Monsterops, LLC v.
Testosterone LLIC
Claim Number: FA1007001333475
PARTIES
Complainant is Monsterops,
LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Thomas J. Overton, of The Overton Law Firm,
REGISTRAR
AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at
issue is <testosterone.com>,
registered with Network Solutions, LLC.
PANEL
The undersigned
certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of
his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
FERNANDO TRIANA, Esq., as Panelist.
PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum
electronically on July 2, 2010.
On July 6, 2010, Network Solutions, LLC confirmed by e-mail to
the National Arbitration Forum that the <testosterone.com> domain name is
registered with Network Solutions, LLC
and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Network
Solutions, LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the Network Solutions, LLC registration agreement
and has thereby agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties
in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the
“Policy”).
On July 13, 2010, the Forum
served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the
Complaint, setting a deadline of August 2, 2010 by which Respondent could file
a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on
Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts,
and to postmaster@testosterone.com by
e-mail. Also on July 13, 2010, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent
of the email addresses served and the deadline for a Response,
was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons
listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing
contacts.
A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on August 2, 2010.
On August 12, 2010, pursuant to Complainant’s
request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the National
Arbitration Forum appointed Mr. Fernando Triana as Panelist.
On August 19, 2010, after reviewing all the
documents submitted by the parties, the Panel decided to request additional
evidence prior to issuing its decision.
The Complainant submitted a response to the
Panel’s order on August 26, 2010. The Respondent submitted its response on
August 20, 2010.
RELIEF
SOUGHT
Complainant requests
that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
PARTIES’
CONTENTIONS
A. Complainant
Monsterops, LLC submitted the complaint in July 2, 2010. However, in
reviewing the Complaint the Forum identified deficiencies and in consequence
required the Complainant to amend them.
An amended Complaint was received on July 12, 2010.
The Complainant makes the following assertions:
1. Respondent’s <testosterone.com> domain name is identical to Complainant’s
TESTOSTERONE trademark.
On May 19, 1997, Complainant applied to register the TESTOSTERONE
trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office –PTO- and on February
24, 2004, the United States Patent and Trademark Office –PTO- approved the
application and issued the Certificate of Registration No. 2,817,618.
2. Respondent does not have any right or
legitimate interests in the <testosterone.com>
domain name.
3. Respondent’s <testosterone.com> domain name is being held, but is not in
use. Upon information and belief, Respondent has never used the domain name.
4. Attempts to contact the Respondent have been
unsuccessful.
B. Respondent makes the following responses:
1. Respondent’s <testosterone.com> domain name is not identical to Complainant’s
TESTOSTERONE trademark.
2. Respondent registered the domain in good
faith in 1995, at a time when Complainant was not in business.
3. Respondent’s <testosterone.com> domain name is in use.
4. Respondent should be considered as having
rights and legitimate interests in respect to the <testosterone.com> domain name.
C.
Additional
Submissions
Complainant filed the following additional response, following the
Panel’s order dated August 19, 2010:
1.
The
attempts were made by prior counsel for Monsterops, LLC.,
Mr. Steven Sullivan. Due to the circumstances in which Mr. Sullivan stopped
representing the company, Monsterops LLC. is not able
to provide written evidence of the attempts made to contact the Respondent.
Respondent filed the following additional response, following the
Panel’s order dated August 19, 2010:
1.
Respondent
has not and never had, any services associated with the domain name <testosterone.com>. The Respondent uses the domain for things other than
web services.
FINDINGS
Paragraph 15 (a) of the Rules for Uniform
Domain Name dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to: “decide
a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in
accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law
that it deems applicable.” Likewise, paragraph 10 (d) of “The Rules”, provides that: “The
Panel shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of
the evidence.”
Paragraph 4 (a) of
the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three
elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or
transferred:
(1)
The domain name registered by the Respondent is
identical to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(2)
The Respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests in respect of the domain name;
(3)
The domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith.
