Quicken Loans Inc. v. Closing and Title Services, LLC
Claim Number: FA1709001751663
Complainant is Quicken Loans Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by Christopher T. Varas, Washington, USA. Respondent is Closing and Title Services, LLC (“Respondent”), Panama.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <quickienloans.com>, registered with NameCheap, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Hon. Karl v. Fink (Ret.) as Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on September 29, 2017; the Forum received payment on September 29, 2017.
On October 2, 2017, NameCheap, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <quickienloans.com> domain name is registered with NameCheap, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. NameCheap, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the NameCheap, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On October 3, 2017, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of October 23, 2017 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@quickienloans.com. Also on October 3, 2017, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On October 27, 2017, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Hon. Karl V. Fink (Ret.) as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant provides online mortgage loans and loan-related goods and services. Complainant uses the QUICKEN LOANS mark in conjunction with its business practices. Complainant registered the QUICKEN LOANS mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (Reg. No. 2,528,282, registered Jan. 8, 2002). Respondent’s <quickienloans.com> is confusingly similar to Complainant’s QUICKEN LOANS mark because it incorporates the mark in its entirety, misspelling the word “quicken” by adding an extra “i” and appending the “.com” generic top level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in <quickienloans.com>. Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use the QUICKEN LOANS mark in any regard, nor is Respondent affiliated with Complainant. Respondent has not made a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain. Respondent’s <quickienloans.com> attempts to impersonate Complainant through fraudulent emails, using the email address <sarahwilliamson@quickienloans.com> to phish for users’ personal and company information.
Respondent registered and is using <quickienloans.com> in bad faith. The disputed domain name is used to phish for users’ personal and company information through fraudulent emails sent by <sarahwilliamson@quickienloans.com>. Moreover, Respondent has engaged in typosquatting. Respondent registered <quickienloans.com> with actual knowledge of Complainant and its rights to the QUICKEN LOANS mark.
B. Respondent
Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.
For the reasons set forth below, the Panel finds Complainant is entitled to the requested relief of transfer of the <quickienloans.com> domain name.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:
(1) the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and
(2) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory. See Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Forum July 31, 2000) (holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true); see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”).
Complainant provides online mortgage loans and loan-related goods and services. Complainant uses the QUICKEN LOANS mark in conjunction with its business practices. Complainant claims it registered the QUICKEN LOANS mark with USPTO (Reg. No. 2,528,282, registered Jan. 8, 2002). The consensus among panels is that registrations with USPTO are sufficient to show rights in a mark. See Liberty Global Logistics, LLC v. damilola emmanuel / tovary services limited, FA 1738536 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017) (stating, “Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes the required rights in the mark for purposes of the Policy.”). Therefore, the Panel determines that Complainant’s registration with USPTO is sufficient to show rights in the QUICKEN LOANS mark.
Complainant asserts that Respondent’s <quickienloans.com> is confusingly similar to Complainant’s QUICKEN LOANS mark because it incorporates the mark in its entirety, misspelling the word “quicken” by adding an extra “i” and appending the “.com” gTLD. “Where a respondent has created a domain name in an effort to visually deceive Internet users via a simple misspelling (and when such misspellings are visually similar to the mark), a finding of confusing similarity under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) is appropriate.” Acme Lift Company, L.L.C. v. VistaPrint Technologies Ltd, FA 1607039 (Forum Apr. 11, 2015). Moreover, the addition of a letter and a gTLD to a mark do not remove the disputed domain name from the realm of confusing similarity. See TripAdvisor, LLC / Smarter Travel Media LLC / Jetsetter, Inc. v. RAKSHITA MERCANTILE PRIVATE LIMITED, FA 1623459 (Forum July 17, 2015) (“Adding a single letter is not enough to prevent a domain name from being confusingly similar to a mark.”); Gardline Surveys Ltd. v. Domain Fin. Ltd., FA 153545 (Forum May 27, 2003) (“The addition of a top-level domain is irrelevant when establishing whether or not a mark is identical or confusingly similar, because top-level domains are a required element of every domain name.”). The Panel concludes that Respondent’s <quickienloans.com> is confusingly similar to Complainant’s QUICKEN LOANS mark.
Complainant has proved this element.
Complainant must first make a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), and then the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Hanna-Barbera Prods., Inc. v. Entm’t Commentaries, FA 741828 (Forum Aug. 18, 2006) (holding that the complainant must first make a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under UDRP ¶ 4(a)(ii) before the burden shifts to the respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name); see also AOL LLC v. Gerberg, FA 780200 (Forum Sept. 25, 2006) (“Complainant must first make a prima facie showing that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interest in the subject domain names, which burden is light. If Complainant satisfies its burden, then the burden shifts to Respondent to show that it does have rights or legitimate interests in the subject domain names.”).
