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Google Inc. v. Raffaele Bassano
Claim Number: FA0401000232958
PARTIES
Complainant
is Google Inc. (“Complainant”),
represented by Rose A. Hagan, 2400 Bayshore Parkway, Mountain View, CA,
USA 94043. Respondent is Raffaele
Bassano (“Respondent”), Via
Garibaldi 8, Pornovo San Giovanni, BG, Italy 24040.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The
domain name at issue is <googlesex.info>,
registered with TuCows, Inc. d/b/a OpenSRS (hereinafter
“OpenSRS”).
PANEL
The
undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and, to
the best of his knowledge, has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this
proceeding.
The
Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.) as Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the “Forum”)
electronically on January 28, 2004; the Forum received a hard copy of the
Complaint on February 9, 2004.
On
January 30, 2004, OpenSRS confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name
<googlesex.info> is registered
with OpenSRS and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name. OpenSRS
has verified that Respondent is bound by the OpenSRS registration agreement and
has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in
accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the
“Policy”).
On
February 10, 2004, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of
Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline
of March 1, 2004 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint,
was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and
persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and
billing contacts, and to postmaster@googlesex.info by e-mail.
A
timely Response was received on February 11, 2004. However, the Response was neither properly served on Complainant
nor submitted in hard copy, and is thus not in compliance with UDRP Rule
5(b)(vii). Nor did the Response include
the certification statement required by UDRP Rule 5(b)(viii). For these
reasons, the Panel may choose not to consider the Response in reaching its
decision. See Six Continents Hotels, Inc. v. Nowak, D2003-0022 (WIPO
Mar. 4, 2003) (holding that Respondent’s failure to submit a hard copy of the
Response and its failure to include any evidence to support a finding in its
favor placed Respondent in a de facto default posture, permitting the
Panel to draw all appropriate inferences stated in the Complaint); see also
Talk City Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (concluding
that no weight would be afforded to the facts alleged in Respondent’s deficient
submission, partly because it “did not contain any certification that the
information contained in the e-mail was, ‘to the best of Respondent’s knowledge
complete and accurate’” in accordance with UDRP Rule 5(b)(viii)). However, the
Panel in its discretion elects to consider Respondent’s deficient Response. See
Strum v. Nordic Net Exchange AB, FA 102843 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 21, 2002)
(finding that formal deficiencies in the Response should be considered in
context of whether or not Respondent is a native English speaker in holding
that "[r]uling a Response inadmissible because of formal deficiencies
would be an extreme remedy not consistent with the basic principles of due
process").
On February 23, 2004, pursuant to Complainant’s request
to have the dispute decided by a single-member
Panel, the Forum appointed the
Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr. (Ret.) as Panelist.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
1.
The domain
name <googlesex.info>, which
fully incorporates Complainant’s famous trademark and trade name GOOGLE, is
confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE trademark and trade name.
2.
Respondent
does not have any rights or a legitimate interest in the domain name because
the domain name trades on the goodwill of Complainant’s GOOGLE mark and name,
and Respondent’s use of that mark and name is unauthorized. Respondent is not and has never been a
licensee of Complainant. Respondent is
not and has never been otherwise authorized by Complainant to use the GOOGLE
mark.
3.
Respondent’s
registration and use of the domain name meets the bad faith requirement
described in Paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP.
B. Respondent
Respondent
contends that the domain name is “free dominion” and contends that he has some
relationship with Google, but he does not elaborate.
FINDINGS
1. Google is one of the largest and
most recognized providers of Internet search services in the world and has used
the GOOGLE mark in conjunction with those services since 1997. Google’s primary website is located at <google.com>.
2. Currently, the GOOGLE search engine
has an index of over 3 billion web pages, and responds to more than 200 million
search queries per day. The GOOGLE
search engine offers Internet users an easy-to-use interface, advanced search technology,
and a comprehensive array of search tools.
In addition, the GOOGLE search engine allows Internet users to search
for and find content in many different languages; access stock quotes, maps,
and news headlines; access telephone book listings for every city in the United
States; and retrieve more than 18 million .PDF documents.
