Sacramento Home Loans, Inc. v. MH
Networks LLC and Alan Martin
Claim Number: FA0402000241937
PARTIES
Complainant
is Sacramento Home Loans, Inc. (“Complainant”),
represented by Stephen L. Davis, of Davis & Leonard, LLP,
451 Arden Way, Sacramento, CA 95815.
Respondent is MH Networks LLC and Alan Martin (“Respondent”), represented by James E. Starnes, of Starnes Law Firm, 22 W. Bryan Street, Suite 200, Savannah, GA
31401.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The
domain name at issue is <sacramentohomeloans.com>,
registered with Enom, Inc.
PANEL
The
undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to
the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this
proceeding.
John
J. Upchurch as Panelist.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainant
submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum (the “Forum”)
electronically on February 24, 2004; the Forum received a hard copy of the
Complaint on February 25, 2004.
On
March 1, 2004, Enom, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the domain name
<sacramentohomeloans.com> is
registered with Enom, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the
name. Enom, Inc. has verified that
Respondent is bound by the Enom, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby
agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance
with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On
March 8, 2004, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative
Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of March 29,
2004 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was
transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons
listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing
contacts, and to postmaster@sacramentohomeloans.com by e-mail.
A
timely Response was received and determined to be complete on March 26, 2004.
On
April 1, 2004 an Additional Submission was received from Complainant. The Additional Submission did not comply
with Supplemental Rule 7, as the Forum received payment after the
deadline. Nevertheless, the Panel has
waived the noncompliance and shall consider the Additional Submission.
On April 5, 2004, pursuant to Complainant’s request to
have the dispute decided by a single-member
Panel, the Forum appointed John J. Upchurch
as Panelist.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainant
requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A.
Complainant
1. Respondent’s
<sacramentohomeloans.com> domain
name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s Sacramento
Home Loans mark.
2. Respondent
does not have rights or legitimate interests in the <sacramentohomeloans.com> domain name.
3. Respondent
registered and used the <sacramentohomeloans.com>
domain name in bad faith.
B.
Respondent
1. Respondent
does not contest that the subject domain name and Complainant’s name are
facially identical.
2. Respondent
has rights and legitimate interests in the subject domain name.
3. Respondent
did not register and use the subject domain name in bad faith.
4. Complainant
is engaged in reverse domain name hijacking.
C.
Additional Submissions
1. Complainant
rebutted Respondent’s Response, asserting that late registration of the mark is
not dispositive, that it had used the mark continuously for over a decade
proceeding Respondents registration of the subject domain name, and that under
the circumstances the registration was in bad faith.
FINDINGS
The Panel finds in favor of Respondent
and denies the relief requested by Complainant.
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph
4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the
following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be
cancelled or transferred:
(1)
the domain
name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2)
the
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name;
and
(3)
the domain
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
The Panel finds that Complainant lacks rights to the SACRAMENTO
HOME LOANS mark merely because Complainant registered the name with the
California Secretary of State’s Office. See Netro Corp. v. Koustas, FA
109723 (Nat. Arb. Forum June
12, 2002) (“Registration of a company name with a state's secretary of state does not
create protectable rights under the Policy.”); see also Cyberimprints.com,
Inc. v. Alberga, FA 100608 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 11, 2001) (finding that,
without further evidence of common law trademark, the Complainant did not
establish rights to the CYBERIMPRINTS.COM mark within the meaning of Policy ¶
4(a)(i) by registering its company name CYBERIMPRINTS.COM, INC. with the
California Secretary of State).
Further, Respondent registered the disputed domain name on May 30,
2003. Complainant has stated that it registered the
service mark SACRAMENTO HOME LOANS with the Secretary of State of California on June 10, 2003, which is after Respondent’s registration of the domain
name. See Abt
Electronics, Inc. v. Motherboards.com, FA 221239 (Nat. Arb. Forum
Feb. 20, 2004) (finding that the "vast majority of decisions" under
Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) require a complainant's rights to predate a respondent's
registration of a domain name in order for a complainant to prevail.); see
also Phoenix Mortgage Corp. v. Toggas, D2001-0101 (WIPO Mar. 30, 2001)
(finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) “necessarily implies that Complainant’s rights
predate Respondent’s registration. . .of the domain name”); see also
Intermark Media, Inc. v. Wang Logic Corp., FA 139660 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb.
