and v) Respondent’s offering to sell the disputed domain names in excess of its out-of-pocket costs further evinces Respondent’s lack of rights and legitimate interests.
The Panel accepts these assertions as a prima facie case made by Complainant that shifts the burden of production to Respondent.
b) Respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in the disputed Domain Name.
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy includes an enunciative listing of circumstances that prove Respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name:
(i) before any notice of the dispute, Respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) Respondent (as an individual, business, or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) Respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Respondent states that he intends to use the disputed domain names to develop a help support service.
Simply stating that the disputed domain names are going to be used as a help support service is not evidence of Respondent’s rights or legitimate interest in them. Since their registration, Respondent has had enough time to prepare and use the websites of the disputed domain names; notwithstanding, it has not used them or proven that it has been preparing them to be used.
Accordingly, Respondent failed to prove that before receiving the written notice of the Complaint he was using or preparing a website to use the disputed domain names in connection with a bona fide offering of goods.
Respondent did not provide any evidence to prove that he is commonly known by the disputed domains[14], thus, the Panel must conclude that Respondent was not and has never been commonly known by the disputed domain names.
Respondent registered several domain names identical to Complainant’s trademark KOHLER to capitalize on Complainant’s trademark and goodwill by attracting internet users to the disputed domain names where, allegedly, Respondent will host a help support service.
Respondent has not used the disputed domain names. Consequently, Respondent is not making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain names. Failing to actively use the disputed domain names does not qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)[15].
Therefore, the second requirement of paragraph 4(b) of the Policy is met.
According to paragraph 4(b) of the Policy, the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:
(1) Circumstances indicating that Respondent has registered or has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(2) Respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(3) Respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(4) By using the domain name, Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to his/her website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of his/her website or location or of a product or service on his/her website or location.
Complainant sent Respondent a letter (Exhibit D to the Complaint), requesting Respondent to transfer the disputed domain name. Respondent replied to the letter and offered to sell the for USD $10,000, each. Respondent asserts that initially, he offered the disputed domain names for USD $1,250, each. Notwithstanding, there is no evidence of such offer. Respondent asking price of USD $10,000, is a value that exceeds the out-of-pocket costs of the disputed domain names, especially given that any value that the domain name has, is attributable to Complainant’s trademark KOHLER antiquity and good will.
Thus, this Panel deems that the mere fact of knowingly incorporating a third-party’s trademark in a domain name constitutes registration in bad faith[16]. In this case, based on Respondent’s emails, it is clear that Respondent knew Complainant’s trademarks before registering the disputed domain names.
As stated by the panel in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sotelo, the requirement of use in bad faith does not require that it prove in every instance that a respondent is taking positive action.
The mere failure to make an active use of the disputed domain names is indicative of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii)[17].
The passive holding of the disputed domain names in sum with Respondent’s registration of multiple domain names incorporating Complainant’s trademarks, establishes a pattern of bad faith registration.
In addition, Respondent’s intended use of the disputed domain names will disrupt Complainant’s business. Respondent’s intended use will falsely suggest sponsorship and/or endorsement by Complainant of Respondent’s website and use of the disputed domain names; and the disclaimer within the resolving sites is not enough to prevent consumer’s confusion.
Moreover, Respondent has the capacity to create a help support service website without using third party’s trademarks in the domain name.
Hence, trying to sell the disputed domain names at a value that exceeds the out-of-pocket costs, even though Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights over the trademark KOHLER, is evidence that Respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling the domain name registration to Complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of Respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name, is indicative of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Moreover, the disputed domain name incorporating Complainant’s trademark, possibly disrupts Complainant’s business and creates a likelihood of confusion with Complainant's trademark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement, thus, evidencing a bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(i) and (iv).
Therefore, the three elements of the Policy ¶ 4(a) are satisfied in the present case.
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <kohlergeneratorparts.com>, <kohlergeneratorservice.com>, <kohlermarinegeneratorparts.com>, and <kohlermarinegeneratorservice.com> domain names be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Fernando Triana, Esq, Panelist
Dated: July 14, 2017
[1] Mile, Inc. v. Michael Burg, D2010-2011 (WIPO, February 7, 2011) (The parties in the current proceeding are both located in the United States, where courts recognize the equitable doctrine of laches, which can result in the dismissal of a complaint for undue delay in asserting legal claims. However, in the United States, the defense of laches typically bars the recovery of damages incurred before the filing of a lawsuit, and courts have concluded that the rationale behind the doctrine of laches does not militate against injunctive relief in a trademark action that seeks to avoid future confusion in the marketplace). See 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (4th ed. 2005) §31:10, p. 31-35 and cases cited therein. The remedies under the Policy are similarly injunctive rather than compensatory in nature, and the focus is on avoiding confusion in the future as to the source of goods or services. Thus, UDRP panels have generally declined to apply the doctrine of laches. See, e.g., Progman Consulting Oy v. Whois Watchdog, WIPO Case No. D2010-1393 (“It is by now well established that trademark doctrines of laches or estoppel have not been incorporated into the Policy”); The E.W. Scripps Company, supra (the Policy does not contemplate a defense of laches, which is inimical to the Policy’s purposes); see also cases cited in the Index of WIPO UDRP Panel Decisions, sec. III(G)(1)(c)).