DISCUSSION
A. Formal Deficiencies of
the Response
The Response filed by the Respondent, was administratively
deficient in a number of respects, taking into account the provisions contained
in Paragraph 5(b) of the UDRP Rules in force, including the following:
1.
The
response did not provide the name, postal and e-mail addresses, and the
telephone and telefax numbers of the domain-name holder and of any
representative authorized to act for the Respondent in the administrative
proceeding.
2.
The
response did not specify a preferred method for
communications directed to the Respondent in the administrative proceeding
(including person to be contacted, medium, and address information).
3.
The
response did not include the statement that a copy of the response has been
sent or transmitted to the Complainant, in accordance with Paragraph 2(b).
4.
No annexes
or documentary or other evidence upon which the Respondent relies was filed
with the response.
It is true
that there are no specific and uniform rules regarding when a deficient
response should be accepted or rejected. Each different panel has decided
according to the particularities of each case. Most panelists believe, and that
is also this Panel’s belief, that they are entitled to decide whether or not to
accept a deficient response.
The sole Panelist stresses the fact that the
Respondent’s submissions were filed by Mr. Andrew Brown, who appears to be the
Technical Contact for the registered domain and not a Respondent’s
representative. Respondent’s representative remains unknown to the Panel.
This
Panel finds that the deficiencies will not result in the rejection of the
Response. The response will be accepted
but will be studied and analyzed in light of the fact that it lacks supportive
evidence and/or documents to affirm any of the Respondent’s claims.
The first element of
the paragraph 4 (a) of the Policy requires existence of a trademark or a
service mark. The industrial property rights are only acquired by registration
before the competent office in many jurisdictions of the world.
Complainant alleges
that it holds the trademark Certificate of Registration No. 2,817,618 issued by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office –PTO- on February 24, 2004 for
its TESTOSTERONE trademark. Complainant
asserts that it applied for this trademark registration on May 19, 1997 and
that the Domain Name is identical with and confusingly similar to the
referenced trademark pursuant to the Policy paragraph 4(a)(i), because it
wholly incorporates the same with the addition of generic or merely descriptive
terms.[1] Complainant
also states that the first use of the TESTOSTERONE trademark took place in May
15, 1998.
The worldwide-accepted definition of a
trademark, involves the concept of distinctive force as the most relevant
element. Said force gives the sign the capability to identify the products or
services of its owner and differentiate them from the product and services of
other participants in the market.
When a sign is registered as a trademark, it
is surrounded by a presumption of existence of sufficient distinctive force,
and the owner is granted with an exclusive right over the trademark, which
entitled him to prevent any third party from using the registered sign or any
other sign confusingly similar to it.
In fact, Complainant has provided evidence of
a registration for the TESTOSTERONE mark, at least in the
The registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of validity,
which creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is inherently distinctive[2]. Complainant’s
registration appears to be incontestable and conclusive evidence of its
ownership of the mark and exclusive right to use the mark in connection with
the stated services.
Respondent has the burden
of refuting this assumption[3].
Respondent, however,
argues that the TESTOSTERONE trademark was registered after the domain name <testosterone.com>. According to
the Respondent, when the domain name <testosterone.com>
was registered, the Complainant was not even in business.
The <testosterone.com> domain name
was registered before the TESTOSTERONE trademark application was even filed. In
fact, the <testosterone.com>
domain name was registered in 1995 while the application for the TESTOSTERONE
trademark was filed in May 19, 1997 and approved in February 2004.
As stated in several
WIPO cases[4],
Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy does not require that
the trademark be registered prior to the domain name. The date in which the
domain name and the trademark were registered and the fact that the domain name
was registered prior to the trademark, may only be relevant regarding the
assessment of bad faith according to Paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy as it
will be analyzed below.
Before establishing
whether or not the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the
Complainant’s registered trademark, the sole Panelist wants to point out that
the addition of generic top-level domains (gTLD), i.e., .com, .biz, .edu, .org
cannot be taken into consideration when studying if the registered domain name
is confusingly similar to the registered trademark.