3. Google’s
website is one of the most popular destinations on the Internet. Google has consistently been honored for its
technology and its services, and has received numerous industry awards.
4. The
GOOGLE mark identifies Google’s unique search services, search engine
technology, and associated services.
Having been widely promoted among members of the general consuming
public since 1997, Google’s GOOGLE mark and name symbolize the tremendous
goodwill associated with Google and are property rights of incalculable
value. Furthermore, due to widespread
and substantial international use, Google’s GOOGLE mark and name have become
famous.
5. Google
is the owner of numerous United States trademark applications for the mark
GOOGLE. Google is the owner of
trademark registrations for the GOOGLE mark worldwide.
6. Google owns the domain name
<google.com>, which was registered on September 15, 1997 and which has
been used to identify Google’s website since on or about that date.
7. Google’s
trademark rights in its GOOGLE mark, based on its trademark filings in the
United States and elsewhere throughout the world, and on its common law rights
under United States law acquired through the extensive use of the GOOGLE mark,
trade name, and domain name, long predate Respondent’s registration of the
domain name <googlesex.info>
on June 28, 2002.
8. On June 28, 2002, Respondent
registered, without Complainant’s permission, the domain name <googlesex.info>.
9. Respondent uses the domain name <googlesex.info> for a web directory of pornographic content. This site prominently displays the word GOOGLESEX in large
letters at the top of each page of the site.
It also includes pornographic images, and causes pop-ups to appear on
the user’s screen asking if the user wishes to install software.
10. On December 1, 2003, Complainant
sent a cease and desist letter via email to the Respondent. On December 4, 2003, Respondent responded
(in Italian) that he was refusing to transfer the domain name unless
Complainant paid Respondent 5,000 Euro.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph
4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the
following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be
cancelled or transferred:
(1)
the domain
name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2)
the
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name;
and
(3)
the domain
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
Complainant has established rights in the GOOGLE
mark through widespread and global use of the mark in commerce, as well as
through registrations of the mark worldwide. See Janus
Int’l Holding Co. v. Rademacher,
D2002-0201 (WIPO Mar. 5, 2002) (finding that Panel decisions have held that
registration of a mark is prima facie evidence
of validity, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is inherently
distinctive. Respondent has the burden
of refuting this assumption); see also Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telepathy Inc., D2001-0217 (WIPO May 7,
2001) (finding that the Policy does not require that the mark be registered in
the country in which Respondent operates.
It is sufficient that Complainant can demonstrate a mark in some
jurisdiction).
The
<googlesex.info> domain name is confusingly similar to
Complainant’s GOOGLE mark. See Oki Data Ams., Inc. v. ASD
Inc., D2001-0903 (WIPO Nov. 6, 2001) (“the fact that a domain name wholly
incorporates a Complainant’s registered mark is sufficient to establish
identity or confusing similarity for purposes of the Policy despite the
addition of other words to such marks”); see also Arthur Guinness Son & Co. (Dublin) Ltd. v. Healy/BOSTH, D2001-0026 (WIPO Mar. 23, 2001) (finding
confusing similarity where the domain name in dispute contains the identical
mark of Complainant combined with a generic word or term). Respondent’s registration and use of the
domain name is designed to cause confusion among internet users as to
Complaint’s affiliation, or association with Respondent’s pornographic
website. See Google Inc
v. Mikel M.Freije, FA 102609 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 11, 2002) (finding
the domain name <googlesex.com> confusingly similar to Complainant’s
GOOGLE mark).
Accordingly,
the Panel finds that the <googlesex.info> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s GOOGLE mark under
Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).
Respondent’s
use of the disputed domain name to host an adult-oriented directory that
displays adult-oriented images is evidence that Respondent lacks rights and
legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. See Isleworth Land Co. v. Lost In Space, SA, FA 117330 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 27,
2002) (finding that Respondent’s use of its domain name to link
unsuspecting Internet traffic to an adult orientated website did not constitute
a connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or a noncommercial
or fair use); see also McClatchy Mgmt. Serv., Inc. v. Carrington, FA
155902 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 2, 2003) (holding that Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to divert Internet users to a website that features
pornographic material had been “consistently held” to be neither a bona fide
offering of goods or services . . . nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair
use).
