Inkwood Books North LLC v. Vivek Sancheti
Claim Number: FA2210002015170
Complainant is Inkwood Books North LLC (“Complainant”), represented by Kate Sherlock of Archer & Greiner, PC, New Jersey, USA. Respondent is Vivek Sancheti (“Respondent”), India.
REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME
The domain name at issue is <inkwoodbooks.com>, registered with Name.com, Inc.
The undersigned certifies that he has acted independently and impartially and to the best of his knowledge has no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist.
Complainant submitted a Complaint to Forum electronically on October 7, 2022; Forum received payment on October 7, 2022.
On October 10, 2022, Name.com, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to Forum that the <inkwoodbooks.com> domain name (the Domain Name) is registered with Name.com, Inc. and that Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Name.com, Inc. has verified that Respondent is bound by the Name.com, Inc. registration agreement and has thereby agreed to resolve domain disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).
On October 11, 2022, Forum served the Complaint and all Annexes, including a Written Notice of the Complaint setting a deadline of October 31, 2022 by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, via e-mail to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative, and billing contacts, and to postmaster@inkwoodbooks.com. Also on October 11, 2022, the Written Notice of the Complaint, notifying Respondent of the e-mail addresses served and the deadline for a Response, was transmitted to Respondent via post and fax to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts.
Having received no Response from Respondent, Forum transmitted to the parties a Notification of Respondent Default.
On November 8, 2022, pursuant to Complainant's request to have the dispute decided by a single-member Panel, Forum appointed Charles A. Kuechenmeister as Panelist.
Having reviewed the communications records, the Administrative Panel (the "Panel") finds that Forum has discharged its responsibility under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules") "to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to Respondent" through submission of Electronic and Written Notices, as defined in Rule 1 and Rule 2. Therefore, the Panel may issue its decision based on the documents submitted and in accordance with the ICANN Policy, ICANN Rules, Forum's Supplemental Rules and any rules and principles of law that the Panel deems applicable, without the benefit of a Response from Respondent.
Complainant requests that the Domain Name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.
A. Complainant
Complainant is a retail and online book seller. It has rights in the INKWOOD BOOKS mark through its registration of that mark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). The <inkwoodbooks.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar because it wholly incorporates Complainant’s registered mark, differing only by the addition of the “.com” generic top-level domain (“gTLD”).
Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name. Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name, Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use the INKWOOD BOOKS mark in any way, and Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Instead, Respondent uses the Domain Name to attract users to its website where it competes with and takes business away from Complainant.
Respondent registered and uses the Domain Name in bad faith. It is using the Domain Name for commercial gain to attract Internet users to its website by creating confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website by Complainant, and Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant’s rights in the INKWOOD BOOKS mark when it registered the Domain Name.
B. Respondent
Respondent did not submit a Response in this proceeding.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instructs this Panel to "decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires a complainant to prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order cancelling or transferring a domain name:
(1) the domain name registered by the respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(2) the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(3) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In view of Respondent's failure to submit a Response, pursuant to paragraphs 5(f), 14(a) and 15(a) of the Rules the Panel will decide this administrative proceeding on the basis of Complainant's undisputed representations and draw such inferences it considers appropriate pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of the Rules. The Panel is entitled to accept all reasonable allegations set forth in a complaint. Nevertheless, the Panel may deny relief where a complaint contains mere conclusory or unsubstantiated arguments. eGalaxy Multimedia Inc. v. ON HOLD By Owner Ready To Expire, FA 157287 (Forum June 26, 2003) (“Because Complainant did not produce clear evidence to support its subjective allegations [. . .] the Panel finds it appropriate to dismiss the Complaint”), WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 4.3 (“In cases involving wholly unsupported and conclusory allegations advanced by the complainant, . . . panels may find that—despite a respondent’s default—a complainant has failed to prove its case.”).
