National Arbitration Forum

 

DECISION

 

Morgans Hotel Group LLC v. 1550507 Ontario Inc.

Claim Number: FA0505000488445

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Morgans Hotel Group LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Jennifer M. Mikulina, of McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 277 West Monroe, Suite 4400, Chicago, IL 60606.  Respondent is 1550507 Ontario Inc. (“Respondent”), represented by Glen A. Bloom, of Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, Suite 1500, 50 O'Connor Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1P 6L2.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAMES

The domain names at issue are <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com>, registered with Namescout.com.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Linda M. Byrne as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically on May 27, 2005; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint on May 31, 2005.

 

On June 1, 2005, Namescout.com confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the domain names <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com> are registered with Namescout.com and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Namescout.com has verified that Respondent is bound by the Namescout.com registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On June 1, 2005, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of June 21, 2005 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@clifthotelsf.com and postmaster@hudsonhotelny.com by e-mail.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on June 21, 2005.

 

Complainant timely filed an Additional Submission on June 24, 2005.  Complainant's Additional Submission addresses issues raised in Respondent's Submission.  Respondent timely filed an Additional Submission on June 30, 2005.  Respondent’s Additional Submission addresses issues raised in Complainant’s Additional Submission.  Both of these Additional Submissions were considered by the Panel.

 

On June 28, 2005, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Linda M. Byrne as Panelist.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain names be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant contends that Respondent's <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com> domain names are confusingly similar to its registered CLIFT HOTEL trademark and its common law HUDSON HOTEL trademark, that Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests with respect to either domain name, and that the infringing domain names have been registered and used by Respondent in bad faith.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent contends that the <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com> domain names are not confusingly similar to any mark in which Complainant has rights, that Respondent did not register the domain names in bad faith, and that Respondent has a legitimate interest in the domain names.

 

C. Additional Submissions

A timely Additional Submission was received from Complainant on June 24, 2005.  The submission addresses Complainant’s rights to the CLIFT HOTEL and HUDSON HOTEL marks, asserts that Respondent is not commonly known by the domain names, and asserts that Respondent’s business benefits financially from the use of the domain names by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s marks. 

 

The Panel received Respondent’s Response to Complainant’s Additional Submissions on June 30, 2005.  Respondent addresses the Hickory Farms decision (Hickory Farms, Inc. v. 1550507 Ontario Inc., FA 282454 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 12, 2004)).

 

 

FINDINGS

Complainant owns a U.S. trademark registration for CLIFT HOTEL (U.S. Reg. No. 2,412,031) for hotel and restaurant services.  This registration states that the CLIFT HOTEL mark has been used since 1915.  Complainant owns the Clift Hotel in San Francisco and the Hudson Hotel in New York City.  Complainant owns the <hudsonhotel.com> and <clifthotel.com> domain names.  

 

When a computer user enters <clifthotelsf.com>, the screen features the headline “clifthotelsf.com” and the statement “This domain was recently acquired by Pool.com.” When a computer user enters <hudsonhotelny.com>, the screen features the headline “hudsonhotelny.com” and the statement “This domain was recently acquired by Pool.com.”  Each website contains links to many third party websites, such as travel services and hotel-finding services for the cities of San Francisco and New York. 

 

Respondent carries on the business of operating a web site on the Internet under the domain name <pool.com> which provides up-to-date information to Internet users on current affairs as well as a search engine which enables users to locate and access other web sites containing information of interest to them.  Respondent generates revenue through its Pool.com service when Internet users click on the links identified in the list of the search results using the Pool.com search engine.  As part of its business, Respondent registers domain names that are released by administrators of top level and country code domain names and that have traffic generated to them.  Respondent detects these domain names automatically by multiple queries conducted through its search engines.

 

The <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com> domain names were identified by Respondent, via the above automated process, as being domain names that would expire in the near future.  Respondent used an automated query to determine the traffic generated by each of the web sites and subsequently placed a back order with Pool.com to register the domain names.  After registering the domain names, the domain names were associated with a website consisting of links to various hotels, travel services, and other types of products and services.  

