The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, Direct Line Insurance plc, and Privilege Insurance Company Limited v. Demand Domains, c/o C.S.C.
Claim Number: FA0605000714952
PARTIES
Complainants are The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, Direct Line Insurance plc, and Privilege Insurance Company Limited (“Complainants”), represented by James A. Thomas, of Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein L.L.P., Post Office Box 389, Raleigh, NC 27602. Respondent is Demand Domains, c/o C.S.C. (“Respondent”), represented by Derek A. Newman, of Newman & Newman, 505 Fifth Avenue South, Suite 610, Seattle, WA 98104.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <privelage.com>,
registered with Enom, Inc.
PANEL
The undersigned certifies that he or she has acted independently and
impartially and to the best of his or her knowledge has no known conflict in
serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Hon. Nelson A. Diaz, Terry F. Peppard, and Anne M. Wallace as
Panelists.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complainants submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum
electronically on May 25, 2006; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard
copy of the Complaint on May 30, 2006.
On June 5, 2006, Enom, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National
Arbitration Forum that the <privelage.com>
domain name is registered with Enom, Inc. and that the Respondent is the
current registrant of the name. Enom,
Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Enom, Inc. registration
agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by
third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (the “Policy”).
On June 7, 2006, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of
Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline
of June 27, 2006 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint,
was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and
persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and
billing contacts, and to postmaster@privelage.com by e-mail.
On June 23, 2006, Respondent requested, pursuant to Supplemental Rule
6, an extension of 14 days to respond to the Complaint, because Respondent did
not procure counsel until June 20, 2006, leaving it with insufficient time to
investigate the underlying claim. On
June 26, 2006, the National Arbitration Forum, with Complainants’ consent,
granted Respondent an extension and set a new deadline of July 11, 2006 for a
filing of a Response.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on July
11, 2006.
A timely Additional Submission was received from Complainants on July
17, 2006 and determined to be complete pursuant to Supplemental Rule 7.
On July 19, 2006, pursuant to Respondent’s
request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, the National
Arbitration Forum appointed Hon. Nelson A. Diaz, Terry F. Peppard, and
Anne M. Wallace as Panelists.
A timely Additional Submission was received from
Respondent on July 24, 2006 and determined to be complete pursuant to
Supplemental Rule 7.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Complainants requests that the domain names be transferred from
Respondent to Complainants.
PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
A. Complainants
· Complainants assert that they have established rights in the PRIVILEGE mark and have used the mark to advertise and promote their insurance services under the trade name Privilege Insurance Company Limited. Complainants assert that they hold numerous registrations for PRIVILEGE and related marks, including registrations with the United Kingdom Patent Office and the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market.
· Complainants further assert that they and their affiliates own and use domain names incorporating the PRIVILEGE mark, including <privilege.com>, <privilege.co.uk>, and <privilegeinsurance.com>.
· Complainants maintain that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to Complainants’ PRIVILEGE mark because the disputed domain name is an intentional misspelling of Complainants’ mark and such use constitutes “typosquatting.”
·
Complainants assert that there is no evidence in the
record indicating that Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name
and, specifically, the relevant WHOIS
information lists the registrant of the domain name as “Demand Domains c/o
C.S.C.” Complainants also assert that
they have not authorized or licensed Respondent to register or use domain names
incorporating Complainants’ mark or any variation thereof.
·
Complainants
allege that Respondent is not using the disputed domain name in connection with
a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to
Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy
¶ 4(c)(iii), because the disputed domain name resolved to Respondent’s website
that redirects users to various websites offering, among other things, services
in direct competition with Complainants’ services.
·
Complainants allege that by directing insurance
purchasers to a web site offering competing services, Respondent is attempting
to generate revenue by diverting Internet users seeking Complainants’ services
to its own website through a false association with Complainants’ PRIVILEGE
mark.
B. Respondent
· Respondent alleges that its business is purchasing domain names with generic terms and misspellings of generic terms and using those domains to provide search services to Internet users.
· Respondent asserts that on these sites, Respondent provides consumers with information concerning various bona fide goods and services. Specifically, Respondent asserts that on the disputed domain <privelage.com>, it offers information concerning Complainants’ services as well as other services associated with the mark PRIVILEGE.