The Panel finds as follows with respect to the matters at issue in this proceeding:
Respondent’s <inkwoodbooks.com> Domain Name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s INKWOOD BOOKS mark because it wholly incorporates Complainant’s mark, merely adding the “.com” gTLD. This change does not distinguish the Domain Name from Complainant’s mark for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). Bittrex, Inc. v. HOUSNTA BENSLEM, FA 1760232 (Forum Jan. 3, 2018) (“[S]ince the disputed domain name differs from the trademark only by the addition of the gTLD “.cam” the Panel finds the domain name to be legally identical to the trademark.”). The WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 1.7, states that the test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the domain name.” Notwithstanding the changes described above, Complainant’s mark is clearly recognizable within the Domain Name.
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the INKWOOD BOOKS mark, in which Complainant has substantial and demonstrated rights.
If a complainant makes a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the domain name under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), the burden of production shifts to respondent to come forward with evidence that it has rights or legitimate interests in it. Neal & Massey Holdings Limited v. Gregory Ricks, FA 1549327 (Forum Apr. 12, 2014) (“Under Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii), Complainant must first make out a prima facie case showing that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in respect of an at-issue domain name and then the burden, in effect, shifts to Respondent to come forward with evidence of its rights or legitimate interests”). If a respondent fails to come forward with such evidence, the complainant’s prima facie evidence will be sufficient to establish that respondent lacks such rights or legitimate interests. If the respondent does come forward with such evidence, the Panel must assess the evidence in its entirety. At all times, the burden of proof remains on the complainant. WIPO Overview 3.0, at ¶ 2.1.
Policy ¶ 4(c) lists the following three nonexclusive circumstances, any one of which if proven can demonstrate a respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in a domain name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii):
(i) Before any notice to the respondent of the dispute, the respondent’s use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
(ii) The respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) has been commonly known by the domain name, even if the respondent has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) The respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent or commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Complainant asserts that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name because (i) Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name, (ii) Complainant has not authorized Respondent to use the INKWOOD BOOKS mark in any way, and (iii) Respondent is not using the Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use but instead uses it to attract users to its website where it competes with and takes business away from Complainant. These allegations are addressed as follows:
The information furnished to the Forum by the registrar lists “Vivek Sancheti” as the registrant of the Domain Name. This name bears no resemblance to the Domain Name. Evidence could, of course, in a given case demonstrate that the respondent is commonly known by a domain name different from the name in which it registered the domain name, e.g., the case of a domain name incorporating the brand name of a specific product offered by and associated with the respondent. In the absence of any such evidence, however, and in cases where no response has been filed, UDRP panels have consistently held that WHOIS evidence of a registrant name which does not correspond with the domain name is sufficient to prove that the respondent is not commonly known by the domain name. Amazon Technologies, Inc. v. Suzen Khan / Nancy Jain / Andrew Stanzy, FA 1741129 (Forum Aug. 16, 2017) (finding that respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain names when the identifying information provided by WHOIS was unrelated to the domain names or respondent’s use of the same), Alaska Air Group, Inc. and its subsidiary, Alaska Airlines v. Song Bin, FA1408001574905 (Forum Sept. 17, 2014) (holding that the respondent was not commonly known by the disputed domain name as demonstrated by the WHOIS information and based on the fact that the complainant had not licensed or authorized the respondent to use its ALASKA AIRLINES mark). The Panel is satisfied that Respondent has not been commonly known by the Domain Name for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii).
Complainant has never authorized or permitted Respondent to use its mark (Declaration of Julie Beddingfield, owner of Complainant, submitted as Complaint Exhibit 4). Complainant has specific competence to make this statement, and it is unchallenged by any evidence before the Panel. In the absence of evidence that a respondent is authorized to use a complainant’s mark in a domain name or that a respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name, the respondent may be presumed to lack rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Eshback, FA 830934 (Forum Dec. 7, 2006) (finding that the respondent failed to establish rights and legitimate interests in the <emitmortgage.com> domain name as the respondent was not authorized to register domain names featuring the complainant’s mark and failed to submit evidence that it is commonly known by the domain name), Indeed, Inc. v. Ankit Bhardwaj / Recruiter, FA 1739470 (Forum Aug. 3, 2017) (”Respondent lacks both rights and legitimate interests in respect of the at-issue domain name. Respondent is not authorized to use Complainant’s trademark in any capacity and, as discussed below, there are no C circumstances from which the Panel might find that Respondent has rights or interests in respect of the at-issue domain name.”).