 

In July 2003, Complainant’s attorney sent a letter to Respondent, requesting the transfer of the domain names.  Respondent declined to do so, arguing that it had registered the domain names for legitimate commercial purposes, in good faith and in furtherance of its business plan and objectives.  Complainant’s attorney sent a follow-up letter in December 2004 but received no response from Respondent. 

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)    the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(2)    the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)    the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

 

Complainant asserts rights in the CLIFT HOTEL trademark.  Complainant relies upon U.S. Registration Number 2,412,031, which was issued on December 12, 2000.  The mark is registered for “hotel and restaurant services,” and alleges a 1915 date of first use.  The registration has been assigned to Complainant.  The Clift Hotel is located in San Francisco, California.

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has established a presumption of valid trademark rights in the CLIFT HOTEL mark as the result of registration and assignment of rights.  See Janus Int’l Holding Co. v. Rademacher, D2002-0201 (WIPO Mar. 5, 2002) (finding that the registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of validity, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is inherently distinctive; the respondent has the burden of refuting this assumption); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. Thomas P. Culver Enters., D2001-0564 (WIPO June 18, 2001) (finding that a trademark registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office creates a presumption of rights in a mark).  Respondent’s argument that Complainant does not have rights to the CLIFT HOTEL mark in Canada is not relevant in this matter.

 

Complainant asserts common law rights in the HUDSON HOTEL trademark.  Complainant alleges that the HUDSON HOTEL is a large New York hotel and is a successor to a hotel that “had been a Manhattan mainstay for almost sixty years before Morgans Hotel Group purchased it in 1998.”  Based on the longstanding use of the HUDSON trademark by Complainant (and Complainant’s predecessor), Complainant concludes that common law trademark rights attach to the HUDSON HOTEL mark. 

 

The Panel finds that the HUDSON HOTEL mark, having been used for over fifty years in connection with Complainant’s (or a predecessor’s) hotel, has acquired secondary meaning.  Thus, Complainant has established valid common law rights in the mark.   See Gardner's Super Markets Inc. v. Ambassa Holdings, Inc., D2002-0253 (WIPO June 14, 2002) (“In determining whether the Complainant's mark has acquired secondary meaning, one must consider a variety of factors, including, but not limited to, advertising, promotion, sales, media coverage and the length, manner and exclusivity of use of the mark by the Complainant.”); see also Tuxedos By Rose v. Nunez, FA 95248 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 17, 2000) (finding common law rights in a mark where its use was continuous and ongoing, and secondary meaning was established).

 

Complainant argues that the disputed domain names, <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com>, are confusingly similar to Complainant’s CLIFT HOTEL and HUDSON HOTEL marks.  Specifically, Complainant contends that the addition of the letters “sf” in the former domain, and “ny” in the latter domain, fail to create sufficient differentiation between the domain names and Complainant’s marks.

 

The Panel notes that the disputed domain names, <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com>, were the subjects of a prior UDRP default decision.  The prior Complaint was filed by Complaintant’s predecessor in interest and and involved the two domain names at issue here, as well as several similar hotel-related domain names.  See Ian Schrager Hotels, L.L.C. v. R5 Group, FA 109370 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 30, 2002).  In that case, the panel determined that, in the absence of a response, the <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com> domain names were confusingly similar to the CLIFT HOTEL and the HUDSON HOTEL marks pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

In the two domain names at issue, Respondent has merely added the geographic abbreviations “sf” and “ny” to Complaintant’s marks.  The Panel concludes that these abbreviations are insufficient to avoid a finding of confusing similarity.  See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. credoNIC.com, FA 234367 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 23, 2004) (finding in a default decision that the <prudentialsf.com> domain name was confusingly similar to the complainant’s PRUDENTIAL mark, despite the addition of the geographic abbreviation for San Francisco, “sf”); see also Net2phone Inc. v. Netcall SAGL, D2000-0666 (WIPO Sept. 26, 2000) (finding that the respondent’s registration of the domain name <net2phone-europe.com> is confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark because "the combination of a geographic term with the mark does not prevent a domain name from being found confusingly similar"); see also VeriSign, Inc. v. Tandon, D2000-1216 (WIPO Nov. 16, 2000) (finding confusing similarity between the complainant’s VERISIGN mark and the <verisignindia.com> and <verisignindia.net> domain names where the respondent added the word “India” to the complainant’s mark).