19, 2003) (finding that any enforceable interest that Complainant may have in
its common law mark did not predate Respondent’s domain name registration,
therefore finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) had not been satisfied).
Complainant cannot rely
solely upon its registration and use of the <sacramentohomeloans.net> domain name. The Panel finds that
without evidence to prove secondary meaning associated with Complainant’s
SACRAMENTO HOME LOANS mark, Respondent must prevail under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See
GLB
Servicos Interativos S.A. v. Ultimate Search Inc., D2002-0189
(WIPO May 29, 2002) (holding that Complainant’s mere possession of a domain
name registration, without demonstrating any common-law or registered rights in
a mark, was insufficient to grant standing to bring a claim under the UDRP); see
also Sampatti.com Ltd. v. Rana,
AF-0249 (eResolution July 31, 2000) (“[T]he mere fact of creating and operating
a company having as a name a common word plus a dot and a TLD suffix does not
give to the company itself the sole right to the word.”); see also
Weatherford Int’l, Inc. v. Wells, FA 153626 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 19, 2003)
(holding that simply operating under a business name does not, per se,
constitute secondary source identification sufficient to warrant a finding of
common law rights in a mark).
Furthermore, Respondent has merely registered a geographic term
alongside terms that describe the services it is providing at the disputed
domain name. Since geographic terms are
not afforded protection under the Policy, the Panel finds that Complainant cannot
prevail under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Port
of Helsinki v. Paragon Int’l Projects, Ltd., D2001-0002 (WIPO Feb. 12, 2001)
(finding that ICANN Policy does not provide protection for geographic names); see
also Neusiedler Aktiengesellschaft v. Kulkarni, D2000-1769 (WIPO Feb. 5,
2001) (“Geographic names can not be monopolized by registering a trademark or
company name. The use of geographic terms as such in domain names or otherwise
by third parties is generally possible despite a trade-mark registration.”); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)-(f); Lanham Act § 2(f) (A term is generally not
viable for registration if it is “merely descriptive” when applied to the goods
of the applicant.); see also General
Mach. Prod. Co. v. Prime Domains, FA 92531 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 16, 2000)
(finding that the term "craftwork" is in widespread use in a
descriptive sense and therefore Respondent has successfully rebutted
Complainant’s arguments and has proven that it is in the business of selling
generic and descriptive domain names such as craftwork.com).
The Panel finds that the domain name is
nothing more than a geographic term combined with a description of Respondent’s
services, which evidences rights and legitimate interests in the disputed
domain name. See Pocatello Idaho Auditorium Dist. v. CES Mkt’g Group, Inc.,
FA 103186 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 21, 2002) (“[G]eographic terms are rarely, if
ever, protected by trademark law because to do so would preclude others from
using such words in a descriptive manner. . . . To hold otherwise would preempt
the nominative or descriptive use necessary to refer to the location in
question”); see also Sorel Corp.
v. Domaine Sales Ltd., FA 96674 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 28, 2001) (finding
that Respondent showed that the SOREL name is used as a geographic term; thus,
the complainant cannot claim an exclusive right to use the name as it is not
exclusively associated with Complainant’s business).
Respondent asserts that it “owns or
controls the ‘loans’ and ‘home loans’ Internet domains for almost every major
city and state in the United States, and several others worldwide.” Response at
4. The disputed domain name is one such
geographically oriented name as it incorporates the term “Sacramento,” which
describes the city that Respondent is marketing its loan services to. The Panel finds that Respondent is using the
domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services
under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a fair use under Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) by using the name
to further Respondent’s own business plan and to provide an Internet tool
whereby consumers can logically and easily locate lenders within their own
immediate geographical area. See Energy
Source Inc. v. Your Energy Source, FA 96364 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 19, 2001)
(finding that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the domain name
where “Respondent has persuasively shown that the domain name is comprised of
generic and/or descriptive terms, and, in any event, is not exclusively
associated with Complainant’s business”); see also Coming Attractions, Ltd. v. Comingattractions.com, FA 94341 (Nat.
Arb. Forum May 11, 2000) (finding Respondent had the right to register the
subject domain name, <comingattractions.com>, based upon the generic
usage of the term "coming attractions").