· Respondent asserts that Complainants lack rights in the PRIVILEGE mark because: (1) privilege is a generic term which appears in dictionaries; (2) Complainants do not hold any U.S. trademark registrations for the PRIVILEGE mark; (3) other entities use the PRIVILEGE mark in the U.S. in connection with insurance services; (4) numerous other entities in the United Kingdom use the PRIVILEGE mark in connection with services unrelated to Complainants’; and (5) a WIPO dispute resolution panel held that Complainants had no rights in the term “privilege.”
· Respondent asserts that it has rights in the PRIVILEGE mark because Respondent provides legitimate search related services, distributing content from Google, Yahoo!, and Overture, and because Respondent was not aware of Complainants or their mark at the time of Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name.
· Finally, Respondent asserts that its registration and use of the domain name is not in bad faith because one of the links on Respondent’s website is to Complainants’ services, and because Complainants have failed to show that consumers are likely to associate the word “privilege” with Complainants’ services.
C. Complainants’ Additional Submission
Complainants’ additional submission reiterates their position that they
have rights in the PRIVILEGE mark, that Respondent, who by its own admission
selected an intentional misspelling of Complainants’ mark to offer links to
services related to Complainants has no rights or legitimate interests in the
mark, and that Respondent’s registration and use is in bad faith.
D. Respondent’s Additional Submission
Respondent’s additional submission similarly reiterates its position
that it has rights and legitimate interests in the use of the domain name to
provide its search related services, that Complainants’ rights in the PRIVILEGE
mark and weak and entitled to minimal protection, and finally that Respondent
did not register and does not use the domain name in bad faith.
FINDINGS
The Panel finds that Complainants have established rights in the
PRIVILEGE mark both in the United Kingdom and in the United States, and that
Complainants use the mark in connection with insurance services. The Panel finds that Respondent’s domain
name, <privelage.com>, is confusingly similar to
Complainants’ mark.
The Panel further finds that Respondent
is not commonly known by the domain name
for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) and has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name.
The Panel finds that the Respondent’s use of the domain name to operate a website featuring links
to competing services is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), nor a
legitimate non-commercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).
DISCUSSION
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a
complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance
with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems
applicable.”
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainants must prove
each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name
should be cancelled or transferred:
(1)
the domain name
registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark
or service mark in which the Complainants has rights;
(2)
the Respondent
has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3)
the domain name
has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
The Panel finds that Complainant
has registered the PRIVILEGE mark with the United Kingdom Patent Office
(“UKPO”) (Reg. No. 2,324,008 issued March 12, 2004; Reg. No. 2,202,813 issued
May 31, 2002; Reg. No. 2,202,812 issued February 20, 2002) and has continuously
used the mark in connection with financial and insurance services since
1994. The Panel finds that
Complainants’ UK trademark registrations are sufficient for Complainants to
establish rights in the PRIVILEGE mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc
v. TRB, FA 622345 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 22, 2006) (“The Panel accepts
Complainants’ registration of the THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND mark with the
United Kingdom Patent Office as evidence of Complainants’ rights in the mark pursuant
to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”); see also Miller Brewing Co. v. The Miller Family,
FA 104177 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 15, 2002) (finding that the complainant had
established rights to the MILLER TIME mark through its federal trademark
registrations).
The Panel finds that Respondent’s <privelage.com> domain name is
confusingly similar to Complainants’ PRIVILEGE mark because the disputed domain
name contains a common misspelling of Complainants’ mark and merely substitutes
the second “i” for an “e” and “e” for an “a.”
The Panel finds that merely by misspelling Complainants’ mark,
Respondent has not sufficiently differentiated the <privelage.com> domain name from the PRIVILEGE mark under
Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Zuccarini, FA 94454 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 30, 2000)
(finding the domain name <hewlitpackard.com> to be identical or
confusingly similar to the complainant’s HEWLETT-PACKARD mark); see also
Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Karpachev, D2000-1571 (WIPO Jan. 15, 2001)
(finding that the domain names <tdwatergouse.com> and
<dwaterhouse.com> are virtually identical to the complainant’s TD
WATERHOUSE name and mark).