 

Moreover, the omission of the word “the” from THE HUDSON HOTEL mark does not materially alter the mark so as to defeat Complainant’s claim of confusing similarity.  See Marriott Int’l v. Café au lait, FA 93670, (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 13, 2000) (finding that the respondent’s domain name <Marriott-hote.com> is confusingly similar to the complainant’s MARRIOTT mark); see also Space Imaging LLC v. Brownwell, AF-0298 eResolution Sept. 22, 2000) (finding confusing similarity where the respondent’s domain name combines the complainant’s mark with a generic term that has an obvious relationship to the complainant’s business); see also Body Shop Int’l PLC v. CPIC NET & Hussain, D2000-1214 (WIPO Nov. 26, 2000) (finding that the domain name <bodyshipdigital.com> is confusing similar to the complainant’s THE BODY SHOP trademark); see also Wellness Int’l Network, LTD v. Apostolics.com, FA 96189 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 16, 2001) (finding that the domain name <wellness-international.com> is confusingly similar to the complainant’s WELLNESS INTERNATIONAL NETWORK mark). 

 

In view of the above, the Panel finds that the <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com> domain names are confusingly similar to Complainant’s marks, and that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) has been satisfied. 

 

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

Complainant asserts that Respondent is not making a bona fide offering of goods or services, nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain names pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii).  The domain names resolve to websites that offer various links to hotel-related services in the cities corresponding to the domain names, specifically, San Francisco and New York. 

 

The Panel finds that this is not a bona fide offering of goods or services, nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain names pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii), because the services marketed at Respondent’s websites compete with those offered by Complainant under its marks.  See Computerized Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Hu, FA 157321 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 23, 2003) (holding that the respondent’s appropriation of the complainant’s mark to market products that compete with the complainant’s goods does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods and services); see also Chip Merch., Inc. v. Blue Star Elec., D2000-0474 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (finding that the respondent’s use of the domain names to sell competing goods was illegitimate and not a bona fide offering of goods); see also Coryn Group, Inc. v. Media Insight, FA 198959 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 5, 2003) (finding that the respondent was not using domain names for a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the respondent used the names to divert Internet users to a website that offered competing services with those offered by the complainant under its marks).

 

Complainant also asserts that Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain names pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  For example, nothing in the WHOIS registration information for the disputed domain names implies that Respondent is commonly known by either domain name.  See Tercent Inc. v. Lee Yi, FA 139720 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (stating “nothing in Respondent’s WHOIS information implies that Respondent is ‘commonly known by’ the disputed domain name” as one factor in determining that Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) does not apply).  Moreover, as Respondent was not commonly known by the domain names prior to their registration, Respondent cannot satisfy Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).  See RMO, Inc. v. Burbridge, FA 96949 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 16, 2001) (interpreting Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) "to require a showing that one has been commonly known by the domain name prior to registration of the domain name to prevail").

 

Respondent’s use of domain names confusingly similar to Complainant’s marks to promote competing hotel services is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). 

 

The Panel therefore finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain names and, thus, Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been satisfied. 

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

Complainant argues that Respondent’s bad faith is demonstrated by the following: 1) Respondent was aware of Complainant’s marks (either before or after Complainant’s letter in July 2003), yet Respondent refused to transfer the domain names to Complainant; 2)  Respondent has engaged in a “pattern of conduct” in order to prevent trademark owners from having domain names that include their trademarks; 3) Respondent has violated the U.S. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act; and 4) Respondent’s domain names make “it more difficult for web users to locate Complainant’s legitimate web sites,” and the domain names dilute the distinctiveness of Complainant’s marks.