The
Panel finds under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii) that Complainant has furnished no evidence
to show that Complainant’s business has been disrupted. See PRL USA
Holdings, Inc. v. Polo, D2002-0148 (WIPO Apr. 29, 2002) (finding that
because Complainant failed to provide any factual allegations as to the nature
of use of the disputed domain name, Complainant failed to prove that
Respondent’s domain names were being used in bad faith); see also Energy Source Inc. v. Your Energy Source,
FA 96364 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 19, 2001) (finding that Respondent successfully
rebutted Complainant’s averments that it registered and used the domain name at
issue in bad faith and that Complainant produced no credible evidence of bad
faith on the part of Respondent); see also Graman USA Inc. v. Shenzhen
Graman Indus. Co. FA 133676 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 16, 2003) (finding that
general allegations of bad faith without supporting facts or specific examples
do not supply a sufficient basis upon which the Panel may conclude that
Respondent acted in bad faith); see also Successful Money Mgmt. Seminars, Inc. v. Direct Mail Express, FA
96457 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 7, 2001) (finding the domain name
<seminarsuccess.com> to be generic and that Respondent registered and
used the domain name in good faith “because Respondent selected the name in
good faith for its web site, and was offering services under the domain name
prior to the initiation of the dispute”).
The
Panel finds that the disputed domain name registration preceded any rights
Complainant may now have in the SACRAMENTO HOME LOANS mark; thus, Respondent
could not have registered the disputed domain name in bad faith. See Ode v. Intership Ltd., D2001-0074 (WIPO
May 1, 2001) (“We are of the unanimous view
that the trademark must predate the domain name.”); see also Interep Nat'l Radio Sales, Inc. v. Internet
Domain Names, Inc., D2000-0174 (WIPO May 26, 2000) (finding no bad faith
where Respondent registered the domain prior to Complainant’s use of the mark);
see also Aspen Grove, Inc. v. Aspen Grove, D2001-0798 (WIPO Oct. 5,
2001) (finding that it is impossible for Respondent to register a disputed
domain name in bad faith if Complainant's company did not exist at the time of
registration); see also Open Sys.
Computing AS v. degli Alessandri, D2000-1393 (WIPO Dec. 11, 2000) (finding
no bad faith where Respondent registered the domain name in question before
application and commencement of use of the trademark by Complainant).
Respondent
argues under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv), “no reasonable consumer could possible (sic)
confuse the two entities or their websites, which contain accurate contact
information. If anything, Respondent’s
lending services network has driven consumers to Complainant’s website, or
other websites, which have chosen domain names connecting geographical regions
with valuable products and services”. The Panel finds this argument to be
persuasive. See Schering AG v. Metagen GmbH, D2000-0728
(WIPO Sept. 11, 2000) (finding that Respondent did not register or use the
domain name <metagen.com> in bad faith where Respondent registered the
domain name in connection with a fair business interest and no likelihood of
confusion was created); see also Mule
Lighting, Inc. v. CPA, FA 95558 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 17, 2000) (finding no
bad faith where Respondent has an active website that has been in use for two
years and where there was no intent to cause confusion with Complainant’s
website and business); see also DJF
Assocs., Inc. v. AIB Communications, FA 95612 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 1,
2000) (finding Respondent has shown that it has a legitimate interest in the
domain name because Respondent selected the name in good faith for its website,
and was offering services under the domain name prior to the initiation of the
dispute).
The
Panel specifically finds that Respondent registered the disputed domain name in
good faith, which destroys any allegation of bad faith on the part of
Respondent. See Eddy’s
(Nottingham) Ltd. v. Smith, D2000-0789 (WIPO Sept. 7, 2000) (finding no bad
faith registration of the domain name where Respondent registered the domain
name in good faith in the interest of promoting Respondent’s business); see
also MatchMaker Int'l Dev. Corp. v. Kaiser Dev. Corp., FA 146933 (Nat. Arb.
Forum May 9, 2003) (Panelist David Sorkin, dissenting) (finding that
Respondent’s reasonable belief in its legitimate right to register the disputed
domain name precluded a finding of bad faith registration).
Reverse
Domain Hijacking
Respondent
alleges that Complainant is engaged in reverse domain name hijacking. The Panel declines to make such a
finding. See Credit Suisse Group v.
Leu Enters. Unlimited, FA 102972 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 23, 2002) (finding
no Reverse Domain Name Hijacking where “the Panel consider[ed] the Complaint to
have been misconceived rather than brought in bad faith”).
DECISION
Having
failed to establish all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the
Panel concludes that relief shall be DENIED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <sacramentohomeloans.com>
domain name remain with Respondent.
John J. Upchurch, Panelist
Dated: April 20, 2004
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