DECISION

 

Morgan Stanley v. Otto L. Zielke

Claim Number: FA1906001848614

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Morgan Stanley (“Complainant”), represented by Eric J. Shimanoff of Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C., New York, USA.  Respondent is Otto L. Zielke (“Respondent”), California, USA.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME

The domain name at issue is <morqanstanley.com>, registered with Google LLC.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certifies that she has acted independently and impartially and to the best of her knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.

 

Sandra J. Franklin as Panelist.

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on June 19, 2019; the Forum received payment on June 19, 2019.

 

On June 19, 2019, Google LLC confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <morqanstanley.com> domain name is registered with Google LLC and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name.  Google LLC has verified that Respondent is bound by the Google LLC registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On June 20, 2019, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint, setting a deadline of July 10, 2019 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@morqanstanley.com.  Also on June 20, 2019, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.

 

Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.

 

On July 14, 2019, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Sandra J. Franklin as Panelist.

 

Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

A. Complainant

1.    Respondent’s <morqanstanley.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark.

 

2.    Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the <morqanstanley.com> domain name.

 

3.    Respondent registered and uses the <morqanstanley.com> domain name in bad faith.

 

B.  Respondent failed to file a Response in this proceeding.

 

FINDINGS

Complainant offers financial services under the MORGAN STANLEY mark and has registered the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) (Reg. No. 1,707,196, registered Aug. 11, 1992).

 

Respondent registered the <morqanstanley.com> domain name on June 17, 2019, and does not make an active use of the domain name.

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)  the domain name registered by Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which Complainant has rights; and

(2)  Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)  the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, the Panel shall decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules.  The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint; however, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. See WIPO Jurisprudential Overview 3.0 at ¶ 4.3; see also eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”).

 

Identical and/or Confusingly Similar

The Panel finds that Complainant has established rights in the MORGAN STANLEY mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) through registration of the mark with the USPTO.  See DIRECTV, LLC v. The Pearline Group, FA 1818749 (Forum Dec. 30, 2018) (“Complainant’s ownership of a USPTO registration for DIRECTV demonstrate its rights in such mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”).

 

Respondent’s <morqanstanley.com> domain name uses Complainant’s mark and simply substitutes the letter ”q” for the letter “g” and adds the “.com” gTLD.  Theses changes do not sufficiently distinguish a domain name from a mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)See Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA LLC v. Shuai Wei Xu / Xu Shuai Wei, FA 1784238 (Forum June 1, 2018) (“Respondent arrives at each of the disputed domain names by merely misspelling each of the disputed domain names and adding the gTLD ‘.com.’  This is insufficient to distinguish the disputed domain names from Complainant’s trademark.”)The Panel thus finds that Respondent’s <morqanstanley.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark.

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

Once Complainant makes a prima facie case that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden shifts to Respondent to show it does have rights or legitimate interests. See Advanced International Marketing Corporation v. AA-1 Corp, FA 780200 (Forum Nov. 2, 2011) (finding that a complainant must offer some evidence to make its prima facie case and satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii)); see also Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”).

 

Complainant contends that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the <morqanstanley.com> domain name, as Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name, nor has Complainant authorized, licensed, or otherwise permitted Respondent to use the mark. Relevant information includes the WHOIS, assertions by a complainant regarding the nature of its relationship with a respondent, and other evidence in the record to support these assertions. See Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same); see also Google LLC v. Bhawana Chandel / Admission Virus, FA 1799694 (Forum Sep. 4, 2018) (concluding that Respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name where “the WHOIS of record identifies the Respondent as “Bhawana Chandel,” and no information in the record shows that Respondent was authorized to use Complainant’s mark in any way.”).  The WHOIS identifies “Otto L. Zielke” as the registrant, and nothing in the record indicates that Complainant authorized Respondent to use the mark for any purpose.  Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent is not commonly known by the <morqanstanley.com> domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).

 

Complainant argues that Respondent fails to make any use of the resolving webpage associated with the disputed domain name.  Failure to make active use of a confusingly similar domain name can evince a lack of rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii).  See Dell Inc. v. link growth / Digital Marketing, FA 1785283 (Forum June 7, 2018) (“Respondent’s domain names currently display template websites lacking any substantive content. The Panel finds that Respondent has does not have rights or legitimate interests with respect of the domain name per Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) or (iii).”).  Complainant provides a screenshot of the resolving webpage, which displays the error message “This site can’t be reached.”  Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent fails to use the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services under or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, and thus has no rights under under Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).

 

Complainant argues that Respondent engages in typosquatting, which also indicates a lack of rights and legitimate interests in a domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).  See Chegg Inc. v. yang qijin, FA1503001610050 (Forum Apr. 23, 2015) (“Users might mistakenly reach Respondent’s resolving website by misspelling Complainant’s mark.  Taking advantage of Internet users’ typographical errors, known as typosquatting, demonstrates a respondent’s lack of rights or legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).”).  Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent’s domain name is a typosquatted version of Complainant’s mark, additional evidence of Respondent’s lack of rights and legitimate interests under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii).

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

Complainant claims that Respondent registered the domain name to take advantage of the goodwill associated with Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark, thus disrupting Complainant’s business.  The Panel agrees and finds that Respondent disrupts Complainant’s business by attempting to trade off the fame of Complainant’s mark in bad faith under Policy ¶¶ 4(b)(iii) & (iv).  See Transamerica Love City Brewing Company v. Anker Fog / Love City Brewing Company, FA 1753144 (Forum Nov. 27, 2017) (Finding that Respondent disrupts Complainant’s business by pointing Internet users to an expired webpage. This may create the perception that Complainant is closed, never existed, or is not a legitimate business. Therefore, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and uses the disputed domain names in bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iii).); see also Phat Fashions, LLC v. Kruger, FA 96193 (Forum Dec. 29, 2000) (finding bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) even though the respondent has not used the domain name because “it makes no sense whatever to wait until it actually ‘uses’ the name, when inevitably, when there is such use, it will create the confusion described in the Policy”).

 

Complainant shows that Respondent fails to make an active use of the <morqanstanley.com> domain name.  Inactively holding a confusingly similar domain name can evince bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See VideoLink, Inc. v. Xantech Corporation, FA1503001608735 (Forum May 12, 2015) (“Failure to actively use a domain name is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”).  Accordingly, the Panel finds that Respondent’s failure to use the domain name demonstrates Respondent’s bad faith under the Policy.

 

Complainant avers that Respondent engaged in typosquatting by intentionally misspelling Complainant’s mark in the <morqanstanley.com> domain name.  The Panel agrees and finds additional bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See Adorama, Inc. v. Moniker Privacy Services, FA1503001610020 (Forum May 1, 2015) (“Respondent has also engaged in typosquatting, which is additional evidence of bad faith registration and use under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  Respondents who capitalize on common typing errors engage in bad faith registration under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”).

 

Complainant argues that Respondent had knowledge of Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark at the time of registering the <morqanstanley.com> domain name, given the fame and notoriety associated with the mark throughout the world.  The Panel agrees and finds that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s mark, demonstrating bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).  See iFinex Inc. v. xu shuaiwei, FA 1760249 (Forum Jan. 1, 2018) (“Respondent’s prior knowledge is evident from the notoriety of Complainant’s BITFINEX trademark as well as from Respondent’s use of its trademark laden domain name to direct internet traffic to a website which is a direct competitor of Complainant”).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant has satisfied Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <morqanstanley.com> domain name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.

 

 

Sandra J. Franklin, Panelist

Dated:  July 15, 2019

 

 

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