Complainant argues that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in <quickienloans.com>. In support of its argument, Complainant demonstrates that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. WHOIS information associated with this case identifies Respondent as “Closing and Title Services, LLC.” The respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name where there is no evidence in the record, including the WHOIS information, suggesting that the respondent is commonly known by that name. See Coppertown Drive-Thru Sys., LLC v. Snowden, FA 715089 (Forum July 17, 2006). Therefore, “[g]iven the WHOIS contact information for the disputed domain [name],” the Panel may “infer that Respondent . . . is not commonly known by the [disputed domain name] in any derivation.” Wells Fargo & Co. v. Onlyne Corp. Services11, Inc., FA 198969 (Forum Nov. 17, 2003).
Complainant argues it has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use the QUICKEN LOANS mark in any regard, nor is Respondent affiliated with Complainant. Complainant contends that Respondent has not made a bona fide offering of goods or services, or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain. To support its contention, Complainant illustrates that Respondent’s <quickienloans.com> attempts to impersonate Complainant through fraudulent emails, using the email address <sarahwilliamson@quickienloans.com> to phish for users’ personal and company information. “Passing off in furtherance of a phishing scheme is not considered a bona fide offering of goods or services or legitimate noncommercial or fair use.” DaVita Inc. v. Cynthia Rochelo, FA 1738034 (Forum July 20, 2017). Likewise, “the respondent’s apparent phishing attempt provides further indication that the respondent lacks any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).” Morgan Stanley v. Zhange Sheng Xu / Zhang Sheng Xu, FA1501001600534 (Forum Feb. 26, 2015). Given the evidence provided, the Panel determines that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain name evinces a lack of rights or legitimate interests in <quickienloans.com> pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii).
Complainant has proved this element.
Complainant maintains that Respondent registered and is using <quickienloans.com> in bad faith. Complainant asserts that the disputed domain name is used to phish for users’ personal and company information through fraudulent emails sent by <sarahwilliamson@quickienloans.com>. The respondent’s apparent use of the disputed domain name in furtherance of a phishing scheme further establishes its bad faith registration and use of the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Google Inc. v. Domain Admin / Whois Privacy Corp., FA1506001622862 (Forum Aug. 10, 2015). Furthermore, “[r]espondent’s use of the domain name’s e-mail suffix for fraudulent purposes illustrates Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) bad faith.” SHUAA Capital psc v. Oba Junkie / shuaa capital psc, FA14009001581255 (Forum Oct. 29, 2014). Therefore, the Panel determines that Respondent’s use of <quickienloans.com> in furtherance of a phishing scheme demonstrates bad faith registration pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Next, Complainant argues that Respondent has engaged in typosquatting.
“Typosquatting is a practice whereby a domain name registrant, such as Respondent, deliberately introduces typographical errors or misspellings into a trademark and then uses the string in a domain name. The conniving registrant wishes and hopes that Internet users will inadvertently type the malformed trademark or read the domain name and believe it is legitimately associated with the target trademark. In doing so, wayward Internet users are fraudulently directed to a web presence controlled by the confusingly similar domain name’s registrant.”
Webster Financial Corporation and Webster Bank, National Association v. IS / ICS INC, FA 16070016833 (Forum Aug. 11, 2016). The respondent’s registration and use of the disputed domain name capitalizes on the typographical error of internet users seeking the complainant's mark, evincing typosquatting and bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See K.R. USA, INC. v. SO SO DOMAINS, FA 180624 (Forum Sept. 18, 2003). The Panel finds that Respondent’s misspelling of “quicken” is an example of typosquatting and evidence of bad faith registration under the Policy.
Finally, Complainant asserts that Respondent registered <quickienloans.com> with actual knowledge of Complainant and its rights to the QUICKEN LOANS mark. “[A]lthough the UDRP does not recognize ‘constructive notice’ as sufficient grounds for finding Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) bad faith,” panels have found “actual knowledge through the name used for the domain and the use made of it.” Orbitz Worldwide, LLC v. Domain Librarian, FA 1535826 (Forum Feb. 6, 2014). Complainant also contends that in light of the fame and notoriety of Complainant's QUICKEN LOANS mark, it is inconceivable that Respondent could have registered the disputed domain name without actual and/or constructive knowledge of Complainant's rights in the mark. See Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc. v. Michael Bach, FA 1426668 (Forum March 2, 2012) (“Although Complainant has not submitted evidence indicating actual knowledge by Respondent of its rights in the trademark, the Panel finds that, due to the fame of Complainant’s [VICTORIA’S SECRET] mark, Respondent had actual notice at the time of the domain name registration and therefore registered the domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”). Therefore, since the circumstances indicate that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant's mark when it registered <quickienloans.com>, the Panel finds bad faith. Deep Foods, Inc. v. Jamruke, LLC, FA 648190 (Forum Apr. 10, 2006).
Complainant has proved this element.
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the <quickienloans.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
__________________________________________________________________
Hon. Karl V. Fink (Ret.) Panelist
Dated: October 30, 2017
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