Respondent is
not commonly known by the disputed domain name, and thus does not have rights
or legitimate interest in the domain name. See Victoria’s Secret v.
Asdak, FA 96542 (Nat.
Arb. Forum Feb. 28, 2001) (finding sufficient proof that Respondent was not
commonly known by a domain name confusingly similar to Complainant’s VICTORIA’S
SECRET mark because of Complainant’s well-established use of the mark); see
also Nike, Inc. v. B. B. de Boer,
D2000-1397 (WIPO Dec. 21, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests
where one “would be hard pressed to find a person who may show a right or
legitimate interest” in a domain name containing Complainant's distinct and
famous NIKE trademark).
Respondent’s
unsolicited offer to sell its domain name registration to Complainant for 5,000
Euro is evidence that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the
disputed domain name. See Am.
Nat’l Red Cross v. Domains, FA 143684 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 4, 2003) (“Respondent’s lack of rights and legitimate
interests in the domain name is further evidenced by Respondent’s attempt to
sell its domain name registration to Complainant, the rightful holder of the
RED CROSS mark.”); see also Mothers Against Drunk Driving v. Shin, FA
154098 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 27, 2003) (holding that under the circumstances,
Respondent’s apparent willingness to dispose of its rights in the disputed domain
name suggested that it lacked rights or legitimate interests in the domain
name).
Accordingly,
the Panel finds that Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in
the <googlesex.info> domain
name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
Respondent’s
unsolicited offer to sell its domain name registration to Complainant for 5,000
Euro is evidence that the domain name was registered and used in bad faith
pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(i). See Matmut
v. Tweed, D2000-1183 (WIPO Nov. 27, 2000) (finding bad faith under Policy
paragraph 4(b)(i) where Respondent stated in communication with Complainant,
“if you are interested in buying this domain name, we would be ready to sell it
for $10,000”); see also Dollar
Rent A Car Sys. Inc. v. Jongho, FA 95391 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 11, 2000)
(finding that Respondent demonstrated bad faith by registering the domain name
with the intent to transfer it to Complainant for $3,000, an amount in excess
of its out of pocket costs).
Moreover, Respondent’s registration of
the <googlesex.info> domain
name indicates Respondent was on notice of Complainant’s rights in the GOOGLE
mark. Respondent’s registration and use
of the disputed domain name despite actual or constructive knowledge of
Complainant’s rights demonstrate Respondent’s bad faith registration and use
pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135,
1148 (9th
Cir. Feb. 11, 2002) (finding that "[w]here an alleged infringer chooses a
mark he knows to be similar to another, one can infer an intent to
confuse"); see also Yahoo! Inc. v. Ashby, D2000-0241 (WIPO June 14,
2000) (finding that the fame of the YAHOO! mark negated any plausible
explanation for Respondent’s registration of the <yahooventures.com>
domain name); see also Google Inc. v. Jon G., FA106084 (Nat. Arb. Forum,
April 26, 2002) (opportunistic bad faith found where the respondent registered
domain name with knowledge of Complainant's GOOGLE mark and used the website to
trade on Complainant’s fame and goodwill); see also Google v. Abercrombie 1,
FA101579 ( Nat. Arb. Forum December 10, 2001) (“because of the famous and
distinctive nature of Complainant’s GOOGLE mark, [r]espondent is thought to
have been on notice of the existence of Complainant’s mark at the time
[r]espondent registered the infringing [domain name]”).
The
Panel thus finds that Respondent registered and used the <googlesex.info>
domain name in bad faith, and that
Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) is satisfied.
DECISION
Having
established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel
concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <googlesex.info>
domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
The Honorable Charles K. McCotter, Jr.
(Ret.), Panelist
Dated: March 8, 2004
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