As it has been
repeatedly accepted by UDRP panels the existence of the “.com” generic top-level
domain (gTLD), in the disputed domain name is not a factor for purposes of
determining that a disputed domain name is not identical or confusingly similar
to the mark in which the Complainant asserts rights.
“In the strictest sense, the domain name lumena.com is not identical to
the trademark Lumena. The former includes a top level domain “.com” while the
word Lumena stands alone in the latter. However, where the addition of it
top-level domain appeared the domain name was the one that most closely
described that nature of trademark (i.e.; “com” representing a commercial enterprise).
The virtual identically seemed sufficient to satisfy the first element of
paragraph 4 (a)(i) of the Policy” [5]
The sole Panelist
notes that the entirety of the mark TESTOSTERONE is included in the
Respondent´s Domain Name <testosterone.com>. Therefore,
the Domain Name is identical and confusingly similar to the TESTOSTERONE
mark pursuant to the Policy paragraph 4(a)(i).
Actually the addition of .com is not a distinguishing difference.[6]
Therefore the sole
Panelist concludes that this evidence establishes Complainant’s rights in the TESTOSTERONE
trademark for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). This, in
addition to the above, because ICANN panels have recognized that reproducing a
trademark in its whole is sufficient to establish that a domain name is
identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant's registered mark; indeed,
the addition of other terms in the domain name does not affect a finding that
the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant's
registered trademark.
Paragraph 4 (c) of the Policy, determines
that the following circumstances in particular but without limitation, if found
by the sole panelist to be present, shall demonstrate the Respondent’s rights
or legitimate interest to the domain name:
(i) before any notice
to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the
domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a
bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual,
business, or other organization) have been commonly known by the domain name,
even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Before shifting the burden to Respondent, Complainant must first make a
prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests
in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests in the <testosterone.com>
domain name. Complainant claims that he should be considered as having
rights and legitimate interests in respect to the <testosterone.com>domain name.
Complainant claims that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate
interests over the domain in dispute. At the same time, Complainant proved that
he has rights and legitimate interest in the <testosterone.com> domain name, while Respondent failed to
provide any evidence that may have contradict Complainant’s assertions.
Previous decisions such as ARAG Allgemeine
Rechtsschutz-Versicherungs-AG v. Seung Nam Kim, (WIPO Case No. D2006-1001), when referring to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), stated that:
“The clear consensus of previous
decisions under the Policy is that a Complainant establishes this element by
making out a prima facie case against the Respondent. (See Overview of WIPO
Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions <http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview/index.html>,
item 2.1 <http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview/index.html>)
The Complainant has done this by indicating that the Respondent is not licensed
or authorized by it to use its ARAG mark. The burden then shifts to the
Respondent to rebut that case.”
Complainant
filed evidence regarding its own rights and legitimate interests in the
disputed domain. Respondent, on the other hand, failed to rebut Complainant’s
assertions.
Other
previous decisions followed that interpretation. In the Julian
Barnes v. Old Barn Studios Limited, WIPO Case No. D2001-0121, the Panel stated that:
“Is the Respondent required to adduce any such
evidence, if the onus is on the Complainant to prove the three elements of paragraph
4 of the Policy? While the overall burden of proof is on the Complainant, this
element involves the Complainant proving matters, which are peculiarly within
the knowledge of the Respondent. It involves the Complainant in the often
impossible task of proving a negative. In the Panel’s view the correct approach
is as follows: the Complainant makes the allegation and puts forward what he
can in support (e.g. he has rights to the name, the Respondent has no rights to
the name of which he is aware, he has not given any permission to the
Respondent). Unless the allegation is manifestly misconceived, the Respondent
has a case to answer and that is where paragraph 4(c) of the Policy comes in.
If the Respondent then fails to demonstrate his rights or legitimate interests
in respect of the Domain Name, the complaint succeeds under this head.”