 

Respondent counters each of the above arguments by stating: 1) Respondent was not aware of Complainant or Complainant’s marks prior to the date that Respondent registered the domain names because Respondent registered the domain names pursuant to an automated system that monitors soon-to-expire domain names; 2) Complainant has presented no evidence to establish a pattern of conduct; 3) the Anticybersquatting Act does not apply to Respondent, a Canadian company; and 4) despite Respondent’s activities, Complainant has been able to register the <hudsonhotel.com> and <clifthotel.com> domain names.

 

The Panel will not comment on each of the arguments set forth above.  However, the Panel concludes that Respondent has used and registered each of the domain names in bad faith.

 

In view of the similarity between Complainant’s marks and the domain names, this Panel concludes that Respondent is using the domain names to divert Internet users who may be searching for Complainant’s hotels.  Respondent’s practice of diversion, which is possibly motivated by commercial gain, is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).  See Perot Sys. Corp. v. Perot.net, FA 95312 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 29, 2000) (finding bad faith where the domain name in question is obviously connected with the complainant’s well-known marks, thus creating a likelihood of confusion strictly for commercial gain); see also Identigene, Inc. v. Genetest Lab., D2000-1100 (WIPO Nov. 30, 2000) (finding bad faith where the respondent's use of the domain name at issue to resolve to a website where similar services are offered to Internet users is likely to confuse the user into believing that the complainant is the source of or is sponsoring the services offered at the site); see also Luck's Music Library v. Stellar Artist Mgmt., FA 95650 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent had engaged in bad faith use and registration by linking the domain name to a website that offers services similar to the complainant’s services, intentionally attempting to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s marks).

 

It appears that Respondent has used and registered the domain names for the primary purpose of redirecting Internet traffic intended for Complainant to Respondent’s websites, i.e. websites that link to hotels that compete with Complainant’s hotels.  Registration of a domain name for the primary purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).  See S. Exposure v. S. Exposure, Inc., FA 94864 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 18, 2000) (finding the respondent acted in bad faith by attracting Internet users to a website that competes with the complainant’s business); see also EthnicGrocer.com, Inc. v. Unlimited Latin Flavors, Inc., FA 94385 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 7, 2000)  (finding that the minor degree of variation from the complainant's marks suggests that the respondent, the complainant’s competitor, registered the names primarily for the purpose of disrupting the complainant's business); see also Puckett v. Miller, D2000-0297 (WIPO June 12, 2000) (finding that the respondent has diverted business from the complainant to a competitor’s website in violation of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii)).

 

Respondent had actual or constructive knowledge of Complainant’s marks when Respondent registered and used the domain names, and actual notice was clearly established by Complainant’s letter of July 2003.  Registration of a domain name confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark, despite knowledge of Complainant’s rights, is evidence of bad faith registration and use.  See Samsonite Corp. v. Colony Holding, FA 94313 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 17, 2000) (finding that evidence of bad faith includes actual or constructive knowledge of a commonly known mark at the time of registration); see also Pfizer, Inc. v. Suger, D2002-0187 (WIPO Apr. 24, 2002) (finding that because the link between the complainant’s mark and the content advertised on the respondent’s website was obvious, the respondent “must have known about the Complainant’s mark when it registered the subject domain name”).

 

It appears that Respondent has registered and used the disputed domain names to misrepresent itself as having an association with Complainant as well as to market Complainant’s hotels and other hotels for profit.  This behavior typifies bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).  See Ian Schrager Hotels, L.L.C. v. R5 Group, FA 109370 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 30, 2002); Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co. v. Jtravel, FA 105960 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 30, 2002) (finding bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) under nearly identical facts); see also Fanuc Ltd v. Mach. Control Serv., FA 93667 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 13, 2000) (finding that the respondent violated Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) by selling used Fanuc parts and robots on its website at <fanuc.com> because customer visiting the site were confused as to the relationship between the respondent and the complainant).

 

In view of the above, this Panel concludes that Respondent has used and registered each of the domain names in bad faith.

 

 

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that the requested relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <clifthotelsf.com> and <hudsonhotelny.com> domain names be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

 

 

Linda M. Byrne, Panelist
Dated: July 14, 2005

 

 

 

 

 

 

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