Micro Electronics, Inc. v. Darby Giles
Claim Number: FA2012001926775
Complainant is Micro Electronics, Inc. (“Complainant”), represented by David A. Einhorn of Scarinci Hollenbeck LLC, New York, USA. Respondent is Darby Giles (“Respondent”), Pennsylvania, USA.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <mymicrocenter.com>, registered with 1&1 IONOS SE.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to the Forum electronically on December 30, 2020; the Forum received payment on December 30, 2020.
On January 4, 2021, 1&1 IONOS SE confirmed by e-mail to the Forum that the <mymicrocenter.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with 1&1 IONOS SE and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. 1&1 IONOS SE has verified that Respondent is bound by the 1&1 IONOS SE registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On January 11, 2021, the Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of February 1, 2021 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@mymicrocenter.com. Also on January 11, 2021, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no response from Respondent, the Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On February 3, 2021, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, the Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that the Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, the Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of any response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant provides retail and online services in the field of computer hardware, software, and accessories. It has rights in the MICRO CENTER mark based on its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Respondent’s <mymicrocenter.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because it incorporates the entire MICRO CENTER mark and merely adds the term “my” and the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. He is not commonly known by the Domain Name and Complainant has not authorized him to use the MICRO CENTER mark. Additionally, Respondent is not using the Domain Name for any bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, Respondent uses the Domain Name to divert Internet traffic and offer pay-per-click hyperlinks for competing products.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. Respondent has a history of bad faith registrations. Additionally, he uses the Domain Name to attract consumers to a pay-per-click hyperlink site which directs them to the sites of other firms which compete with Complainant. Respondent’s bad faith is also evidenced by the use of a privacy service, and Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the MICRO CENTER mark when he registered the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition (WIPO Overview 3.0), at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
The MICRO CENTER mark was registered to Complainant with the USPTO (Reg. No. 1,552,264) on August 15, 1989 (Amended Complaint Exhibit E). Complainant’s Registration of its mark with the USPTO is sufficient to establish its rights in that mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Target Brands, Inc. v. jennifer beyer, FA 1738027 (Forum July 31, 2017) ("Complainant has rights in its TARGET service mark for purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) by virtue of its registration of the mark with a national trademark authority, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).”).
Respondent’s <mymicrocenter.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. It incorporates the entire MICRO CENTER mark, merely omitting the space and adding the term “my” and the “.com” gTLD. These changes are not sufficient to distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Bond & Co. Jewelers, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assocs., FA 937650 (Forum Apr. 30, 2007) (finding that the elimination of spaces between terms and the addition of a gTLD do not establish distinctiveness from the complainant’s mark under Policy ¶ 4(a)(i)), BBY Solutions, Inc. v Best Buy Online / M/S Best Buy Online, FA 1620654 (Forum July 2, 2015) (“The addition of the generic word ‘my’… does not prevent a finding that the disputed domain name and mark are identical or confusingly similar.”), Jerry Damson, Inc. v. Tex. Int’l Prop. Assocs., FA 916991 (Forum Apr. 10, 2007) (“The mere addition of a generic top-level domain (“gTLD”) “.com” does not serve to adequately distinguish the Domain Name from the mark.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the MICRO CENTER mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent or commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent is not commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Complainant has not licensed or authorized Respondent to use its mark, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use because the web site resolving from it is a pay-per-click site which redirects visitors to the sites of Complainant’s competitors. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists “Darby Giles” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant states that it has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark. Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no Policy ¶ 4(c) circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Amended Complaint Exhibit C is a screenshot of the web site resolving from the Domain Name. It features links such as “Microcenter,” “Micro Center Monitor,” “Computer Repair,” “Zagg Screen Projectors” and the like. It is obviously a typical pay-per-click site. Amended Complaint Exhibit F is a statement filed by Complainant’s general counsel in which he states that when the visitor to Respondent’s site clicks on one or more of these links the visitor is redirected to the sites of firms which complete directly with Complainant. Using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic to a webpage that offers pay-per-click links to goods and services, whether related or unrelated to a complainant’s business, is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). McGuireWoods LLP v. Mykhailo Loginov / Loginov Enterprises d.o.o, FA1412001594837 (Forum Jan. 22, 2015) (“The Panel finds Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to feature parked hyperlinks containing links in competition with Complainant’s legal services is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), Vance Int’l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees), Materia, Inc. v. Michele Dinoia, FA1507001627209 (Forum Aug. 20, 2015) (“The Panel finds that Respondent is using a confusingly similar domain name to redirect users to a webpage with unrelated hyperlinks, that Respondent has no other rights to the domain name, and finds that Respondent is not making a bona fide offering or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, Respondent is using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its web site, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). Respondent here obtains commercial gain from his use of the Domain Name and the resolving web site to generate pay-per-click revenues. Pay-per-click sites are common on the Internet. Under the most common forms of business arrangements relating to these sites, when a visitor to the site clicks on one of the links which appear there, the site sponsor receives compensation from the various web site owners who are forwarded from the site. In most cases, the site sponsor receives compensation based upon the number of hits the downstream web site owners get from being linked to Respondent’s web site. AllianceBernstein LP v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2008-1230 (WIPO, 2008) (the domain name resolved to a search directory site with links to third-party vendors and the panel inferred that the respondent received click-through-fees when site visitors clicked on those links), Brownells, Inc. v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2007-1211 (WIPO, 2007), (finding in similar cases that a respondent intentionally attempted to attract internet searchers for commercial gain). Respondent’s use of the Domain Name is commercial also because the sponsors of the various web sites forwarded from Respondent’s web site benefit from the subsequent interest and purchases of those who visit the sites. UDRP panels have held that there only needs to be commercial gain sought by some party for the use to be commercial. Focus Do It All Group v. Athanasios Sermbizis, Case No. D2000-0923 (WIPO, 2000) (finding that “[I]t is enough that commercial gain is being sought for someone” for a use to be commercial).
Finally, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when he registered the Domain Name in August 2019 (Amended Complaint Exhibit A shows creation date). Complainant’s MICRO CENTER mark has been used by it in commerce since the early 1980s (Amended Complaint Exhibit F) and is well-known if not famous in the computer industry. Respondent copied it exactly into the Domain Name and directed many if not all of the pay-per-click links on his web site to businesses that operate in that market. This may not fall within any of the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b), but that paragraph acknowledges that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005), Bloomberg Finance L.P. v. Domain Admin - This Domain is For Sale on GoDaddy.com / Trnames Premium Name Services, FA 1714157 (Forum Mar. 8, 2017) (determining that Policy ¶ 4(b) provisions are merely illustrative of bad faith, and that the respondent’s bad faith may be demonstrated by other allegations of bad faith under the totality of the circumstances). The nonexclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith and registering an identical or confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in an incorporated mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <mymicrocenter.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
February 5, 2021
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