According to the above cited decisions and to other decisions[7] , Complainant
met its burden of establishing a prima
facie case when alleging that he has rights and interest in the domain
name. This shifts the burden to Respondent to articulate rights and legitimate
interests in the domain name. Since
Respondent failed to produce either evidence or an argument in support of such
rights or interests, the Panel is allowed to assume that Respondent has no such
rights or legitimate interests.[8] [9]
Even if the Respondent claims that he is using the domain name <testosterone.com>, he does not
provide any evidence that may allow the sole Panelist to believe that the
domain is being used, even privately.
In order to grant the opportunity to the Respondent to prove that he
has been using the domain name <testosterone.com>,
the Respondent was requested, by Order dated August 19, 2010, to provide
evidence regarding the use of the domain name. The Respondent answered on
August 20, 2010, stating that: “We do not
and have never had any services associated with the DNS name www.testosterone.com.
We use the domain for things other than web services.”
The sole panelist finds that the Respondent fails to provide evidence
of the use of the domain name <testosterone.com>.
The evidence filed by the Complainant as Exhibit B whose content was
confirmed ex-officio by the Panel by the
means of an inspection to the web-site <t-nation.com/previousIssues.jsp> on
September 7, 2010, shows that
the Complainant is using its TESTOSTERONE trademark. The above mentioned
web-site and the print outs filed by the Complainant, claim that the
TESTOSTERONE trademark has been in use for several years.
Exhibit A (Complainant’s Testosterone Trademark Registered with the
On this particular issue, the Panel deems
appropriate to mention that Respondent’s failure to provide a response as
requested by the Panel, means that Respondent has not presented any
circumstances that would promote its rights or legitimate interests in the
subject domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), bearing in mind that Complainant
has asserted that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests with respect
to the domain name, making incumbent for Respondent to come forward with
concrete evidence rebutting this assertion because this information is uniquely
within the knowledge and control of the Respondent.
Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or
legitimate interests in the <testosterone.com>
domain name and thus, Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) has been
satisfied.
To fulfill the third requirement, the Complainant must prove that the
domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.
The sole panelist
has considered the fact that Respondent has failed to evidence its legitimate rights
or interest in the disputed domain name as presumptive and circumstantial
evidence of Respondent´s bad faith in the registration and use of the <testosterone.com> domain name.
According to
paragraph 4 (b) of the Policy the following circumstances, in particular but
without limitation, if found by the panel to be present, shall be evidence of
the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have
registered or you have acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of
selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the
Complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a
competitor of that Complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of your
documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in
order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the
mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern
of such conduct; or
(iii) you have
registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business
of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have
intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your
web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with
the Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web
site or location.
It must be clarified that the above mentioned circumstances, are merely
illustrative and not exclusive. The Panel may appreciate all the circumstances
surrounding the case in order to determine whether or not the domain has been
used in bad faith.
Respondent claims
that the <testosterone.com>
domain name is being held, but is not in use and that upon information and
belief, Respondent has never used the domain name.
On the other hand,
Respondent asserted that he has not and never had, any services associated with
the domain name <testosterone.com>. He
also stated that he uses the domain for things other than web services.
The sole Panelist considers that the
Complainant has a history in the fitness business, taking into consideration
the usage that it has given of its trademark. Moreover, the fact that the
Complainant has registered its TESTOSTERONE trademark is sufficient evidence
for the sole Panelist that the Complainant is identifiable in the market by its
distinctive sign.
Also the domain name <testosterone.com>, is
clearly connected to the Complainant’s trademark, as the sole Panelist
concluded by the analysis of the evidence provided by the Complainant (See
Exhibit B).
The
Panel confirms that the domain name <testosterone.com>
is not in use. On September 7, 2010, the sole Panelist tried to access the
disputed domain, finding that the same is not currently in use. At this
respect, the Respondent also alleged, when responding to the Order issued by
the Panel on August 19, 2010, that:
“We do not,
and have never had, any services associated with the DNS name
www.testosterone.com. We use the domain for things other than web services.”
