Morgan Stanley v. Stanley Morgan / Hidden Tech
Claim Number: FA2008001907238
Complainant is Morgan Stanley (“Complainant”), represented by Eric J. Shimanoff of Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C., New York, United States. Respondent is Stanley Morgan / Hidden Tech (“Respondent”), California, United States.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <stanleymorgan.org>, registered with Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Openprovider.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on August 4, 2020; the Forum received payment on August 4, 2020.
On August 6, 2020, Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Openprovider confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <stanleymorgan.org> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Openprovider and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Openprovider has verified that Respondent is bound by the Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Openprovider registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On August 10, 2020, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of August 31, 2020 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@stanleymorgan.org. Also on August 10, 2020, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On September 2, 2020, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant offers a full range of financial, investment, and wealth management services. It has rights in the MORGAN STANLEY mark through its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s <stanleymorgan.org> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark as it merely reverses the two components of Complainant’s mark and adds the “.org” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, nor did Complainant authorize Respondent to use its mark in any way. Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the Domain Name resolves to a webpage which offers financial services similar or related to those offered by Complainant.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. It attempts to divert internet users from Complainant to its own competing webpage, and Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the MORGAN STANLEY mark when it registered the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) The respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The MORGAN STANLEY mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 4,470,389) on January 21, 2014 (Complaint Exhibit 6). Complainant’s registration of its mark with the USPTO is sufficient to establish rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Liberty Global Logistics, LLC v. damilola emmanuel / tovary services limited, FA 1738536 (Forum Aug. 4, 2017) (“Registration of a mark with the USPTO sufficiently establishes the required rights in the mark for purposes of the Policy.”).
Respondent’s <stanleymorgan.org> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark. It fully incorporates the mark, merely reversing the two elements of it and adding the “.org” gTLD. These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Google LLC v. Hai Min Xu / Xu Hai Min / haimin xu, FA 1779597, (FORUM May 3, 2018) (finding the <opensourcegoogle.com> domain name to be confusingly similar to the GOOGLE OPEN SOURCE mark, as the domain name consists of the mark with the terms transposed). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the MORGAN STANLEY mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent has used or has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) the respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) the respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Complainant has not authorized or licensed Respondent to use its mark, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the web site resolving from it offers products and services which are similar to and compete with those offered by Complainant. These allegations are addressed as follows:
Complainant states that it has never licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark in any way. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
The WHOIS information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists the registrant of the Domain Name as “Stanley Morgan / Hidden Tech.” The Hidden Tech name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark).
The Stanley Morgan name is, of course, similar to Complainant’s mark This does not mean that Respondent has been commonly known by the Domain Name, however, because as discussed above Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s mark, and the evidence before the Panel gives no indication that Respondent used this name for any purpose other than to register the Domain Name. Registering a domain name in a name which is similar or identical to the domain name is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that the respondent “has been commonly known by” it for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). There must be some evidence, independent of the registration, that the respondent used the name in a business or some other undertaking, or that persons have by other means come to associate the respondent with that name. If a person could acquire rights or legitimate interests in a domain name under Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) simply by registering it in a name similar or identical to the domain name at issue, Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) would be essentially meaningless. Moneytree, Inc. v. Matt Sims / MoneyTreeNow, FA1501001602721 (Forum Mar. 3, 2015) (finding that even though the respondent had listed “Matt Sims” of “MoneyTreeNow” as registrant of the <moneytreenow.com> domain name, the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii), because he had failed to list any additional affirmative evidence beyond the WHOIS information), Ripple Labs Inc. v. Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund, FA 1790949 (Forum July 9, 2018) (finding that, although the respondent listed itself as “Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund” in the WHOIS contact information, it did not provide any affirmative evidence to support this identity; combined with the fact that the complainant claimed it did not authorize the respondent to use the mark, the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name). On the evidence before the Panel, it is clear that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complaint Exhibit 8 consists of screenshots of the pages of the web site resolving from the Domain Name. While this site does not attempt to mimic or copy the general appearance or content of Complainant’s site at <morganstanley.com> (Exhibit 4), it does purport to offer investment banking services, which are a primary focus of the services offered by Complainant. There is no question that if Respondent does in fact offer the services advertised on its web site it is competing with Complainant. Using a confusingly similar domain name to offer services which compete with those of a complainant is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). General Motors LLC v. MIKE LEE, FA 1659965 (Forum Mar. 10, 2016) (“use of a domain to sell products and/or services that compete directly with a complainant’s business does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”).
Complainant has made its prima facie case. On the evidence presented, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent have registered or the respondent has acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent’s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is clearly using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web sites by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its web site. This fits squarely within the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) and is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA1504001612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) (“The Panel agrees that Respondent’s use of the website to display products similar to Complainant’s imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”), Xylem Inc. and Xylem IP Holdings LLC v. YinSi BaoHu YiKaiQi, FA1504001612750 (Forum May 13, 2015) (“The Panel agrees that Respondent’s use of the website to display products similar to Complainant’s, imputes intent to attract Internet users for commercial gain, and finds bad faith per Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv).”), Alcon, Inc. v. ARanked, FA 1306493 (Forum Mar. 18, 2010) (“The Panel finds that capitalizing on the well-known marks of Complainant by attracting internet users to its disputed domain names where Respondent sells competing products of Complainant is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”).
Second, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it registered the Domain Name in July 2020 (Complaint Exhibit 7 shows creation date). Complainant’s MORGAN STANLEY mark has been used by it since 1935 (Complaint Exhibit 6) and is well-known throughout the world as that of a prominent financial services company (Complaint Exhibit 5). Respondent copied that mark into the Domain Name, albeit reversing the order of the two component elements, and is using the name to offer the same types of products and services as those sold by Complainant. Policy ¶ 4(b) recognizes that mischief can assume many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in a mark prior to registering an identical or confusingly similar domain name has often been held to be evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <stanleymorgan.org> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
September 4, 2020
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