DECISION

 

Microsoft Corporation v. On behalf of microsoftwi.com OWNER / c/o whoisproxy.com Ltd.

Claim Number: FA1503001610404

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Microsoft Corporation (“Complainant”), represented by Molly Buck Richard of Richard Law Group, Inc., Texas, USA.  Respondent is On behalf of microsoftwi.com OWNER / c/o whoisproxy.com Ltd. (“Respondent”), Auckland, New Zealand.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <microsoftwi.com>, registered with Google Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Debrett G. Lyons as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on March 19, 2015; the Forum received payment on March 19, 2015.

 

On March 23, 2015, Google Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <microsoftwi.com> domain name is registered with Google Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Google Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Google Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On March 26, 2015, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of April 15, 2015 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@microsoftwi.com.  Also on March 26, 2015, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On April 22, 2015, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Debrett G. Lyons as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

Complainant asserts trademark rights in MICROSOFT and alleges that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to its trademark. 

 

Complainant alleges that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

 

Complainant alleges that Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith.

 

B. Respondent

Respondent failed to submit a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

The factual findings pertinent to the decision in this case are that:

1.    Complainant uses the trademark MICROSOFT in connection with computer software and related goods and services;

2.    The trademark MICROSOFT is registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") under Reg. No.1,200,236, registered July 6, 1982;

3.    The trademark MICROSFT enjoys common law trademark protection and is one of the best known trademarks in the world;

4.    The disputed domain name was registered on October 22, 2014;

5.    The domain name redirects Internet users to Complainant’s own website; and

6.    There is no commercial agreement between the parties and Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use the trademark or to register any domain name incorporating the trademark.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(e), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations and inferences set forth in the Complaint as true unless the evidence is clearly contradictory (see Vertical Solutions Mgmt., Inc. v. webnet-marketing, inc., FA 95095 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 31, 2000) holding that the respondent’s failure to respond allows all reasonable inferences of fact in the allegations of the complaint to be deemed true; see also Talk City, Inc. v. Robertson, D2000-0009 (WIPO Feb. 29, 2000) (“In the absence of a response, it is appropriate to accept as true all allegations of the Complaint.”)).

 

Trademark rights / identity or similarity

Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy requires a two-fold enquiry – an investigation into whether a complainant has rights in a trademark, followed by an assessment of whether the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that trademark.

 

Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy does not distinguish between registered and unregistered trademark rights.  It is well established by decisions under this Policy that a trademark registered with a national authority is evidence of trademark rights.  Since Complainant provides evidence of its United States national registration for the trademark MICROSOFT the Panel is satisfied that it has trademark rights (see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Periasami Malain, FA 705262 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 19, 2006) (“Complainant’s registrations with the United States Patent and Trademark Office of the trademark, STATE FARM, establishes its rights in the STATE FARM mark pursuant to Policy, paragraph 4(a)(i).”); see also Mothers Against Drunk Driving v. phix, FA 174052 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 25, 2003) finding that the complainant’s registration of the MADD mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office establishes the complainant’s rights in the mark for purposes of Policy paragraph 4(a)(i)).

 

For the purposes of assessing the confusing similarity of the trademark and the domain name, the generic top-level domain gTLD, “.com”, can be ignored (see Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) finding that the top level of the domain name such as “.net” or “.com” does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar).  The comparison reduces to MICROSOFT with microsoftwi.  The terms differ only by addition of the letters “w” and “i”.  Those letters are a trivial addition to the trademark which remains readily identifiable.  Those letters might also be understood as a form of shorthand for the “West Indies” (see, for example, Skype Ltd. & Gannett Co. v. Chan, D2004-0117 (WIPO Apr. 8, 2004) (“…it is well established that a domain name consisting of a well-known mark, combined with a geographically descriptive term or phrase, is confusingly similar to the mark.”)

In either case Panel finds that the terms are confusingly similar and so finds that Complainant has satisfied the requirements of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy. 

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy states that any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate rights or legitimate interests to a domain name for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy:

 

(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;  or

 

(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark rights;  or

 

(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trade mark or service mark at issue.

 

Complainant need only make out a prima facie case that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, after which the onus shifts to Respondent to rebut that case by demonstrating those rights or interests (see Do The Hustle, LLC v. Tropic Web, D2000‑0624 (WIPO Aug. 21, 2000).

 

The publicly available WHOIS information for the owner of the domain name does not provide any prima facie evidence that Respondent might be commonly known by the disputed domain name.  There is no evidence that Respondent has any trademark rights.  There is no evidence that Complainant has authorized Respondent to use the trademark and Complainant denies any such authorization.

 

Nor has there been any bona fide use of the domain name which merely redirects Internet users to Complainant’s website (see Direct Line Ins. plc v. Low-cost-domain, FA 1337658 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 8, 2010) (“The Panel finds that using Complainant’s mark in a domain name over which Complainant has no control, even if the domain name redirects to Complainant’s actual site, is not consistent with the requirements of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or ¶ 4(c)(iii) . . .”). 

 

Panel finds that Complainant has established a prima facie case and so the onus shifts to Respondent to establish a legitimate interest in the domain name.  In the absence of a Response, that case is not met and so Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or interests and so finds that Complainant has satisfied the second limb of the Policy.

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Complainant must prove on the balance of probabilities both that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith and that it is being used in bad faith. 

 

Further guidance on that requirement is found in paragraph 4(b) of the Policy, which sets out four circumstances, any one of which is taken to be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith if established.

 

The four specified circumstances are:

 

‘(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or

 

(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or

 

(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or

 

(iv) by using the domain name, respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, internet users to respondent’s website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the respondent’s website or location or of a product or service on the site or location.’

 

Complainant does not make any argument for the application of paragraph 4(b) but instead argues, separately, for findings of registration and use in bad faith.  Panel agrees and finds both registration and use in bad faith.  Given the notoriety of Complainant's trademark, it is inconceivable that Respondent could have registered the domain name without actual knowledge of Complainant's rights.  There is no evidence of any legitimate interest in the domain name.  There is no evidence of good faith use of the domain name.  Instead it merely redirects users to Complainant’s website.

 

Complaint has established the third limb of the Policy.

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <microsoftwi.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Debrett G. Lyons, Panelist

Dated:  May 1, 2015

 

 

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