Complaint Exhibit 6 is a screenshot of a page from the website resolving from the Domain Name. It is an Affiliate Disclosure statement that identifies Complainant as the sponsor of the site (even to the extent of including a copyright notice at the bottom naming Complainant as the holder of the copyright), states that it participates in an affiliate program with <amazon.com> that enables the site sponsor (falsely identified as Complainant) to be compensated a small amount with no increase in cost to the customer when the customer purchases a book from Amazon using one of the links appearing on the website. Respondent is thus using the Domain Name to pass off as Complainant, to operate a pay-per-click site, and to divert business away from Complainant. None of these uses qualifies as a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). Respondent’s pay-per-click scheme is not typical in that it does not display links to numerous other websites. According to the Complaint Exhibit 6 Affiliation Disclosure, Respondent’s links redirect only to <amazon.com> but this is no less of a pay-per-click arrangement than the typical ones displaying numerous links. Using a confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet traffic for pay-per-click revenues is neither a bona fide offering of goods or services within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii). McGuireWoods LLP v. Mykhailo Loginov / Loginov Enterprises d.o.o, FA1412001594837 (Forum Jan. 22, 2015) (“The Panel finds Respondent’s use of the disputed domain names to feature parked hyperlinks containing links in competition with Complainant’s legal services is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), and it is not a legitimate noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”), Vance Int’l, Inc. v. Abend, FA 970871 (Forum June 8, 2007) (concluding that the operation of a pay-per-click website at a confusingly similar domain name does not represent a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use, regardless of whether or not the links resolve to competing or unrelated websites or if the respondent is itself commercially profiting from the click-through fees), Materia, Inc. v. Michele Dinoia, FA1507001627209 (Forum Aug. 20, 2015) (“The Panel finds that Respondent is using a confusingly similar domain name to redirect users to a webpage with unrelated hyperlinks, that Respondent has no other rights to the domain name, and finds that Respondent is not making a bona fide offering or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use.”).
Likewise, passing off as a complainant is not a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate non-commercial or fair use. Ripple Labs Inc. v. Jessie McKoy / Ripple Reserve Fund, FA 1790949 (Forum July 9, 2018) (finding the respondent did not use the domain name to make a bona fide offering of goods or services per Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or for a legitimate noncommercial or fair use per Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii) where the website resolving from the disputed domain name featured the complainant’s mark and various photographs related to the complainant’s business), Nokia Corp. v. Eagle, FA 1125685 (Forum Feb. 7, 2008) (finding the respondent’s use of the disputed domain name to pass itself off as the complainant in order to advertise and sell unauthorized products of the complainant was not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i), or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii)).
Finally, using a confusingly similar domain name to divert Internet users away from legitimate websites of a complainant to competing sites also fails to qualify as a bona fide offering of goods or services or a legitimate noncommercial or fair use. Alcon, Inc. v. ARanked, FA 1306493 (Forum Mar. 18, 2010) (“The Panel finds that capitalizing on the well-known marks of Complainant by attracting internet users to its disputed domain names where Respondent sells competing products of Complainant is not a bona fide offering of goods or services pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(i) or a noncommercial or fair use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(iii).”).
The evidence furnished by Complainant establishes the required prima facie case. On that evidence, and in the absence of any evidence from Respondent, the Panel finds that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
Policy ¶ 4(b) sets forth a nonexclusive list of four circumstances, any one of which if proven would be evidence of bad faith use and registration of a domain name. They are as follows:
(i) circumstances indicating that the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant which is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, the respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the respondent’s web site or location or of a product of service on the respondent‘s web site or location.