Complainants have not registered the PRIVILEGE mark in the United States, where Respondent resides. However, the Panel finds that the Policy does not require a complainant to own a trademark registration in the country of the respondent’s residence in order for a complainant to show rights in a mark. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent’s argument has no merit under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Telepathy Inc., D2001-0217 (WIPO May 7, 2001) (finding that the Policy does not require that the mark be registered in the country in which the respondent operates; therefore it is sufficient that the complainant can demonstrate a mark in some jurisdiction); see also KCTS Television Inc. v. Get-on-the-Web Ltd., D2001-0154 (WIPO Apr. 20, 2001) (holding that it does not matter for the purpose of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy whether the complainant’s mark is registered in a country other than that of the respondent’s place of business). The Panel further finds that Respondent’s attempts to undercut the weight of Complainants’ rights by pointing out that Complainants’ do not allege any rights in the U.S. is particularly irrelevant in light of Respondent’s specific targeting of customers in the United Kingdom, as evidenced by content on Respondent’s website, for example a link titled “Privilege Car Insurance, UK Apply here.”
Finally, the Panel finds Respondent’s
reliance on Direct Line Ins. Plc., et al.
v. Snook, D2002-0870 (WIPO Nov. 6, 2002) is misplaced for two reasons. First, the relevance of that decision is
greatly diminished by the fact that, subsequent to that decision, Complainants’
applied for and received registration for their PRIVILEGE mark in the United
Kingdom. Second, and more importantly,
the question of Complainants’ rights in the PRIVILEGE mark was not squarely
before that panel. At issue in that
case was whether the domain name <ihateprivilege.com> was confusingly
similar to Complainants’ PRIVILEGE mark.
Any attempt by Respondent to analogize its case to that case is wholly
inapt. In that case, any potential for
customer confusion was severely diminished because it is obvious that a domain
name proceeded by “ihate” is not, in fact, the website for the product. Such is not the case here. By Respondent’s own admission, its use of
the <privelage.com> domain
name is intended to attract consumers seeking Complainants’ services.
The Panel notes that, once Complainants have made the necessary prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000-0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000) (holding that, where the complainant has asserted that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests with respect to the domain name, it is incumbent on the respondent to come forward with concrete evidence rebutting this assertion because this information is “uniquely within the knowledge and control of the respondent”); see also G.D. Searle v. Martin Mktg., FA 118277 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 1, 2002) (“Because Complainants’ Submission constitutes a prima facie case under the Policy, the burden effectively shifts to Respondent.”).
The Panel finds that Respondent is
not commonly known by the disputed domain name, and that Respondent does not
have rights or legitimate interests in the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶
4(c)(ii). See Broadcom Corp. v. Intellifone Corp., FA
96356 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 5, 2001) (finding no rights or legitimate interests
because the respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name or
using the domain name in connection with a legitimate or fair use); see also
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Onlyne Corp. Services11,
Inc., FA 198969 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 17,
2003) (“Given the WHOIS contact information for the disputed domain [name], one
can infer that Respondent, Onlyne Corporate Services11, is not commonly known
by the name ‘welsfargo’ in any derivation.”).
Respondent’s website at the <privelage.com> domain name is a commercial web directory
displaying links to Complainants’ competitors in the financial and insurance
services industries. Despite
Respondent’s assertion that there is a link to Complainants’ own website on
Respondent’s website, the link at Respondent’s <privelage.com> domain name actually resolves to the
<compare-carinsurance.com> domain name, a website displaying contact
information for twenty-one different automobile insurance providers in the
United Kingdom. The Panel finds that
Respondent’s use of the <privelage.com>
for commercial gain, presumably by earning “click-through” fees for each
consumer Respondent redirects to the websites of Complainants’ competitors,
does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant
to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to
Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). See Coryn Group, Inc. v. Media Insight, FA 198959 (Nat. Arb. Forum Dec. 5, 2003) (finding that
the respondent was not using the domain names for a bona fide offering
of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the
respondent used the names to divert Internet users to a website that offered
services that competed with those offered by the complainant under its marks); see
also Gardens Alive, Inc. v. D&S Linx, FA 203126 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov.
20, 2003) (finding that the respondent used a domain name for commercial
benefit by diverting Internet users to a website that sold goods and services
similar to those offered by the complainant and thus, was not using the name in
connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate
noncommercial or fair use).