The
Respondent, even if he claimed that he is using: “the domain for things other than web services”, failed to prove or
even to describe what those: “things
other than web services” are.
In
consequence, the Panel concludes that the Respondent failed to provide any
evidence whatsoever regarding its use of
the disputed domain.
According to the ICANN Policy, the requirement by which the Complainant
must prove that the Respondent is using the disputed domain in bad faith does
not oblige him to prove that the Respondent is taking positive action. The fact
that the Respondent is not using the domain, does not exclude the possibility
of concluding that he acted in bad faith. According to all the particular
circumstances of the case, bad faith can be asserted even if the only positive
action of the Respondent was to register the domain.
Several precedents strengthen the above mentioned position[10].
It has been accepted that holding a disputed domain name can be considered as
bad faith registration and use under Policy 4(a)(iii).
Respondent had several opportunities to prove that he has been using
the disputed domain. However, when required to produce evidence regarding its
use of the disputed domain, he failed to deliver them to the Panel.
This circumstance when analyzed, especially with Respondent’s failure
to prove that he has a legal interest on the domain, is enough to conclude that
the Respondent had registered and used the domain in bad faith according to the
Policy.
Therefore, due to the study made by this Panel, it is considered that
Complainant has met the requirements of Paragraph 4 (a)(iii)
of the Policy, in demonstrating Respondent’s bad faith in the registration of
the <testosterone.com>
domain name.
DECISION
Having established
all three elements required under the paragraph 4(a) of the ICANN Policy, the
Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <testosterone.com>
domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Fernando Triana Esq.
Panelist
September 8, 2010
Click Here to return to the main Domain Decisions Page.
Click Here to return to our Home Page
[1] Snow Fun, Inc. V. O’Connor, (NAF F.A. 96578), where they find that the domain name <termquote.com> is identical to the Complainant’s TERMQUOTE mark).
[2] See also Janus Int’ l Holding Co. V. Rademacher, (WIPO Case D2002-0201)
[3] See, e.g., EAuto, L.L.C. v. Triple S. Auto Parts d/b/a Kung Fu Yea Enterprises, Inc.,(WIPO Case No. D2000-0047).
[4] See Digital Vision, Ltd V. Advanced Chemill Systems, (WIPO Case D2001-0827) and AB Svenska Spel V. Zacharov, (WIPO Case D2003-0527)
[5] See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. V. Walsucks and Walmarket Puerto Rico. (WIPO Case D200-0477)
[6] See Blue Sky Software Corp. v. Digital Sierra, Inc., (WIPO Case No. D2000-0165)
[7] See Intocast AG v. Lee
Daeyoon, (WIPO Case No. D2000‑1467), where it is stated that “For methodical reasons it is very
hard for the Complainant to actually prove that Respondent does not have rights
or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name, since there is no strict
logical means of verifying that a fact is not given... Many legal systems
therefore rely on the principle negativa non sunt probanda. If a rule contains a negative element it is
generally understood to be sufficient that the complainant, by asserting that
the negative element is not given, provides prima facie evidence for this
negative fact. The burden of proof then shifts to the respondent to rebut the
complainant’s assertion”. See also
[8]
See Do The
Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, (WIPO Case No. D2000-0624) (finding that once Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or
legitimate interests in respect of the domain, the burden shifts to Respondent
to provide credible evidence that substantiates its claim of rights and
legitimate interests in the domain name);
[9]
See also Pavillion Agency, Inc. v. Greenhouse Agency Ltd. (WIPO Case No.
D2000-1221) (finding that Respondent’s
failure to respond can be construed as an admission that they have no
legitimate interest in the domain names).
[10] See DCI S.A. v. Link Commercial Corp. (WIPO Case No. D200-1232), see also Disney Enters. Inc. v. Meyers (NAF Case FA697818).