The evidence of Respondent’s conduct discussed above in the rights or legitimate interests analysis also supports a finding of bad faith registration and use, based upon one or more of the foregoing grounds articulated in the Policy and upon additional grounds adopted by UDRP panels over the years. First, by using the Domain Name to pass off as Complainant and earn money by providing links to a competing vendor, Respondent is using the Domain Name to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its web site by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website by Complainant, as described in Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv). As described above, and as admitted by Respondent in the Complaint Exhibit 6 Affiliation Disclosure, Respondent here obtains commercial gain from its use of the Domain Name to generate pay-per-click revenues. This is manifest evidence of bad faith registration and use. AllianceBernstein LP v. Texas International Property Associates, Case No. D2008-1230 (WIPO, 2008) (“It is well-established that use of a domain name to redirect Internet users to websites of competing organizations constitutes bad faith registration and use under the Policy.”). Respondent’s use of the Domain Name is commercial also because <amazon.com> also benefits from the subsequent interest and purchases of those forwarded to that site from Respondent’s site. UDRP panels have held that there only needs to be commercial gain sought by some party for the use to be commercial. Focus Do It All Group v. Athanasios Sermbizis, Case No. D2000-0923 (WIPO,2000) (finding that “[I]t is enough that commercial gain is being sought for someone” for a use to be commercial).
As discussed above, Respondent is using the Domain Name to pass off as Complainant. This may not fit precisely within any of the circumstances described in Policy ¶ 4(b) but that paragraph recognizes that mischief can manifest in many different forms and takes an open-ended approach to bad faith, listing some examples without attempting to enumerate all its varieties. Worldcom Exchange, Inc. v. Wei.com, Inc., WIPO Case No. D-2004-0955 (January 5, 2005). The non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b) allows for consideration of additional factors in an analysis for bad faith, and passing off as a complainant, in and of itself, is evidence of bad faith. Bittrex, Inc. v. Wuxi Yilian LLC, FA 1760517 (Forum Dec. 27, 2017) (finding bad faith where “Respondent registered and uses the <lbittrex.com> domain name in bad faith by directing Internet users to a website that mimics Complainant’s own website in order to confuse users into believing that Respondent is Complainant or is otherwise affiliated or associated with Complainant.”).
Next, it is evident that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it acquired the Domain Name in December 2019. In or around 1999, one of Complainant’s affiliates established a website located at the Domain Name in order to sell its books online (Declaration of Julie Beddingfield submitted as Complaint Exhibit 4). In or around 2019, that affiliate closed its retail location in Tampa, Florida and the Domain Name was unintentionally abandoned. Respondent took advantage of that and registered the Domain Name. (Ibid., WHOIS report submitted as Complaint Exhibit 1 shows an update in the registration in December 2019). There is no question that Respondent had actual knowledge of Complainant and its mark when it acquired the Domain Name. In light of the non-exclusive nature of Policy ¶ 4(b), registering a confusingly similar domain name with actual knowledge of a complainant’s rights in a mark is evidence of bad faith registration and use for the purposes of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii). Univision Comm'cns Inc. v. Norte, FA 1000079 (Forum Aug. 16, 2007) (rejecting the respondent's contention that it did not register the disputed domain name in bad faith since the panel found that the respondent had knowledge of the complainant's rights in the UNIVISION mark when registering the disputed domain name).
Finally, UDRP panels have frequently held that registering and using a domain name after a complainant’s registration inadvertently lapses is evidence of bad faith. Sharper Innovations Inc. v. c/o Slimezone.com, FA 1103001376177 (Forum Apr. 8, 2011) (finding evidence of bad faith when respondent registered and used the disputed domain name after complainant’s domain registration inadvertently lapsed, InTest Corp. v. Servicepoint, FA 95291 (Forum Aug. 30, 2000) (“Where the domain name has been previously used by the Complainant, subsequent registration of the domain name by anyone else indicates bad faith, absent evidence to the contrary.”).
For the reasons set forth above, the Panel finds that Respondent registered and is using the Domain Name in bad faith within the meaning of Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).
Complainant having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be GRANTED.
Accordingly, it is Ordered that the <inkwoodbooks.com> Domain Name be TRANSFERRED from Respondent to Complainant.
Charles A. Kuechenmeister, Panelist
November 10, 2022
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