[2] See The Hebrew University of Jerusalem v. Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2002-0616; The E.W. Scripps Company v. Sinologic Indus., WIPO Case No. D2003-0447 (the Policy does not contemplate a defense of laches, which is inimical to the Policy's purposes). See also Tom Cruise v. Network Operations Center/ Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2006-0560 (finding no meaningful precedent under the Policy for refusing to enforce trademark rights based on delay in bringing a complaint).
[3] See City Bank v. Domain Admin / Inavit, Inc. FA1406001564337 (Forum July 21, 2014).
[4] See Mile, Inc. v. Michael Burg. D2010-2011 (WIPO February 7, 2011): (“The Panel considers it more appropriate to address such issues squarely within the terms of paragraphs 4(a)(ii) and (iii) of the Policy, rather than analyzing them under the equitable doctrine of laches”).
[5] See MatchNet PLC. v. MAC Trading, D2000-0205 (WIPO May 11, 2000); see also British Broad. Corp. v. Renteria, D2000-0050 (WIPO March 23, 2000).
[6] See Janus Int’l Holding Co. v. Rademacher, D2002-0201 (WIPO May 5, 2002).
[7] See Expedia, Inc. v. Tan, FA 991075 (Forum June 29, 2007) (“As the [complainant’s] mark is registered with the USPTO, [the] complainant has met the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”); see also Royal Bank of Scot. Group plc & Nat. Westminster Bank plc v. Soloviov, FA 787983 (Forum November 3, 2006) (“Complainant’s trademark registrations for the NATWEST mark with the United Kingdom Patent Office . . . establish Complainant’s rights in the mark pursuant to Policy ¶4(a)(i)”.); see also Google, Inc. v. DktBot.org, FA 286993 (Forum August 4, 2004) (“finding that the complainant had established rights in the GOOGLE mark through its holding of numerous trademark registrations around the world”).
[8] See Altec Industries, Inc. v. I 80 Equipment, FA 1437753 (Forum May 18, 2012).
[9] See YottaMark, Inc. v. Lukasz Chudy, FA 1392357 (Forum July 15, 2011)
[10] See ER Marks, Inc. and QVC, Inc. v. Hansmann, FA 1381755 (Forum May 6, 2011); see also Oki Data Ams., Inc. v. ASD, Inc., D2001-0903 (WIPO November 6, 2001).
[11] See Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. candrug, D2008-0382 (WIPO April 24, 2008) (“when a respondent merely adds generic or descriptive terms to a distinctive trademark, the domain name should be considered confusingly similar to the registered trademark”.); see also Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Monseen, D2003-0275 (WIPO May 30, 2003).
[12] See Arla Foods amba v. Bel Arbor / Domain Admin, PrivacyProtect.org, D2012-0875 (WIPO June 7, 2012); see also F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v. Bargin Register, Inc. - Client Servs., D2012-0474 (WIPO April 24, 2012).
[13] See Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO August 1, 2000).
[14] See Braun Corp. v. Loney, FA 699652 (Forum July 7, 2006).
[15] See Thermo Electron Corp. v. Xu, FA 713851 (Forum July 12, 2006) (“finding that the respondent’s non-use of the disputed domain names demonstrates that the respondent is not using the disputed domain names for a bona fide offering of goods or services under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)”); see also Household Int’l, Inc. v. Cyntom Enters., FA 95784 (Forum November 7, 2000) (“holding that the respondent’s “vague and unsupported assertion of ‘plans to sell household goods, supplies and appliances over the Internet’” was insufficient to be considered proof of a legitimate business plan”).
[16] See F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v. Bargin Register, Inc. - Client Services, supra. See Mothers Against Drunk Driving v. Marcus Finefrock, FA1304001492647 (Forum May 15, 2013).
[17] See State Farm Mut.Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sotelo, FA 1008269 (Forum July 17, 2007); see also Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Risser, FA 93761 (Forum May 18, 2000).
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