The Panel also finds that because the <privelage.com> domain name is a common misspelling of
Complainants’ PRIVILEGE mark, Respondent has engaged in typosquatting, which
suggests that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the <privelage.com> domain name
pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). See
IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Ebeyer, FA 175292 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 19, 2003)
(finding that the respondent lacked rights and legitimate interests in the
disputed domain names because it “engaged in the practice of
typosquatting by taking advantage of Internet users who attempt to access
Complainants’ <indymac.com> website but mistakenly misspell Complainants’
mark by typing the letter ‘x’ instead of the letter ‘c’”); see also LTD Commodities LLC v. Party Night, Inc., FA 165155 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 14, 2003) (finding that
the <ltdcommadities.com>, <ltdcommmodities.com>, and
<ltdcommodaties.com> domain names were intentional misspellings of
Complainants’ LTD COMMODITIES mark and this “‘typosquatting’ is evidence that
Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names”).
The Panel finds that by redirecting
Internet users seeking Complainants’ financial and insurance services to
competing websites, Respondent has engaged in bad faith registration and use
pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii). See Mission KwaSizabantu v. Rost,
D2000-0279 (WIPO June 7, 2000) (defining “competitor” as “one who acts in
opposition to another and the context does not imply or demand any restricted
meaning such as commercial or business competitor”); see also S. Exposure v. S. Exposure, Inc., FA 94864 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 18, 2000)
(finding that the respondent registered the domain name in question to disrupt
the business of the complainant, a competitor of the respondent); see also EBAY, Inc. v. MEOdesigns, D2000-1368
(Dec. 15, 2000) (finding that the respondent registered and used the domain
name <eebay.com> in bad faith where the respondent has used the domain
name to promote competing auction sites).
Moreover, the Panel finds that,
pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv), Respondent has evidenced its bad faith by
diverting Internet users searching for Complainants’ financial and insurance
services to the websites of Complainants’ competitors for commercial gain,
presumably by earning referral fees for each consumer Respondent redirects to
other websites. See Luck's Music Library v. Stellar Artist Mgmt.,
FA 95650 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 30, 2000) (finding that the respondent engaged
in bad faith use and registration by using domain names that were identical or
confusingly similar to the complainant’s mark to redirect users to a website
that offered services similar to those offered by the complainant); see also
MathForum.com, LLC v. Weiguang Huang,
D2000-0743 (WIPO Aug. 17, 2000) (finding bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv)
where the respondent registered a domain name confusingly similar to the
complainant’s mark and the domain name was used to host a commercial website
that offered similar services offered by the complainant under its mark).
The Panel finds further that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Respondent’s registration and use of the <privelage.com> domain name is indicative of bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). See CBS Broad., Inc. v. LA-Twilight-Zone, D2000-0397 (WIPO June 19, 2000) (“[T]he Policy expressly recognizes that other circumstances can be evidence that a domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.”); see also Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Home Interiors, D2000-0010 (WIPO Mar. 7, 2000) (“[J]ust because Respondent’s conduct does not fall within the ‘particular’ circumstances set out in [¶ 4(b)], does not mean that the domain names at issue were not registered in and are not being used in bad faith.”).
The Panel finds that Respondent has engaged in
typosquatting by registering and using a domain name that is a common
misspelling of Complainants’ PRIVILEGE mark and redirecting Internet users
seeking Complainants’ financial and insurance services to competing
websites. See Myspace, Inc. v. Kang, FA 672160 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 19, 2006)
(“Respondent misspells the Mark with intent to intercept internet users from
Complainants’ web site, given the fact that Complainants’ website is a popular
website and the Disputed Domain Name is a misspelling of the Mark which is
highly likely to occur. This
typosquatting is evidence of bad faith.”); see also Nextel Commc’ns Inc. v.
Geer, FA 477183 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jul. 15, 2005) (finding that the
respondent’s registration and use of the <nextell.com> domain name was in
bad faith because the domain name epitomized typosquatting in its purest form).
DECISION
Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy,
the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <privelage.com>
domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainants.
Hon. Nelson A. Diaz, Terry F. Peppard, and
Anne M. Wallace, Panelists
Dated: August 2, 2006
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